Žmogaus orumas: konstitucinės refleksijos

Abstract

The theoretical recognition of the priority for human rights and freedoms and their legal consolidation are the core of the constitutionalism of democratic states. It is clear that the system of human rights and freedoms is a particular entirety of standards of behavior among people. The doctrines of the constitutionalism of democratic states agree that the genesis of human rights and freedoms is treated as innate. Such a conception is meaningful due to several aspects. Firstly, it no longer provides any ground a priori to question the value of human rights and freedoms. Secondly, such a conception leaves much room for the discourse on the content of a specific right or freedom, and on the balance between rights and freedoms. When analyzing the catalogues of human rights and freedoms, the notion of human dignity is inevitably encoutered. Paradoxically, the term of human dignity, although forming a part of the content of many international legal acts and national constitutions, is not understood unambiguously. In some countries, such as Poland or Germany, human dignity is such a significant core of the constitutional jurisprudence that it itself determines the outcome of many cases. In other countries, such as Lithuania and Latvia, human dignity is mentioned in the constitutional jurisprudence, however, an assessment related to guaranteeing (failure to guarantee) human dignity is not the principal one, nor is it the only argument determining the outcome of a specific case. That being said, it is also necessary to note that the different intensity of the use of the term “human dignity” in the constitutional jurisprudence of different countries does not mean a different situation of human dignity in those states. Neither philosophy nor the legal jurisprudence defines the category of human dignity in an unambiguous manner. However, an important conclusion may be formulated that the ontological essence of human dignity, both in philosophical and legal aspects, is best disclosed through the relation between this term and the term of human rights and freedoms. In the discourse, on the basis of an empirical method, we have held that human dignity may not be violated without violating its specific right or freedom. In this sense, we find a methodological formula to treat the term “human dignity” as a certain synonym when we talk about specific human rights and freedoms or when we talk about them in general. By ensuring a specific right or freedom of the human being, the constitutional jurisprudence ensures their dignity as of the human being.