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dc.contributor.authorMikelėnas, Valentinas
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-17T08:40:49Z
dc.date.available2014-09-17T08:40:49Z
dc.identifier.urihttps://www3.mruni.eu/ojs/jurisprudence/article/view/1563/1502
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.mruni.eu/handle/007/11895
dc.description.abstractThe contemporary State power is concentrated in the hands of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, which is traditionally referred to as the principle of the division of State power. The separation of State power and the attribution of the function of the interpretation and application of statutory law to courts were like “letting the genie out of the bottle”. Having started with a mechanical application of the statutory law, the courts, armed with various doctrines on interpretation of law, have in the meantime started creating rules themselves and turned into rivals to the legislator. In addition to having started making the law, the courts have also begun exerting control over both the legislative (constitutional justice) and the executive (administrative justice) powers. The acknowledgement of the fact that by interpreting and applying the law, the court is simultaneously making it, gives rise to a host of questions, e.g.: if the court is the guardian of law, who is the guardian of the court? How to separate the interpretation of law from its creation? If the court acts as a lawmaker, then maybe in future, the court will turn into a sole lawmaker?, etc. The lawmaking function of courts in some countries is noticeable and aggressively active to such an extent that this starts causing serious concern about the courts having turned into the most dangerous branch of the State power. The activeness of courts is determined by a number of reasons. One of them is the increasing importance of law as an instrument of economic and social policy. The increased and still further increasing both the role of law and the complexity of legal problems demand the adequately modified – broader, deeper, containing the internal and external consistency and logics – legal argumentation. This, in its turn, facilitates the activeness of courts also in the area of interpretation of law and legal argumentation. The process of interpretation could be compared to a game, where, like in any other game, certain rules are determined. However, the existence of particular rules does not necessarily mean that those rules will be obeyed. If somebody is permitted to ignore the linguistic method of interpretation of law, which is comparatively clear and defined, then it is even more possible for them to ignore other methods of interpretation of law which are less clear and defined. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge that most of the principles of linterpretation of law are “mystical” issues, which tend to express desirability rather than reality. Consequently, interpreting the law on the basis of principles entails manipulating with irrealities, which open practically unlimited possibilities before the interpreter. Principles of law in the hands of an unscrupulous interpreter may result in unpredictable outcomes, which could have never been foreseen by any intelligent person. Thus, the principles of law, if handled irresponsibly,may create even greater vagueness and ambiguity in law. The fact that interpretation of law offered even by such a court whose judgement is final and not subject to appeal is not always unequivocally certain is also confirmed by the institute of dissenting opinion. Article 109, Part 3 of the Constitution states that judges obey only the law, though it is the judge himself who defines what law is and what it means. Thus, interpretation of law is a kind of interpretation game to mask lawmaking. How far the judge will go in interpreting law to a great extent depends on his conscience, qualification, and the tolerance of the other branches of power and the society.en
dc.language.isolten
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.titleInterpretacinis žaismas, arba kaip kurti teisę be parlamento.en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.description.abstract-ltStraipsnis parengtas pranešimo, skaityto mokslinėjė-praktinėje konferencijoje „Šiuolaikinės teisės aiškinimo problemos“, vykusioje 2009 m. kovo 12 d. Mykolo Romerio universitete, pagrindu. Jame analizuojama teismų vykdomos teisės aiškinimo ir teisės kūrimo funkcijų prigimtis, esmė bei raida. Siekiama bent trumpai paaiškinti teismų vykdomos teisės aiškinimo ir teisėkūros veiklos sąsajas, apibrėžti jų santykį, atriboti jas, atskleisti teismo diskrecijos ribų, teismo aktyvumo ir pasyvumo aiškinant ir kuriant teisę, interpretatoriaus neklystamumo problemas, turint tikslą paskatinti (aktualizuoti) diskusiją, ar yra teismo teisės kuriamosios funkcijos ribos. Kartu reiškiamas kritiškas požiūris į teisės aiškinimo taisyklių sureikšminimą, specialiai išskiriant teisės principų svarbą ir parodant, kad patys teisės aiškinimo kanonai savaime dar neužtikrina racionalių teisės aiškinimo ir kūrimo procesų.en
dc.identifier.alephSYS 000005358en
dc.publication.sourceJurisprudencija, 2009, Nr. 2(116)en
dc.subject.facultyKitasen
dc.subject.keywordTeisės aiškinimasen
dc.subject.keywordTeisės taikymasen
dc.subject.keywordTeisės principaien
dc.subject.keywordInterpretation of lawen
dc.subject.keywordApplication of lawen
dc.subject.keywordLegislationen
dc.subject.keywordPrinciples of lawen
dc.subject.publicationtypeS3en
dc.subject.sciencedirection01S - Teisėen


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