Žmogaus orumas ir teisė į orumą teisinio personalizmo požiūriu: nuo statiškojo prie tampančiojo orumo sampratos.
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The article critically analyse a conservative conception of passive or static dignity in accordance with which human’s dignity is a human’s value as one coming from the exterior (from the God or from a biological human’s nature) or one as existing per se. In opposition to it, a conception of active or created dignity is being developed, which strives to treat human’s dignity not like a human’s quality but like a social relationship, like person’s individual ability to live properly in the society (participate in barter relations on the ground of equivalence) and using this propriety, to create own individual social value (dignity) like a personal contribution towards maintenance of concord and collaboration in the society. Consequently, there are two levels of person’s social value: 1) general or passive one, which results from the right of any person to be acknowledged as a subject as such (it has been as human’s dignity so far); each person reaches this level of the value without any own efforts besides barter relations; it is common to all persons because it is coincident with state (social) acknowledgment of rights to life, health, freedom, person’s 61 inviolability for every and each person...and with state’s commitment to protect in case of their infringement; acknowledgement of the same rights for everybody presumes equal value of all persons. However, this value is just a mechanical generalisation of the above-mentioned rights and, consequently, a person receives nothing besides those rights, and it does not presuppose any new social-psychological reality, which may exist besides the above-mentioned goods and which could become a separate object of the right to dignity. Therefore, there is no reason to differentiate persons in accordance with their value. But if speaking about dignity we mean something more than the above-mentioned rights as a whole and to treat the right to dignity as a separate, independent right besides the right to life, health, freedom..., so this logic obliges us to associate dignity with person’s cultural activity (fulfilment of own obligations) and claim that general person’s value is not dignity itself as it is just a legal assumption of its emergence. 2) Individualised or active social value of a person, which is created by a person himself/herself for fulfilment of his/her obligations to family members, but only in such a case, which obligates other persons (the society) to feedback obligations. Fulfilment of obligations really proves that the person properly lives in the society and on this base he/she creates his/her individual social value. This person’s value is a new social, psychological reality created by the person himself/herself like a growth of person’s social utility (getting more social), which becomes a base for differentiating persons in accordance with their value (in terms of their suitability for living in the society). With such subdivision of own value, the person has the reason to require an official authorisation (right) from the society to appropriate this social reality, which has been created by himself/herself, and which he or she wants to refer as his/her own individual social value or, if speaking in short, as dignity (valuable self-raise) and to require the society to acknowledge this social reality created by himself/herself and to behave properly in terms of him/her. With fulfilment of own obligations, subdivision of own social value created by a person becomes an object of the right to dignity, while due to its usage, the relation between the person and the society is the right to dignity.
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