Vyriausybės įgaliojimų grąžinimo išrinkus Respublikos Prezidentą kontstitucinė doktrina: kai kurie argumentavimo aspektai.

Abstract

The article deals with the doctrine of the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic formulated in the Constitutional Court ruling of 10 January 1998. Attention is focused on the arguments of the Constitutional Court upon which this doctrine is based–these are the arguments regarding the expression of no-confidence in the Prime Minister and the new empowerment of the Government (after more than a half of the ministers are changed). In the opinion of the author, some of such arguments are subject to discussion. The constitutional regulation regarding the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic is inexhaustive and unclear. Although the wording of the provisions of the Constitution regarding the returning of the powers of the Government after the elections of the Seimas and after the elections of the President of the Republic is almost the same, there is one essential difference: the Constitution provides that after the elections of the Seimas the Government must return its powers to the President of the Republic and must resign, whereas the Constitution does not provide that the Government must resign after the elections of the President of the Republic as well. The fact that the Constitution does not provide that the Government must resign after elections of the President of the Republic allows to make several assumptions regarding the legal situation which occurs after the President of the Republic is elected. One of the assumptions may be as follows: even though the wording of some provisions that are entrenched in the Constitution and must be implemented after the elections of the Seimas is the same as the wording of the provisions that must be implemented after the elections of the President of the Republic, they may not be construed as leading to a conclusion that the Government must resign after the election of the President of the Republic as well. Thus, certain provisions that are entrenched in the Constitution and must be implemented after the President of the Republic is elected may not be construed by applying only the linguistic method of the construction of law. The content (implementation) of some provisions that are entrenched in the Constitution and must be implemented after the President of the Republic is elected has some peculiarities. Another assumption is the following: the Constitution also presumes such a legal situation, when the provisions entrenched in the Constitution regarding the formation of the Government after the President of the Republic is elected and the empowerment of the Government may be implemented only under certain conditions. [...]