Algis Mickunas

MODERN WEST:
TWO LIFE WORLDS

Monograph

Vilnius
2013
UDK 321.6/.8
Mi53

Reviewers:
Prof. John W. Murphy, Miami University, USA
Prof. Joseph J. Pilotta, Ohio State University, USA

Author:
Prof. Algis Mickunas (13,9 author’s sheets)

Publishing was approved by:
Institute of Humanities of Mykolas Romeris University (7th of November 2013, No. 10-72).
Committee of Continuation and Change of Values in Global Society Research Programme of Mykolas Romeris University (12th of November 2013, No. 1).
Department of Philosophy of Mykolas Romeris University (5th of November 2013, No. 1FLK-2).
Publication Review and Approval Commission of Mykolas Romeris University (27th of November 2013, No. 2L-3).

This research is funded by the European Social Fund under the Global Grant measure.
Global Grant measure is being managed using ESF funding, by implementation of a project „Paradigmatic changes in the thinking of contemporary society of Lithuanian and European area” No. VP1-3.1-SMM-07-K-03-025 “Support for scientific research by scientists and other researchers (Global Grant)” project No. VP1-5.1-FM-01-V-02-001. Project is being funded by European Social Fund (ESF) under the Human Resources Development Action Programme.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER I</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
<td>Research Method</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III</td>
<td>Birth of Modern Western Thought</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV</td>
<td>Institutions and Liberation</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V</td>
<td>Dialectics: Society and Individual</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI</td>
<td>Life in-between</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The first volume is designed to articulate methodological requirements relevant for the investigations of the context(s) that comprise the modern Western civilization and the way its diverse factors interrelate, leading to a predominance of one over others, their suppression and their efforts to reestablish their own mode of supremacy. The methodology establishes general rules of interpretation of “texts – cultures” and locates them in their own contexts. The major contribution of the methodology is the way it can show what texts belong together, which ones become incompatible and constitute if not contradictory positions, at least are deemed dangerous, disruptive of “normal order”, leading to the efforts to ban, prohibit and even destroy the texts that contest some predominant trend of interpretation of the states of affairs. The method is also designed to show in what ways a particular tradition (present in texts) becomes suppressed and how it survives by becoming a required part of the suppressing tradition. This will become obvious in subsequent chapters, where the confrontation, accommodation and suppression of Political Enlightenment by Scientific Enlightenment and conversely will become evident. It is essential to disclose the principles on which major controversies are based. Thus, the modern philosophical debate concerning freedom and equality led to the notion that one cannot be had without the other, and yet the development of the two enlightenments compelled a separation between freedom and equality. The result is two modern histories, each attempting to favor one or the other aspect of enlightenment, political or scientific, even while the former was in a position to extend the scientific more openly and creatively. Without a clear understanding of this philosophical debate, there would not be any basic conception as to the “conflict” between Soviet Union and the West, and by extension, we would fail to grasp the revolutions against the Soviet Union and the current states of affairs and the emergent paradigms in Lithuania. Obviously, Lithuanian efforts
to extricate from the suppression by an interpretation of scientific enlight-
enment of modern tradition, embodied in Marxism, also raises questions
concerning whether the paradigm of such a tradition has its own internal
flaws. This will be addressed with the analyses of Marxist-Leninist para-
digm and its unexplored ontological grounds of modern history.

There, the question will be discussed concerning the ways that scien-
tific enlightenment, in a form modified by the presumed “free market”,
continues in the present Lithuanian state, and how such a continuation is
framed by the presence of political enlightenment. Crucial issue arises with
respect to the ways Lithuanian state embodies political enlightenment and
what elements are missing. Moreover, the text must confront the issue and
controversy between “individualism” and “collectivism”, each demanding
to be the foundation of the other. What is necessary is the exposition of
the ontological grounds of this debate and the way a new paradigm must
resolve this confrontation. Indeed, the entire “dialectic” rests on this debate
and despite all efforts by such a dialectic, it failed: every step of these ef-
forts ran into a wall of ontological inconsistencies. There are no texts that
deal with this issue at its base, and hence the research, proposed in this vol-
ume, will have to set the tone for any debate about the place of Lithuania in
post-Soviet Europe. The new paradigm will appear with the limits of Soviet,
Marxist-Leninist way of thinking and offer a base for political engagement
of the public. Once the paradigm is established, it will become obvious what
changes must take place within various institutions, such as judicial, educa-
tional, journalistic, economic, to complete the transition from Soviet ways
of thinking to a more encompassing European ways.

The transition or, in terms of our project, the “paradigm shift” is mod-
ern Western conception, and its understanding requires a philosophical
context. In this sense, the discussion seeks to ground all concepts on the
analyses of basic issues and their prejudgments. Once disclosed, the latter
will become part of methodological means to make evident the tensions
between the suppressed and the suppressing theses and the way that the
tension is maintained despite the efforts of the suppressing tradition to
negate or explain away the suppressed. In this text, we shall not repeat the
close analyses of methodological hermeneutics – the latter was published
in previous work as part of another project; only the precise rules of inter-
pretation will be offered, while the rest of methodology will be “philosoph-
ical hermeneutics” supplemented by “transcendental” argumentation that is required to have an access both to methodological and philosophical hermeneutics. The latter offers the context of a tradition, with its prejudgments and equally the ways that a tradition must confront its own self critical analysis, and opens the door for such analyses at the transcendental level. It must be understood that the “transcendental” awareness includes a rational argumentation between diverse positions without becoming subject to any of them. It is a unique “in-between” position allowing the disclosure of contesting positions, their limits, differences and overlapping characteristics.

Since the project concerns Lithuania and its transition from one paradigm, the Soviet interpretation of Scientific Enlightenment to another, Western European efforts to maintain a balance between Political and Scientific Enlightenments, the text will use research materials from European scholars, appropriate for a given period and region under discussion. While there are North and South American discussions of the mentioned issues, they tend to follow the lead of European thinkers. In this sense, their texts are secondary sources and will not become predominant in this research. The introduction of other civilizations in the explication of hermeneutical methodology, such as India, is needed to show that the methodology will become relevant for further investigations into Lithuanian issues with globalization and its claim to universality. Here, we shall address a methodological requirement for comparative civilizations that cannot be derived from any civilization since such a derivation would become prejudicial in favor of its origin. No doubt, the transcendental argumentation accessing the limits, differences and intersections of civilizations will become a necessary requirement.

It is to be noted that the first volume is unfolding the way that Lithuania has joined Europe, but also became a part not only of Europe, but global in its own local self-interpretation. This is notable in the ways that Lithuania advertises itself by using not only global means – technologies – but by giving itself popular images of Lithuanian citizens as globally significant, such as sport stars, writers, artists, and even historical figures. This kind of local – global self-assertion will be disclosed at various levels in the second volume of this research. Regardless how we would wish to assert our Lithuanian uniqueness, premised on the greatness of the past, we are inescapably in a global context. While in previous researches it was pointed out how
Lithuanian self-identity could be expressed and even thrive in European context, in our continuous research the global and inter-civilizational logic must be addressed. After all, Lithuania is welcoming not only Europeans, but also Japanese, Chinese, Indians, both in commercial and cultural senses. This means that to welcome such global world, such diverse civilizations, we must understand what they are – apart from the superficial images paraded down city streets chanting “Hare Krishna”.
CHAPTER II

RESEARCH METHOD

Hermeneutics

One of the most prevailing methods in the study of history, as constituted by modern understanding of historical time, to be discussed shortly, and the various cultural and civilizational encounters, is offered by hermeneutics. The term “hermeneutics” was coined in the seventeenth century. It is one of the main theses that promises to demonstrate that “language” as a tradition is basic to all understanding. The philosophical lexicon by Rudolph Gocklenius, *Lexicon Philosophicum* (1613), contains an article on hermeneutics under the Greek term *hermeneia*. It shows the function of this term in medieval theology and jurisprudence and its technical uses. Its earlier forms appeared in Greek thought, inclusive of Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s *Laws*, there is a discussion of arts, one of which is interpretation; it attempts to illuminate the cryptic sayings of divinities without making any claim to truth. In Aristotle, one mode of speaking is interpretive. Subsequently, hermeneutics was developed into an auxiliary discipline of philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence, devising specific rules for the explication of texts. This development also included major crises of Western thought, specifically during various confrontations of distinct texts and traditions. There was a confrontation between Hellenic allegorical thought with the Judeo-Christian historical-prophetic orientation. It appeared in the efforts to transmit Greek education to the Latin world in order to overcome linguistic barriers. Hermeneutics appeared in the efforts to pass on Roman jurisprudence, Greek philosophy and Biblical texts to subsequent generations. Finally, the efforts were made by Schlegel and Schleiermacher to free hermeneutics from its auxiliary role and present it as a universal theory of understanding.
The general view that hermeneutics presents is that all explicit human thought, including philosophy, is founded on an implicit understanding. Such an understanding includes all divisions of human thought and activity, from philosophy through psychology, arts, sociology, religion, economy, to physical sciences to the extent that the latter assume human understanding and also the divisions of the world into specific domains implicit in this understanding. This means that the understanding contains implicit prejudgments as divisions of various domains that sciences and humanities take for granted. Such an understanding is much broader than any area of sciences and humanities. Moreover, it must deal with other domains, such as architecture, since they too are aspects of human world and have an architectural and social meaning. Indeed, it has been suggested that architecture is a concrete embodiment of a given social “spatial” system. The arrangements of human life into socially assigned roles are evident in the places and hierarchies that humans occupy in their architectural arrangements. Hence, the understanding of architecture requires the prejudgments of social divisions of a given population. The exposition of the various prejudgments is the task of hermeneutics.

At the level of prejudgments, various writers divide hermeneutics into specific philosophical domains. Thomas Seebohm, for example, claims that hermeneutics can be divided into four basic concerns: first is the methodological concern for interpreting texts. As we shall see, this concern is very important because the understanding of a given text is a complex process of deciphering layers of meaning. Second is the conception of a general theory of understanding. Can understanding be universal and include all traditions, or is it bound to a specific tradition and its prejudgments? Is the meaning of “understanding” as interpretation limited to theoretical concerns of the Western philosophy and its various divisions into sciences, humanities, and their subdivisions, or can it cover prejudgments of other traditions? The reason for these concerns appears in the studies of other traditions. For example, Indian tradition might have prejudgments, wherein the division into sciences and humanities is not a given; that tradition might divide the world into cosmic eroticism and practical action in terms of powers and the search for ultimate dissolution of the individual. Hence, the term “understanding” might be “particular universal” stemming from the Western tradition. Third is the meaning
“philosophical hermeneutics” as fundamental ontology, answering the question concerning the meaning of being in distinction to the varieties of beings that are in the world, which are the most fundamental. It is claimed that the entire Western thought is premised on this distinction between being and things. Subsequently, we shall suggest arguments why and how such a distinction arose and why it is significant. Fourth addresses the question of interpretation of symbols that attempt to “read” the domains of the latent and the unconscious. Here, one could have psychoanalysis, both Freudian and Jungian, and various types of mythological and mystical pronouncements. As a fifth, we could include historical hermeneutics. This type is concerned with temporal development of some text that contains problems and their continuous resolutions. The resolutions may open entirely different conceptions that were not available in the original text. An example of this type would be the development of a particular science, such as geometry from Euclidean to Non-Euclidean. The latter opens up the conception of space that is very different from the Euclidean. It is claimed, nonetheless, that a full understanding of Non-Euclidean geometry requires a historical study of Euclidean type and the non-necessity of some of its postulates. We shall discuss these hermeneutical types and issues in greater detail, since philosophical hermeneutics will be most significant as methodology for the understanding of the shift in paradigm in Lithuania.

Before entering the philosophical debates that establish contexts for understanding basic principles and prejudgments, explicated by “philosophical hermeneutics”, we need to be reminded of the contributions of methodological hermeneutics. In this text, there is no need to offer a detailed exposition of such hermeneutics, since this exposition is present in sufficient detail in my previous text entitled Civilizations, Cultures, Lifeworlds (Vilnius: Mykolas Romeris University, 2012), only a brief reminder of the rules of “suppression” and “renaissances” will be included in this chapter. Methodical hermeneutics, wherein every text, social system, or political structure must be understood from its own context and the part must be understood through the whole, while the whole must be understood through the parts, is the well accepted procedure. This rule is articulated into four different whole-part relationships and can be ordered hierarchically. The first whole, of which the text and parts of the text is a part, is the language in which the text is
written (deconstructive hermeneutics belongs here). The second whole, to which the text and parts of the text belong, is the historical context of the text. We have to understand the events, to which the text refers, other texts, their terminologies, etc., in the framework of this context. The third whole is the totality of the works written by an author, for example, Marx the _oeuvre_, in its temporal and historical unfolding. This whole is represented first by a style (the specific use of language, pertaining to an individual or a “school” of individuals), and changes in the style in the texts belonging to the same author or school, such as Marxism-Leninism. Fourth, is the whole as the text itself, and the parts are the parts of the text. The first level is called the “grammatical level”, the second is the “historical level”, the third is the “individual level” and the fourth is called the “generic level”.

Yet we know that some texts and traditions end in various ways. Some of the ways, relevant for our research, will be offered in terms of methodological rules. The reason for the question as to the end of a text or a tradition is the common situation, wherein tribes, nations, or vast movements attempt to suppress a tradition that is being either conquered or regarded as wrong, immoral, false, and hence to be suppressed. This is most relevant for our task: we must show what were the tradition and the texts, which were imposed upon Lithuania and the entire Soviet Union, which suppressed the traditions of Lithuania (and others), and whether the suppression was inadequate on its own grounds. This is the reason why methodological hermeneutics will require philosophical hermeneutics as a completion for the understanding of the paradigmatic shift, initiated by Lithuanian declaration of independence. Hence, let us summarize the methodological rules of suppression and liberation. We can state at the outset that in rare occasions, a tradition might end of its own neglect.

1. A tradition ends, in the simplest sense, with the last person who refers to the text, or in the present, in which the question is raised. Any other position, which in any way refers to the text, such as reading someone else’s work about it stands, at the present, in the tradition of the text. If this is the case, then there will never be a “true” or final interpretation, unless all references to the text cease. Speaking more concretely, some of the traditional texts tend to fade out, cease to function as “significant” in a given context, and thus the only preservation that is accorded to them is done by philological method. The latter can
be a catalyst for various renaissances of texts – a sort of archaization movements that proclaim genuine truths of the past that have been forgotten and neglected. New agisms have this tendency, yet such tendencies are always destructive – as one modification of methodological hermeneutic – to the extent that the “dead languages”, although preserved by philological method in archival depositories, are framed in the current living languages and hence are taken out of their own contexts. They are a species that have vanished, and reappear only in a dramatically reconstructed genetic pool. For example, after the Renaissance, Scientific and Political Enlightenments, and Reformation, medieval literature virtually vanished. What we have as “Neoscholasticism” is a concoction of parts into a whole that belongs to modern reading. This suggests the first rule of methodological hermeneutics: a suppressed tradition fades out and its revival means the death of its unity, since it will be framed by a context alien to it. In brief, the means for its survival will be borrowed.

2. There is a death of a tradition by violence: one culture conquers another and suppresses it completely, specifically if the conquering culture has a monopoly of text production. In the context of our research, autocratic rulers, a variant of which was Soviet Union, had a monopoly on the production of all texts and media, extended through an entire pedagogical system and its prescribed texts that gave a hermeneutical reading from childhood through higher education, is a major mode of suppression of all other traditions. Any deviant understanding was “underground”, depicted as subversive, immoral and false. Media and pedagogy are simple propaganda that changes the history of the suppressed tradition in favor of the oppressor. All that was Lithuanian history received negative shading and became something to be avoided. Here, we find a second rule: a complete and irrevocable suppression, attempting to leave no traces of the suppressed, presupposes that the oppressing tradition has a total control of producing and preserving of texts, including the reproducing of selected texts from the past as confirmation of the veracity of the suppressing tradition.

3. A more complex case, where the other retains power in very fascinating ways, is present in the confrontation of cultures that possess literary traditions, or a culture with two powerful literary traditions. One
main example, relevant for our topic, is present in modern Western world. The Scientific Enlightenment formed a novel interpretation of “reality” and relied on eminent texts, such as those of Galileo, Newton, Bacon, Hobbes, and their followers, and tended to submit all events, including human activities, within its scientific circle. In principle, all other texts were at best subjective or at worst, false, to be relegated to fiction. Yet, there was another aspect of modern tradition, the Political Enlightenment with its eminent texts, ranging from Rousseau through Locke to Kant, with its dominating terminology of equality, rights, autonomy and responsibility. Suppression of this literature included Marxism as a social, economic and materialistic theory, fascism, as a racial theory, and both demanding the suppression of the hermeneutical circle of the Political Enlightenment. Both mentioned movements followed an older Mid-Eastern tradition of autocratic Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and not only banned the “false” texts, but burned libraries, books, and the producers of books. Thus, in the twentieth century, the Russian Revolution engaged in the destruction of texts as well as the writers of them; Nazis did the same, and Chinese Cultural Revolution repeated this autocratic tradition. In this sense, the twentieth century has seen some of the most archaic methods to deal with literary traditions that are regarded as condemnable. Yet the suppressed tradition had to be incorporated as a background, which remained a critical aspect for the excuses of the oppressors. In this context, it is possible to decipher a third rule of methodological hermeneutics: if a conquering and thus oppressing literary tradition suppresses another strong tradition, then it is forced to incorporate the conquered tradition and use it against the latter. Yet, the very use can turn against the conquering tradition and thus create a crisis. The analysis of this crisis will be given in the paradigm of Soviet Union and the way it was challenged from its own incompleteness. Such incompleteness will become obvious when we articulate the basic methodological morphology with philosophical hermeneutics. It is important to note that the oppressing tradition of the Scientific Enlightenment, exemplified by Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism, is infallible, and cannot tolerate opposition to itself. Meanwhile, the tradition of the Political Enlightenment could tolerate contradic-
tions, and was under no obligation to avoid them; indeed, to produce contradictions belongs to the structure of this literature. Thus, any authority could be abandoned in favor of open debate concerning any subject matter, and it was abandoned.

Since our researches will include comparative civilizations, it is worth noting that there is another tradition, that of India, which adds a variant of the third rule of methodological hermeneutics. It offers a clear indication of a confrontation between “texts” within one tradition. This confrontation is equivalent to modern West containing a tension between two hermeneutical “circles” and the way such circles have struggled for supremacy that included Soviet Union and the “unruly Republics” questing for “radical” change. No doubt, the tradition of India includes the similarities with modern West, but it also contains its own uniqueness. It has two fully developed hermeneutical circles in its literatures, and hence two theories. We recall that tradition is basically a theory. What is radical about this tradition is its demonstration that the presumably oppressed literature is found to be an inextricable and integral part of the oppressing tradition.

For the task facing the shift in paradigms – from the Soviet to the Western – requires an in depth researches in the Western and, specifically, modern Western philosophical thinking that provides a context, within which the tensions, the suppressions, the prejudgments that comprise principles, ambiguity and aims of which allow for temporary antagonisms and even armed confrontations and partial reconciliations. Having established the ways that the traditions can oppress one another, and how within one tradition there might be two contesting interpretations, we are in a position to ask more fundamental questions, leading to philosophical hermeneutics in order to understand modern West and its construction of texts that formed a basic prejudgment, which also formed two modern histories, competing for supremacy. Lithuania was subjected to one of the histories that oppressed another and thus the very oppression turned out to be pervaded by the oppressed tradition that finally emerged and became a predominant force. Here, we shall encounter a question, whether the oppressing tradition, which went under the guise of the Scientific Enlightenment, proposing to construct a society deemed to be “scientific socialism” is still continuing in Lithuania, and if so, under what interpretation, and if the new paradigm that emerged in the philosophical framework as the Po-
ITICAL ENLIGHTENMENT IS CAPABLE OF SUPPRESSING AT LEAST THE EXTREMES OF THE SCIENTIFIC ENLIGHTENMENT AND ITS VARIANTS, SUCH AS SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, MARKET SUPREMACY, SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND EVEN BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN LIFE.

THE METHODOLOGICAL TASK FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMATIC CONCERNING WESTERN TRADITION AND THE WAY IT APPEARED IN MODERN ERA IS ONE OF PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS THAT ASKS THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF BEING. THE REASON THAT THIS TYPE OF HERMENEUTICS BECOMES SIGNIFICANT RESTS ON THE AWARENESS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THINGS, EVENTS, STATES OF AFFAIRS, ALL SORTS OF OBJECTIVITIES AND SUBJECTIVITIES, IN SHORT BEINGS AND BEING. BEING MUST BE EXPLICATED IN ITS OWN RIGHT, APART FROM EXPLANATIONS OF THE TOTALITY OF THINGS, EVENTS, MYTHOLOGICAL FIGURES, CONCEPTS AND EVEN SOCIAL SYSTEMS. WHILE THE DIFFERENCE HAS BEEN NOTED SINCE THE ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT, BEGINNING MOST LIKELY WITH PARMENIDES, ITS CURRENT HERMENEUTICAL INTEREST WAS INFLUENCED BY MARTIN HEIDEGGER. LET US LOOK AT THE WAY, IN WHICH THIS DIFFERENCE HAS ARISEN, AND WHAT SORTS OF PROBLEMS IT PRESENTS. IN WESTERN TRADITION, IT IS COMMON TO INQUIRE ABOUT THINGS, OBJECTS AND EVENTS IN ORDER TO DISCOVER “WHAT” THEY ARE, THEIR ESSENTIAL NATURE OR STRUCTURE. IT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT WHEN WE ASK “WHAT IS A HUMAN” OR “WHAT IS MATTER” OR “WHAT IS A MIND”, WE CAN GIVE DEFINITIONS THAT CAPTURE SOME ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE BEINGS. THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS, NEVERTHELESS, NOTICED A SPECIFIC AND SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM: LANGUAGE INDICATES THAT WHenever WE ATTEMPT TO DEFINE ANY BEING, WE NOT ONLY ATTEMPT TO DISCOVER ITS BASIC CHARACTERISTICS, BUT WE ALSO SAY THAT SUCH A BEING IS. APART FROM HAVING SOME ESSENTIAL FEATURES, EVERY BEING SOMEHOW PARTICIPATES IN BEING. IN TURN, THE LATTER IS DIFFERENT FROM ANY PARTICULAR BEING AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS.

GIVEN THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS, THE ANCIENT GREEKS TOOK ON THE TASK OF DEVISING THE WAYS TO UNDERSTAND THIS BEING THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM ALL OTHER BEINGS. YET, ACCORDING TO HEIDEGGER, THEY MADE A FATAL MISTAKE: THEY ASKED THE SAME QUESTION THAT THEY USED TO INTERPRET ALL BEINGS: WHAT IS BEING. THE POINT IS THIS: IF BEING IS DIFFERENT FROM ALL BEINGS, THEN IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO ASK THE SAME QUESTION OF BEING THAT WE ASK OF BEINGS. AND YET, SINCE THE SAME QUESTION WAS ASKED, THEN BEING WAS INTERPRETED IN TERMS OF WHAT AND HENCE THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEINGS AND BEING WAS LOST. BEING BECAME ONE OF THE BEINGS, EVEN IF IT WAS DESIGNATED AS THE “HIGHEST” BE-
ing. Because of the interpretation of everything, including being in terms of “what something is”, the difference was forgotten and the question of being was neglected. Asking “what something is” is equivalent to asking what constitutes the essence of something. This silent and unquestioned “essentialism” is a prejudgment that philosophical hermeneutics discloses, with a full understanding that a disclosure does not eliminate a prejudgment. Questioning a prejudgment and asking “what it is” assumes that the question is in the context of the prejudgment.

Yet, what are the options to ask the question of being without interpreting it in terms of the “what” of beings? First, we can notice one specific option in human knowledge: either we know the essence of beings eternally, or we know such beings temporally. If we accept the first option, then our search for knowledge would end as soon as we have propositions purporting to give an essential truth of any being once and for all. But according to historical hermeneutics, no one, so far, has given us such a truth. This is evident from history: many truths were offered and none of them survived critical debates. Hence, the second option can be taken as more plausible: the essence of any being is temporal and hence our knowledge is open to a range of possibilities. This means that if we speak about a specific being and want to know what it is, we are also in a position to open the future possibilities of what else can this being be. In this sense, we can speak of being as an open horizon of future possibilities. What is significant in this conception of the relationship of beings and being is the inclusion of ourselves as beings, who are not definable essentially, but are open to the possibilities of our future being. We too are temporal and temporary. The implications of this interpretation are important. First, all our future possibilities are temporal, and we cannot escape our own temporal being. This means that the closest possibility that we must accept is our own non-being – death. Second, the possibility of death also implies that our knowledge of all the future possibilities of being is also limited. In this sense, we cannot claim to have understood all the options of our future and the possibilities of all beings. Third, in face of this situation, we cannot postpone our current commitments, since tomorrow might not come. The possibility of our non-being demands that we live fully at the present. This will become an important aspect for understanding one of the catalysts that initiated the transformation of the Soviet Union.
Given the suggested problems, it is necessary to test the cultural prejudgment that all awareness is structured by language and its traditions, some of which have been called “historical”. This is to say, we must resolve a fundamental philosophical issue of awareness and language, of transcendental subjectivity and philosophical hermeneutics with its emphasis on a historical tradition and its language, specifically, the prejudgments that are at the base of all judgments, including the assumption of “What something is”. Since the basic claim of language based theories purports that all awareness is linguistically shaped, and all experienced phenomena are linguistically interpreted, then assuming the validity of the priority of language, the transcendental problematic seems to be surpassed, since there is no need of a subject, awareness of which must correlate to the phenomena of the world. We find meaning as a prejudgment imbedded in language. Resultantly, what is known as “essence” depends on a given language of a tradition, a language that privileges the requirement to define all things in the presumed “what something is”. If such a prejudgment is made obvious, then there is no ontological basis for “essences”, apart from the notion of philosophical hermeneutics that is founded upon a Greek classical tradition, lasting through the entire history across all sorts of variants. After all, in most distinct disciplines, diverse philosophical schools, we still ask the same question: what is matter, what is evidence, what is mind, what is life, spirit, soul, what is an idea, what is a number. It seems then that the matter is settled and that any position that opposes philosophical hermeneutic will be based on the same prejudgment. This is to say, there is no longer any requirement for the last vestiges of modern metaphysics located within the sphere of transcendental subjectivity that supposedly accounts for meaning. Whether this is a solution or a mere postponement and a relocating of the question of meaning will be seen in the development of the problematic of interpretation: does language or culture frame the fundamental interpretation of all events, or does a subject who can and must transcend the limitations of language and culture is the final arbiter of sense? For our research, this issue means that texts define us and different texts might disagree, leading to a confrontation of two textual traditions, such as modern Western difference between the Political and Scientific Enlightenments.
Reflective Method and History

Counter to the claims that all sense inheres in language or culture is the transcendental argument that purports to show that all awareness, even the linguistically and culturally laden positions, are premised on a final moment of reflection, presence of which cannot be denied without the denying thesis becoming nonsensical. The arguments that demonstrate the requirement of such subjectivity are offered by an analysis of language as it is given purely on empirical grounds. It is noted that a variety of empirical marks or sounds can have one meaning, leading to the notion that the meaning is not in the marks or sounds but comes with the meaning provided by the subject. In turn, there is no way, by learning a language, that one can discover in it a “history” and a tradition. Daily discourses do not point to anything else apart from the things that we talk about, i.e. intend as our objects of interest. To speak at present and suggest that the words we use and the propositions we form depends on the historical tradition is to introduce time awareness that in no wise is implied in the present speaking. An access to traditional history or historical tradition is not identical with such a tradition. If this holds, then it could be said that any thesis, any position is, in the final analysis, transcendental. This appears in a tacit introduction of awareness into every position, theory, or method. For example, if one states that it is possible to look at mathematics as at any other subject matter, one will also recognize that looking at... as intentionality does not look like the subject matter that is being intended, in this case – numbers. Yet, how easily the sense of looking or awareness can be modified in cases, when one states: let us look at things mathematically. This suggests that mathematics becomes a mode of perception that is very distinct from the things or subject matters that this mode intends.

Other modes of such awareness are just as available: we can look at things theoretically, practically, theologically, aesthetically and realize that such modes are not at all subjective in the sense of mental or psychological states. In this way, we can also say let us look at language, whereby the looking or awareness of language is not part of language, or we can say let us look at the world culturally or linguistically, and hence make a transcendental claim that all awareness is linguistic or cultural. Any discussion of language, any comparison of languages will be done either from an-
other language, and the latter from another one, ad infinitum, or any language can be present to awareness that can decipher the meaning of terms, phrases, comparisons to other languages, and thus provide an access for anyone at the level of awareness. In brief, at this level of awareness, the interpreter of languages is not a language. In this part, we will explicate this interpreter both as historical-linguistic and cultural, and to what extent it is adequate to deal with the question of the very giveness of a tradition, language, or culture. The way to disclose such interpreter is to engage first in the problematic of historical-linguistic and cultural phenomena and to note whether they can offer a universal account, and second, to disclose the transcendental awareness that might provide provisional indications of individual identity. For philosophical hermeneutics, it is inescapable that the subject is unavoidably present in a tacit, but essential way. If we take the basic rule of reading of philosophical texts (and any other texts) and claim that they all obey the philosophical rule such that any part of a given text – no matter how vast it might be – is determined by the whole text, and that the whole text is determined by its parts, then such a claim makes the text as a whole into an object of investigation, while the investigator is the subject who does not become part of the text or the whole text.

It has been shown that for modern Western philosophical thought there is no direct and demonstrable connection between explanatory structures and the domain of life world experience of things. The experienced phenomena are external to theories and the conjunction between them has no necessity. The conjunction requires a conjoiner, understanding of which must be broader than the theory and its selected perceptual aspects. The conjoiner is a reflecting process that performs the task from a vantage point of interest, whether the latter is culturally prejudged, linguistically prescribed or part of a historical tradition. In this sense, an application of a theory does not yield pure objective perceptual phenomena, but one that is interpreted by the theoretical requirements and finally by some contextual interest. The latter is usually understood in cultural, historical or linguistic terms. Thus, modern sciences, in their “empirical” mode, are not concerned with perceptual things, but with quantifiable magnitudes. Hence, the mathematically framed theory determines what sort of objectivity is “real.” The scientist, whose awareness is constituted by “let us look at everything mathematically,” conjoins this “look” with the things of the
world by excluding all perceptual – qualitative – indeed essential aspects of any “matter of fact.” The very possibility of conjunction between theory and fact is from an interest that is negative – exclusion of all experienced phenomena. This is significant for our methodological considerations in that the Soviet, Marxist-Leninist paradigm was not engaged with any reality, but with the imposition of this paradigm on a given life world and thus defining and remaking the latter in accordance with the requirements of such paradigm. What was available in that life world was suppressed, as were excluded the “essential” aspects of humanity. The paradigm was not just a theory, but also a methodology that was imposed from the vantage point of power of the ruling elites. This means that the claim to “objective” analysis of a situation was premised on the power interests of a group, which excluded itself from the very paradigm that it imposed on an entire society. This suggests that the paradigm did not reflect any facts, but was conjoined to the facts from a point of interest that was excluded from facts and the paradigm.

Let us look at the issue critically and point out that the scientist, or the philosophizing subject, or the ruling elite as cultural and historical, are also figures in the domain of investigation. By the principles of philosophical hermeneutics (varied in terms of theoretical theses, such as Marxism-Leninism), all events are also present in the series of explication of any matter of fact. Thus, the philosopher, the theoretician, if he/she is a part of culture, or his/her own history, cannot claim to obtain the given phenomena of his/her life world without interpreting them in terms of his cultural, linguistic, historical understanding. In addition, the very philosophical or theoretical explanation that assumes a novel historical or cultural position will itself transform the subject matter of such explanation. While being shaped by historical and cultural prejudgments, the explanations offered, will also change a given life world. In turn, if a theory is part of language and history, with their prejudgments, and is shaped by them, then no theory is sufficiently broad to encompass and offer neither a final nor an impartial interpretation – it comprises only one aspect of a historical tradition. Thus, if positivism were to offer two contesting meta-languages, each claiming to account for all the usages of a given language, then the debate between them would involve a language that is broader than either metalanguage. Indeed, this can also be said of historical-philosophical herme-
neutics that posits a historical tradition with its linguistic prejudgments as an unsurpassable ground of all understanding of things and being itself: it too is a historically contingent position that may belong to a specific historical period of a specific tradition and hence cannot offer a universal claim. Another context, of the same tradition, might not have a historicizing language and hence no such understanding, not to speak of entirely different traditions. This also holds true for the paradigm constructed by Marxism-Leninism, specifically with the claim that all theories depend on a given historical context of material conditions of production. In this sense, it cannot claim universal validity, since the proposed theory would escape the parameters of historical-material conditions. While claiming universal validity, Marxism-Leninism is one aspect of one tradition and cannot become universal, specifically in areas, such as economy, social life world, aesthetics, culture, language, since all of these areas belong to human creation and not physical world.

Historical reason encounters broader issues. Assuming that there is a continuous historical process, having a future aim as its final purpose that is posited as a necessary condition for necessary connections between temporal events, such assumption results in a positing of historical rules, be they dialectics of Hegelian or Marxian brands, or some presumed evolution. In brief, future final purpose is posited as a condition for the invention of necessary rules of historical development. It is significant that the final purpose is in and part of history and hence one aspect of history and thus defies the very notion of a final purpose. Obviously, one historical event cannot be the aim of the whole. After this “final event” is reached, history does not cease and thus abolishes such an event as final. This outcome forces the thinkers of historical reason to posit a transcendent historical aim above or beyond history. Such transcendence cannot be historical and properly must be designated to be eternal. The results of this transcendent view are as follows: first, the best that can be obtained from it is a changeless dialectical structure or system and hence in principle static, yielding no historical development; second, transcendent, infinite being is unknowable by contingent historical actors (well noted by Kierkegaard) and thus cannot be a source of claims as to whither of human destiny; third, infinity has no temporal orientation and would not be an index of a purposive direction of history; fourth, historical consciousness cannot es-
cape self-destruction in terms of its claim to be universal and all inclusive, because, one, if all consciousness is historical (expressed pedagogically as an accumulation of knowledge) and must be historically contextualized, then such a conscious claim, in terms of historical hermeneutics, is equally historical and must be understood within its historical context; and two, the very ontology, which gave rise to the conception of mechanical world, is equally historical. Hence, if the mechanical universe were to be reinterpreted as one having open meaning, i.e. signitive, then historical consciousness would cease to be relevant. These aspects place the current historical consciousness at a complete loss and a crisis. No doubt, the wrestling with this crisis led numerous philosophical and scientific efforts into all sorts of metaphysical postulates of infinity, and cosmic order, all attempting to find some permanent component, even an eternal recurrence, as a saving grace. Theories are proposed and discarded like spring fashions, continuously disclosing our confusion.

And the confusion is methodological; after a brief critique of philosophical hermeneutics and its attendant historical ground, it is essential to offer complex arguments to indicate what must be added methodologically to make certain that an access to the paradigms and their transformations would come into focus. Moreover, it is necessary to discover methodological requirements without falling into the predicament of separating theory from the world, without the irrational proposal to apply theory on the world in order to transform the latter, and without becoming stuck in the philosophical hermeneutical circle. These options are the principle hindrances that inhere in the very composition of the paradigm of the Soviet experiment and in turn fail to take into account the required “non-position” of the researcher. No doubt, it is necessary to understand that the initiating ground of modernity, postulating a self as an ego-logical point, whose primary activity is reflection upon itself, upon its own thinking and upon its own powers, as guarantees of the validity of all claims and the possibility of their realization, is inadequate. It was required that all events justify themselves in the court of standards and rules established by a subject reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears to the subject, whether it is a physical thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or even a feeling, cannot be taken as it is in its own right, but must first justify itself before this subject. Hegel ended the modern tradition by demonstrating its ultimate
principle: *no longer thinking and being are the same, but reflecting thinking and being are the same.* It will not do to argue that various philosophical trends of the last century posited various explanations, even of the ego-logical subject, in terms of social, material, economic or biological conditions and numerous other claims. Yet, all of them posit their methods and theories derived from and adjudicated by reflection. Despite this inevitable ground, it is possible to disclose some aspects, which do not allow such reflection to be the final ground, specifically in the context of the modern construct of history and its variants discussed above. This means that a “subject”, who is impartial to all positions, will be required as a methodological “non-position”.

It was noted that the positing of a purposeless, mechanistic nature is the catalyst for modern historical consciousness. But this suggests that such consciousness does not primarily reflect upon itself, but first from the material world to itself as excluded from such a world. The unfolding of reflection from something other than oneself comprises an opening to an awareness, which traces first requirement to understand history. While discussing hermeneutics, it was noted that hermeneutics arose as a basic trend of humanities in distinction to the scientific or mechanistic explanation of nature. At the very outset, hermeneutics obtains its own position by reflecting from the position of mechanical sciences and claims that such sciences are based on a philosophical prejudgment. Yet, when hermeneutical understanding deals with scientific explanation and contrasts the latter with a broader linguistic process, within which explanation is understandable, it assumes a comparative position, which belongs neither to hermeneutics nor to scientific explanation. Although hermeneutics assumed that the linguistically transmitted historically effective consciousness is the final mediation of all awareness, in showing this final mediation as distinct from scientific claims, it must grant an inter-reflective awareness between hermeneutics and science and be able to see the limits of each, even if one or the other claims to encompass everything. Such an “interim” is a condition for hermeneutical understanding of itself as historical and for the scientific awareness as explanatory. Moreover, hermeneutical understanding with its linguistic primacy, in which flux we live, have no signs disclosing that they are transmissions of a historical tradition. They become historical when they are mediated by inter-reflection, which designates them as historical
and, in addition, as temporally contingent. What is also to be noticed is the return of both, hermeneutics and explanatory sciences, to the rational world: the inter-reflection constitutes them both as something, a what, and as essentially different one from the other, and thus return to the same philosophical hermeneutics with its prejudgment. Yet, the appearance of this inter-reflexivity is both linguistic and yet transgresses the given parameters of language; thus, it is both language and explanation, and also..., or it is neither one nor the other, but is aware of both.

The inter-reflexivity is a methodological requirement and can be disclosed in various ways, using for this task what is already understood: thus, hermeneutically understood language is the ultimate mediation of all experience and nature. By itself, this claim cannot be maintained, because (1) direct living in language does not reveal language but the world; language functions anonymously and exhausts itself in opening the world in specific ways. In this sense, to speak of language as the medium for the manifestation of nature and even history is to implicitly disclose an inter-reflexivity between language and nature, to recognize both for their difference, and hence to be neither one nor the other; (2) to say that the historically effective consciousness has horizons that are more extensive than our individual horizons and at the same time to show how they are related and converge is to live between them in order to show their difference and fusion. Hence, this in between domain is a lived awareness that resists being reduced to either/or mental exclusion and opens neither/nor and yes/but/more. It is the most concrete awareness, mediation of which cannot be accomplished by any other positional mode. It is significant that it cannot be located as an ego, psyche, or even magic, because any structuring would reveal this awareness as already in play. It is equally significant to note that its appearance is not caused by any historical or explanatory hypotheses; it appears as if it were spontaneous, unintentional, and thus having no intentional orientation.

The next question arises with respect to the composition of this “interim awareness”. Can it be rational, i.e. philosophical and hence capable of offering arguments for the selection of methodology, or is it some amorphous presence, composition of which might depend on specific historical period and its context of interpretation? There is no doubt that for philosophical hermeneutics reason is subordinate to the force of interpretation that immerses reason itself in a hermeneutical circle from which no sub-
ject can escape, and indeed wherein the subject itself is defined. Of course, our initial discussion of methodological hermeneutics is viable as an aid to overcome the positivistic inertia of the scientific logic and its historically unreflected linguistic foundations. In this sense, the significance of methodical hermeneutics is its ability to elevate understanding from its pre-scientific experience to its reflective articulation. If we are to abolish our naive relationship with the historical content of theories, we must devise a method of interpreting this content in terms of its categorical frameworks. Such a method is hermeneutical in principle, but it will avoid the pitfalls of philosophical hermeneutics. It can be said that the latter contains an “irrational” moment insofar as it claims that the prejudgments of a tradition can be disclosed but not avoided. The prejudgments are, accordingly, an “authority” precluding any “emancipatory” methodology, leading to a problem of understanding the possibility of paradigm transformation or shift. Philosophical hermeneutics has a tendency to form a closed hermeneutical circle, thus contradicting its own thesis of “future horizon” that overlaps with the past horizon. This is to say, the future horizon is not open, but is limited by the prejudgments of the past horizon and its authority, implying that if the paradigm of former Soviet Union had its prejudgments, then its future horizon could not transgress them, leading to the unavoidable “closed” society. But in this sense, philosophical hermeneutics, with such variants as Soviet Union, could not be universal.

There is another issue that is preeminent in philosophical hermeneutics: scientific methodology is not only inadequate, but, above all, misleading concerning the phenomena of its research. For example, social phenomena cannot be reduced to empirical data and then treated by scientific methodology as if it were a sum of mathematically posited individual atoms. Moreover, scientific methodology assumes an ontological base that is derived not from discoveries by scientific methodology, but from philosophical debates. In this sense, scientific methodology obeys a prejudgment that is not scientific; it must then be part of philosophical interpretation that cannot be discarded by some decision of subjects without destroying modern sciences and their methods. Even the “subjects” are part of modern interpretation and cannot escape the modern historical hermeneutical circle. Thus, the “absolutism” of scientific methodology belongs in modern context and is valid only within that context and
cannot claim universal validity. Yet, there is an irrational background to this argument for hermeneutical priority over scientific methodology. The latter has been and is constantly being modified in face of the demands of phenomena. If the phenomena resist specific methodological composition, the latter can be modified. Yet, if hermeneutical understanding were correct, then by dint of historically given prejudgment, no methodology could be escaped, i.e. if methodology is historically bound by a tradition, then it cannot be rejected. How can then philosophical hermeneutics, within its own historical horizon, claim that the scientific methodology is to be rejected – it is an irrational authority that no reason could abolish. This state of affairs is posited as a general principle: what is at issue is not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens beyond our doing and wanting, i.e. what happens to us can never be objectified and completely resolved, as it takes place within the process of a tradition, in which past and present are mediated. Thus seen, the process of a tradition would be a blind, spontaneous “substance”, which develops in accordance with its own prejudgments. Even if we continuously test our presuppositions – a linguistic process, – the horizon of the present is constantly constituted, such that our understanding is always a process of the merging of such assumedly independent horizons. This continuous mergence is the condition for the domination of the subject by the spontaneity of a tradition. This “merging of horizons” implies that a tradition continues without interruptions and that it is at the same time more than we can encompass reflectively. This “more”, happening “behind our backs”, is the superfluity of a tradition, a linguistic process that dominates all our actions.

Philosophical hermeneutics, as a method, can give us a closed system, but not its own problematic that would lead either to its collapse or transformation. The problematic requires a transcendental method of reflection as an addition to philosophical hermeneutics, specifically since the latter gives little credence to the power of reflection and critical thought. It is not surprising then, that it is compelled to lend an undue weight to authority of pre-judgments. But authority can be abolished by the power of reflection, leading to persuasion by rational insight and communication or by analysis of the contents of a paradigm as either closed or open. While philosophical hermeneutics would insist on the “linguistic a priori” of all socio-historical understanding, without noticing that this a priori
is contingent, constituting at the same time a transcendent power, which can neither be grasped, nor demonstrated concerning its necessity – traditions, after all, are contingent. But contingency cannot preclude reflection and, hence, the possibility of emancipation. The latter might appear within the horizon of what is currently impossible, but still comprises an aim implicit within philosophical hermeneutical circle, specifically that of modern philosophy. Such aim is accessible to reflection, but of a very specific kind. Philosophical hermeneutics also assumes tacitly a modern prejudgment of what constitutes reflection: an individual entity that, in principle, cannot encompass by reflection the entire tradition and escape its prejudgments. Indeed, on this interpretation, philosophical hermeneutics is safe, but it is not safe to the extent that it accepts a historically constituted notion of individual, Cartesian self, reflecting upon itself or the thoughts, upon which it reflects.

The above discussion, in fact, seems to suggest an ambiguity in the notion of authority. On one hand, we can never surpass the “over-abundant” flux and the horizons of a tradition; on the other, philosophical hermeneutics supposes the ability to reflect upon the presuppositions of a tradition and, therefore, to break from its authority. What appears is a reflection not of an individual, but a transcendental awareness that can “look” at any authority such that “looking at”, as a mode of awareness, is very distinct from the object of this awareness and, thus, as a reflection, is free from any authority. It comprises a moment of emancipation that is in a position to evaluate the validity and the limits of traditional prejudgments, specifically since the latter are contingent. The prejudgments, comprising an inescapable and irrational authority for philosophical hermeneutics, are disclosed by rational reflection that such an authority is contingent and has no force of necessity. In contrast to dogmatic authority of a tradition, the real authority is rational reflection. Authority based on rational supremacy can free consciousness from that authority, which is merely legitimated by a tradition. At the same time, it is clear that such a reflection need not claim to be all-encompassing, since it reflects on prejudgments of a given tradition and becomes emancipated from its authority. In this sense, rational reflection is always “particular universality”, showing, in our case, that universal philosophical hermeneutics is impossible as a methodology. Such conception would require a “universal history”, laws
and aim of which could be recognized and consciously appropriated. But, although it is possible to show aspects of reason in history, it is impossible to reveal the “reason” of history; the sense of history as such. This will be seen in our analyses of the Soviet paradigm.

If transcendental reflection is to extend philosophical hermeneutical methodology, then it is necessary to show in what ways such a reflection appears, with the required provision that it does not leave a tradition, but finds within it its own “crises”. The latter reveals a latent presence that must make sense of a tradition, and thus treat the latter as containing an irrational dimension. Once this dimension is methodologically disclosed, as was done in this chapter, then the method of disclosure appears in its own right and “complements” the inadequacies of a tradition as a “whole” text. Thus, one important rule of philosophical hermeneutics is that a given text, as a tradition with its prejudgments, can and must be completed by the interpreter in a way that even the author(s) were not tacitly aware. This means that a given text and its interpretation do not depend on the subject doing the interpretation, but in the disclosure of aspects of the text that must be introduced if the text is to lose its inadequate interconnections. As we shall see, the question of “essence” in terms of “limits” will reveal this requirement. This means that the “truth” of the text has a hermeneutical horizon, ground of which is philosophy and thus rational transcendental reflection. In this sense, the explication of the text will reveal its own inadequacy as a hermeneutical circle and will require a principle, an arche, a tacit and yet necessary awareness that might not even be a part of the circle, and yet a completing ground for interpreting the whole text. This philosophical hermeneutics will be our methodological condition for explicating modern Western philosophy, its two paradigms, wherein one of them became the hermeneutical text of the Soviet Union, and how transcendental reflection constantly comprised a completion of the text both breaking out of the closed circle and disclosing what that tradition required to make sense. To state the case otherwise, the given text, regardless of its significance and magnitude, requires a completion, and if the interpreter does all to avoid the task of completing the text, then he is not adequate to the requirement of the text and is simply adding his subjective affirmation of the truncated text. Simply stated, the affirmation reveals such interpreter’s analyses as premised on specific social interest.
Temporal Field and Reflection

It is well known that for Europe, since the eighteenth century, reality was no longer something present, but the “conditions for the possibility of being”. This is precisely what is needed methodologically to understand the conditions and, above all, horizons of what is possible. Hence, this aspect of methodology will include the reflective consciousness and yet will not be “outside” of the modern Western world. This means that other kinds of “conditions” must be addressed – including the structure of closed social/economic systems and the levels, at which dialogue is possible. To decipher such possibilities requires a methodology, which would also access common awareness. It is best to begin with the latter as an inevitable ground of diverse human actions, their limitations and interpretations.

There is a given understanding in modern West that life – and in most cases – that all events are temporal, including the notion of permanent eternity, wherein there is a promise of all sorts of activities in “an eternal place” and, thus, human life. As briefly noted above, human life, as temporal, is a major aspect that opens a question whether a promise of “future” paradise, that is constantly postponed and postponed, is beyond reach and forces a person to live “today” to the fullest extent. It is noticeable that the “eternal place” is present to awareness in the mode of “expectation” and, thus, as one aspect of numerous other “expectations” of what is possible – an open temporal horizon, which can be narrowed as to what is relevant and what is at present irrelevant. In turn, awareness is extended as a “past horizon”, which is equally relevant since in some societies the past horizon might be restricted to specific eminent texts that become equally relevant what shall be selected as significant from the future horizon. In this sense, it could be said that past-present-future comprise a field phenomenon of human active orientations. This is a way of saying that there is a selectivity of activities that are deemed to be proper and exclusion of those that are forbidden or irrelevant. As we shall see shortly, this kind of time does not mean that humans make history – they are their history directly manifest in what they do and build. The field of active time is not connected causally, but “meaningfully”, such that present events point to past and future events, i.e. they “signify” them, forming what contemporary European thinkers call a “life-world”. This suggests that to understand people, one
must understand their life-world. Even in the most beautiful and uncluttered life, events and people interconnect through meaning: this plant is medicine, and that animal is domestic, while the one growling at a distance is wild. One event signifies an entire field of other events, equally with overlapping temporal awareness. The horizon of memory does not reveal an entire past, but makes leaps connecting only the events, personalities, mythical figures, as they are required in the temporal field of today, this week, this year, tomorrow, next year. Whatever is the extent of the “present”, it dominates the selectivity of what is relevant for it. In case of the former Soviet Union, the selectivity was strictly prescribed by ideological commitments, and the ways that ideologies were interpreted in accordance with the current proclamations by the authorities. The very structure of ideology and its contemporary interpretation comprised the method of selectivity of relevant events of the past and required possibilities of the future. Even the selectivity of texts from “outside” and from the past was decided on the horizon of what is possible and what is not – specifically with respect to the text from the world of the Political Enlightenment.

Meaningful connections of events, coupled with the difference between theoretical and field time, account for the fact that there is no one to one correlation between the changes in natural environment and its evaluation in field time. Indeed, while natural events may change, their entering a life world as meaningful interconnections may remain the same, and conversely. This is one part of the methodology being unfolded here – variation of natural and meaningful aspects. Thus, the so-called material conditions may be similar, yet the temporal field of a life world might signify such conditions very differently from life world to life world within their horizons of possibilities. Such a horizon is also open selectively, where significant possibilities are selected and form a context for interpretation of events across future, present and past, forming a historical continuity that skips over the theoretical time of causal succession. Even if events are past and causally no longer efficient, their significance is present not only as past, but also as a factor in the horizon of what is possible.

Our brief delimitation of temporal field awareness, pervading a given life world, also disclosed the presence of societies as traditions that while devised in the past they are equally dominant in regulating future horizon and what is possible in it. It is the next task to articulate the field time of
CHAPTER II

action with its open horizons in terms of social or life world compositions and the ways they may limit such horizons – what was already selected and what can be selectable. It is equally important that the field time of action retains open horizons and options that a given society has not considered, even if it was not against its requirements. Moreover, an open horizon must remain even if what is selected from it as possible comprises its limits; the comprehension of the latter is premised on the presence of the horizon and all that is possible, but for a given tradition is impossible. Contemporary (and of course many other) clashes and revolutions are premised on the tensions of what there is as a life world of a given tradition, and what there is not – the open possibilities of a horizon that one tradition has closed. One can think of the “Arab Spring” that is still “springing” and shifting the selectivities of what is possible – both showing the limits of what has been a tradition and its horizons and what limitations are no longer acceptable – the closed circle of Mid-Eastern autocratic (in its theocratic interpretation) mode of life, and modern Western reflective domain that is always present in any attempt to close the horizon in a philosophical hermeneutical circle. This was the case of the Soviet Union and its paradigm that could not be closed because it had to reflect from its own temporal horizon, requiring more than the philosophical hermeneutical circle in its scientific variant would allow.

It ought to be obvious that within a context of a society and its traditional life world, not all possibilities are equally significant – some are more remote than others, and some are not even available. In turn, it is the case that some possibilities in a given life world are not realizable even if possible. The relationships between socially possible and impossible is quite complex. What may be possible politically may be remotely possible or even impossible economically, and what is possible economically might not be possible technically, morally, ontologically or, in many cases, mythologically. This means that some options might be excluded for time being and “sink” into the horizon of the past, and yet they might be reinstated as a future possibility given its shift in significance or the changes in moral values or economic distributions. Such changes require an introduction of awareness as “time reflex”.

As noted above, the limits of what society appears in terms of what is possible is reflected from what is impossible. But the latter is what reveals
options for a society from another society, leading either to transformation or to a clash of societies or two forms within a given tradition. It is the case that in contemporary global interaction, such time reflexivity is unavoidable, despite the claims of positivistic sociologists that analyses of facts do not indicate any transformations. Indeed, such sociology, without an addition of the notion of life world and its horizontal composition, cannot disclose anything as a daily awareness and the way it plays a role in constituting demands for change, demands for “return” to some eminent text and its prescribed narrowing of the horizons and indeed precluding a dialogue. During one session at the UNESCO conference in Vilnius (five years ago), a question of tolerance was raised; there were Muslim scholars from Egypt and Iran, and they stated that as long as West tolerates homosexuality, no dialogue will be possible between Islam and the West. Within their horizon of what is possible, homosexuality is not possible and, thus, any question of its tolerance is to be rejected and with it a society that allows this possibility to be part of its life world. Here, we have an autocratic closed hermeneutical circle yet inevitably forced to reflect from another society and its horizon as to its possibilities and their limits. Within an autocratic life world the pronouncements in one text determine the limits of what is possible and no forces of nature or evolution can change this temporal field.

It is now possible to sketch briefly the way time reflex is a primary method in understanding various research ventures and what the researcher, including his reflective awareness, can offer in disclosing life worlds, their traditions and differences. First, the dialogue concerning the options and possibilities of a given life world is in flux, and the changing, expanding or narrowing of temporal horizons also shifts the selectivity and significance of events. Second, this means that temporal horizon of the future is a way to locate what is more significant from the past and how such significance can be modified in terms of the needs that must be fulfilled. Third, the past, as a tradition of a life world with its own future horizon, may be opened in terms of current events and yield new possibilities for the past, such as rereading of some eminent texts or making previously some insignificant sections of such texts become significant, or even in case of a group that depends on family or tribal stories. The latter may be enlisted as a way to interpret the novel possibilities and, thus, to become part of the fabric of the future. Hence, while moving toward
the future, research also establishes an orientation and selectivity of past-present-future events. Fourth, time reflex accounts for the distinction and relationship between the present of the past, present of the present, and present of the future. Each present is available with its temporal horizons, which intersect and are continuous with those of other presents. This accounts for historical presents as overlapping temporal fields that continue a specific tradition of selectivities of the possible, the transformative, and how the latter comprises a confrontation, intersection and mutual transformation with other traditions. Any reflexivity presupposes as its condition the distinction between what is currently real and the temporally possible, the modalized. Thus, a particular social history does not vary only in terms of the presently given and selected facts, but also in terms of constitutive conditions of selectivity based on possibilities, which are temporal. The insight into the selectivity of facts in any social process is a key to the constitution of the relationship between social facts, their structures and the temporal horizons or possibilities.

Our most limited discussion of the conditions of reflexivity has opened the possibility to consider further the shift of the concept of theory to a concept of critical theory. The latter must (i) show how its very explanations of events will influence such events, since such an explanation can be subsumed under reflexive process and its predictions either enhanced or thwarted; (ii) it must evaluate social events from a temporal horizon of possibilities, showing what is possible and what is impossible within a given social system and its subsystems. This means that a critical theory must correlate all factors and show how, in this correlation, some possibilities are realizable, others probable and still others made impossible. For example, it must show how an economic capacity may be thwarted by a political incapacity, a moral stance or an economic misapplication; or how an economic capacity, yielding certain options, may become impossible due to a technological incapacity. At the same time, the critical theory must show the limits of the possibilities of a social system and delimit what changes must be instituted within certain social sub-systems to surpass the limitations. Critical theory thus constitutes the most encompassing process of social reflexivity in historical and ultimately in the complexity of world time.

The methodological outline as time reflexivity can now be regarded in relationship to any specific life world and the way an intervention by an-
other life world either from outside or from within can become relevant to the extent that it would disclose what else is possible and beneficial. This is where time reflexivity begins to appear: but this is a question of value and which value is temporally most feasible and which must be postponed, reflecting from the future possibility of a paradigmatic transformation or a partial extension of an already established life world. To be methodologically precise, when dealing with a philosophical hermeneutical disclosure of prejudgments that form the limits of a hermeneutical circle, it is necessary to assume a tacit reflection that posits such a circle as a whole. This means that the whole is defined by its parts and the parts belong to the whole, such that there is a mutual implication among parts and among parts and the whole and the way the whole implies its parts. Hence, the analyses of the whole are usually seen from transcendental-reflecting awareness that is emancipatory that does not belong to the circle and is a broader consciousness than the philosophical hermeneutical circle could contain. But for our task, this kind of methodological reflection surpasses our requirements, since the latter is to unfold a given paradigm – its philosophical hermeneutics – and disclose within its own horizon to what extent its circle contains the very conditions that allow the circle to be completed in a very fundamental way. This means that the transcendental reflection will have to be found as “passive” awareness providing a broader “synthesis” than the one offered “actively” as an all-encompassing philosophical hermeneutical circle.

Now, we can point to the methodological hermeneutical rules concerned with suppression of texts or traditions, and the way the suppressed experience a renaissance or at least a partial renaissance in different historical contexts in the sense of modern Western Enlightenment and, as we shall see, its initial hermeneutical circle that separated into two distinct circles, one oppressing the other in such a way that the oppressing will turn out to be – at the level of philosophical hermeneutics – incomplete. In this sense, the completion by transcendental reflection might disclose that the oppressed is the ground of the oppressing hermeneutics. In methodological hermeneutics, we saw how India exemplifies this situation. In philosophical hermeneutics, this would mean that the ontological essence is not only a completion of the one sided modern Enlightenment, but also the ground of the suppressing hermeneutical circle. It is also important to
note that the interpreter, who completes the philosophical hermeneutical circle, needs not be “outside” of its horizon, since he too must interpret himself as a condition for the completion of a text. To speak socially and politically, he is the place, where the “right to speak”, as an aspect of the suppressed, is equivalent to the horizons, which he discloses. In this sense, we overcome the “individual” subject and appropriate the emancipator reflection embodied by the individual.

Given the methodological concerns and the requirement for transcendental reflection, it will become important to explicate how the shift of paradigms from the Soviet to European in Lithuania attempt to merge the horizons of the Scientific and Political Enlightenments, and what levels of transcendental methodology are present to mediate between the two enlightenments. In order to reach this level of awareness, we still have to explicate the principles that base modern Western philosophies – principles that formed a very unique philosophical hermeneutic circle that faced a “crisis” and thus a crisis of the understanding of who we are.
CHAPTER III

BIRTH OF MODERN WESTERN THOUGHT

Power and Will

The methodological discussion reached a position that in principle a particular understanding must respect the context, within which it unfolds. It is the case that the background of the Soviet Union and its paradigm, as well as the paradigm of the West, were composed by the profound debates among philosophers, concerning the nature of “reality”, of what it is to be human, what sort of society is to be achieved through the revolutions against Monarchy and aristocracy, and what does it mean to have a government and a political society and state. In this chapter, the shape of modern world will be explicated in principle, providing a context that shaped the compositions and the tensions of the twentieth century, encompassing the European Continent and beyond. It is to be noted that the Soviet Union was born, to a great extent, on the basis of “Westernizers”, who rejected the autocracy of Russian nation. If the Soviet Union continued an autocratic tradition, it was in an entirely different context – Western-scientific paradigm that was partially a dominant trend across Western Europe and the United States. For our research, this state of affairs means that the shift from Soviet paradigm to European paradigm is not absolute, and we shall have to be cautious not to think that contemporary West does not have some of the political and social problems found in the former Soviet Union. While starting with the entry of Lithuania into a “new” life world, it is necessary to explicate the context of this life world, called the modern West.

After gaining independence from the Soviet-Byzantine, autocratic empire, Lithuania had to face some principal issues that plague the West: how to balance freedom and equality. This balance requires a reflective consciousness for its explication, fully knowing that the Western civili-
zation, as political, is not obtained by mere thought, but by action. The political praxis, initiated by a selfreflective thought and reason, required a mode of action, which positioned the human as an object of human will. This praxis proposes that the reality of political revolution is the universal equality of the human as human. While it has been assumed that for modern Western philosophy there cannot be anything such as “human essence”, it is nonetheless clear that the more basic background of classical tradition remains: human as a fallible, yet responsible being even in face of mistakes that he must correct. This very fallibility is what allows the self-understanding of persons in Western civilization as “open”. Being fallible, the individual is posited as equal to any other individual, recognizing no dominance of one person over others, and no authority, which is not affirmed by the individual’s reflection upon himself. Every individual is independent from others, and in a free association with others he only recognizes a political society and its representatives established and appointed by him. The representatives must be accountable to the individual and the public. This equality also leads to independence and freedom of each. Yet, it is not sufficient to make such easy proclamations, since they require implementation and a specific kind of society: political society or, as Greeks called it, the Polis.

At the origination of the Polis, Pericles had pointed out that a free life requires a strict adherence to the law, and law protects a person from injustice. Here, we have an expression of relationship between freedom, right and law. This relationship is the main theme of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thought. Such a thought is pervaded by a dominant question: what allows a legitimate application of power if man is essentially free? We must begin by asking: what kind of relationships, which would allow the emergence of a political society, must there be between humans? This is to say, what distinguishes political communities from other human relationships? The answer offers a unique relationship between the human as a rational being and as a political being. Most kinds of human relationships are based on common purposes, and indeed the origin of political society might have numerous common purposes; yet there must be an essential difference, which belongs to the founding of political community itself. This is to say the founding and the existence of the political society are inextricably related. While we have other purposes, toward which we
aim in common, the political community is its own purpose, which we ought to have and maintain. The very purpose of human relationship in political community is this very relationship, i.e. the purpose of the origination of this community is the very existence of the community. The community is not a means for other purposes or a common purpose, but rather the unification of humans into a political community is its own purpose. The origination and continuation of political community is, as such, a fundamental purpose in itself: it is selffounded. Greeks called *ousia* as something that has its foundation in itself. For Kant, the political community is what constitutes a common essence or *ousia*. Thus, the political community is not comparable to any other human relationship; the relationship of humans, as a purpose in itself, and not a relationship for the sake of other purposes, is what maintains for the human the source of its own essence. This means that the very origin of human as human, as rational and responsible, can only be maintained and preserved in a political community, and in this sense the human as human must be essentially political if he is to constitute, preserve and originate human essence.

This should be regarded closer in terms of various levels, at which the relationship between the human and the political community is fundamental. What constitutes the human, in one basic sense, is his rationality, i.e. the capacity to function in the world in light of humanities own purposes. But in order to manifest his rationality, humanity must establish a political community. How so? The human as rational is empowered to function in accord with purposes, and purposes are representations of the future and at the same selfrepresentations of the human as to what she is and what she wants to accomplish. But a purposive being of this kind is a free being. Yet, she is constantly working with others for common purposes, and hence her freedom is constantly delimited against the others; her freedom exists in the context of life with others in such a way that this life might lead to one group becoming the “masters”, while another becoming the “slaves”. Here, the very essence of the human is completely subverted. How is one to avoid such subversion? The freedom of each, in the multifarious relations with others, is guaranteed when the free activity of an individual is tied to a condition: the consensus of free members with one another to the extent that the consensus is guaranteed by universally accepted laws. This condition circumscribes and determines the essence
of public rights, comprising the totality of laws, which rule the freedom of each in relationship to freedoms of others.

It must be emphasized that the conception of human freedom requires political community, in which the freedom of the individual is guaranteed not by some ontological rules, present in some determinate being, but by a free establishment of laws and a free submission to such laws. The free establishment of laws is at the same time an establishment of a political community, purpose of which is itself, i.e. the existence of freedom of each individual to freely posit and submit to laws, which guarantee the very freedom to posit law. Thus, once again, the political community is its own purpose, within which context other purposes can be agreed upon and attained in freedom. The origin of political society is freedom, which, by virtue of the founding of political society posited freely, insures each individual’s freedom by mutually and freely accepted laws. Other forms of society are not political but purposive, i.e. such forms are established for the sake of purposes, such as power, economy, psychological security, neither of which have any public domain. This is to say, the essence of political society is a common and mutual maintenance of the public domain; all other forms of social organization are private, even if it claims to be democratic, specifically if the public domain begins to be intersected by various private or social interests; a public, which does not engage in public affairs and hence it is also privatized, i.e. it remains at the level of society but not at the level of political society. The establishment of public domain excludes private interests, private positions and social status, socially acquired rank and hierarchical slot. In political society, each member meets and regards others as political members with only one “interest”, the maintenance of what each member already is: free. In political society, the public arena is where free persons gather for the sake of the maintenance of freely established law and, hence, for the maintenance of what each person is.

The laws, which secure each person’s freedom, are not always followed, i.e. not everyone follows the law for the sake or due to respect of the law. But what would it mean to say that someone follows the law for the sake of the law? First, it would mean that such a person respects freedom (he is not submitting to some dictating or necessitating impulses); second, the respect of such freedom and, hence, the law is not some natural occurrence, but calls for constant maintenance of the law and its free origins;
after all, such a law is not simply there, but is a continuous “ought”, not in some moral sense, but in a public political sense. Thirdly, this constant “insistence” means that freedom is not a pre-given, inborn, gifted from higher authority condition, but a condition that is constantly established and maintained. Fourth, any maintenance of the public domain, as the political domain of freedom, requires legitimate power, which can compel the maintenance of the public against the private, i.e. a person, who fails to freely accept the law, which stems from her freedom and the freedom of others, acts privately and hence ceases to participate in the political arena; hence, she has lost her freedom, has given it up for the sake of an arbitrary and compulsive action, some cause or biological, psychological impulse. Legitimate power can be used against such a person. In other words, the freely agreed upon laws lend each person her freedom and in turn a demand that the law is to be maintained publicly; in this sense, each person, as a member of political society, can exercise legitimate power to maintain the public sphere free from private incursions and attacks, and, hence, attacks on persons as members of political society. One mode of use of power is legitimated by political society and its members, who exercise it to insure the freedom of each in the public domain by dissuading any private act from arbitrary exercise.

It is obviously incorrect to equate morality with law and rights. Moral laws require the person’s freedom, but they have causal or compulsory call to be followed. As it is well known, moral rules are usually premised on punishments and rewards and, hence, are not free. Moral laws are “for the sake of” some purpose and, thus, are followed of necessity. Freely established laws are for the sake of such laws as a guarantee of freedom and can be enforced and consequences delimited in case of the incursions against such laws. Thus, those, who are appointed to insure the public domain, are not preservers of any morality, but keepers of the law and nothing else. Inclusion of morality would turn political society into warring factions of fanatics, each offering his “ultimate value”. If the judiciary were to assume the role of the preserver of morality, then it would have to apply the methods of inquisition in order to check the private conscience of every citizen.

No doubt, there is a specific ethos in relationship to rights in the public domain: first, a free recognition and acceptance of the laws, which stem from mutual freedom of each individual in relationship to the “ought”, i.e.
the maintenance of the rights of each, and second, the continuous engagement of the individuals in the public domain to insure that the laws meet the condition of maintaining the public domain of rights and freedoms. This means that laws are not eternal, but must be wisely modified in order to accommodate the public requirements of currently interrelating individuals. For example, contrary to numerous commentaries, Kant did not posit absolute norms as laws; rather every law, as practical, is to be tested in the public arena in order to obtain a universal, i.e. public validity. By the latter, Kant means that the law will be acceptable when it guarantees each member of political society equal public rights, i.e. when the freedom of any member is balanced by the freedoms of all members. This of course permits the laws to change in accordance with changing human relationships and public needs. What is important to recall that political society or, as some would call it, “juridical state”, is not a formal set of laws or imperatives. Each individual is a social being, capable of life only in society. This life, nonetheless, is insufficient if left solely at the social level, in which all individuals or groups are intent on pursuing individual or group aims. This level would not be able to account for the “existent freedom” being coextensive with the public domain, and, in turn, the “existent” public domain as coextensive with freedom. This is to say political society reveals the very essence of the selffounding of a public domain that allows for diversity of positions to be debated, contested, and resolved; thus, it is not merely an aggregate of individuals aiming at common purposes. The purpose of the political society is the political society, wherein the rights of all individuals as equals are guaranteed by the laws and their acceptance and enactment. This conception of the public rights of the individual stems directly from the founding of the public domain and, thus, of freedom as a basic mode of rational human interaction. In a society, the human “wills” that the society becomes a political society; without the latter, the social life remains private and nonpolitical, allowing human rule over humans by illegitimate power. Indeed, it is possible that societies might mislead and suppress the political sphere for the sake of a quick fix in the domain of private aims and interests, yet such a society, on its own basis, cannot account for the continuous appearance of voices calling for “rights”, calling for “public participation” in the establishment of laws, calling for freedoms; these very voices constitute a reminder that pure social life, even under the guise of “politics”, which serves “group” interests, is basically a despotic life, devoid of political ethos.
The voices calling for the public domain are not a reminder that there are some problems with the laws – after all, in pure social life there are no public laws, – but a problem with the origin, from which a political society emerges, an origin, which is a continuous origination and maintenance of the public domain and freedom as an essence of a rational being. This also means that a historical investigation into the appearance of various social systems is inadequate for the understanding of the origin of the political society. The political society, as its own purpose, has the following fundamental principles in a sense that their denial would be a performative contradiction.

The constitution of a first democratic institution is the public domain accessible to all members of a society. This step is coextensive with the constitution of freedom of each member of a community as a human being. Each has a right and a duty to engage in and continuously found the political domain and freedom. In turn, each can establish her own way of life, to shape her destiny, under the condition that she allows others to do the same. A political community must be constantly reminded that in order to understand itself as political, it must constantly be aware of this principle in order to maintain and guarantee the mutual freedoms of each member. At times, this principle is misread, especially in face of the immense difficulties in adjudicating within the public sphere various claims and counter claims. Hence, too often the task is left to the “fathers” of a political community to handle the affairs of the state. This mode of “governing” turns out soon to be “paternal”, i.e. the governed are the children, who need to be told what to do and who cannot be told everything. The benevolent paternalism leads to the notion that all benefits should stem from the “new idol”, the state, which, in its omnipotence and omniscience, should be left in the hands of the “leaders”. This is one form of despotism, which abolishes the rights of the citizen in the sense that the citizen has acquired duties but no rights. Such a tendency can appear even in a parliamentary democracy, when, for example, the representatives begin to think that political decisions are best left in the hands of the expertise of some more “preeminent” leaders or even the representatives themselves.

The theory of “limited understanding of the subordinates” can emerge as the main view of the representatives, even if this view is hidden under some other name, such as “popular leadership”. In fact, such a hidden
domination tends to attack any criticism from the “intellectuals” as a criticism that stems from a “pretense” to “know better” than the population, all the while maintaining the subordination of the “dumb population” under the unquestioned popularity of the representatives. This “paternalistic benevolence” takes its model from a family, with the father at its head. The problem is that political community and family are basically distinct. The family is not a miniature state and the state is not a magnified family. The regard of a political community as a family hides a social despotism, in which political freedoms cease to play a role. Subsequently, we shall see how such a despotism appears on the basis of reduction of political community to pure society. Another danger for the public domain is the proclaimed “national unity”, tending to abolish the public participation by arguing that all human relationships are power laden, and, hence, the leaders must assume power in order to “protect the citizens” from all sorts of internal and external enemies. This tends to crush public debate and opposition. It is a way of using power by positing “external” and “internal” enemies, which must be guarded against and hence by instilling a false pride in the national unity and power. Even in the United States, the democratic procedures are subverted under the protective jargon of “national security”. Subsequently, other threats to political society will be explored, specifically those, arising with political technocracy.

From autonomous freedom that is coextensive with the maintenance of the public domain flows equality of each member of political community. As we saw, freedom based on rationally constituted law allows each person to compel other persons, i.e. allows each a right to demand others to follow the law. Thus, each through each is submitted to the law. But the members are not submitted to each other’s power; rather, each has a right to compel others to submit to the law and each must submit to the law himself. Of course, the laws are laws stemming from freedom and not imposed by an arbitrary power, even if some power has become legitimated by longevity. It is to be noted that autonomous freedom, as a source of law in the public domain, constitutes each member of the political community as equal source of law. It is also to be noted that for modern Western understanding the notion of “common human nature” is untenable; hence, the option of deriving political domain from “natural law” is excluded. The reasons for such exclusion are complex, but some of them need to be
mentioned as examples. The modern West includes numerous sciences concerning the understanding of “nature”. First, there is the basic ontology that all things are sum of material parts, no matter how large or small, and everything must be explained by their magnitudes, movements and locations in space and time. Second, human nature is a complex biological and chemical process, ruled by genetic “codes”. Third, human nature is a momentary ideological phenomenon, reflecting the economic, material interests. Fourth, and equally quite prevalent, is the psychological human, driven by unconscious impulses expressed in all sorts of sublimated achievements. We should mention the current rage of multiculturalism pronouncing that each culture defines humans in terms of its own language, image, and rituals. Fifth, human nature is invented by some magician in the sky who pronounced a word, and a thing, such as a human, imbued with “heavenly” essence, appears. Thus, the question is which of these “natures” shall be proposed as the basis of law?

The only option that is left is the constitution of the public domain, wherein each member of the political community will be regarded as autonomous and equal source of law. The most difficult task for the current age is to decipher and promote laws, which would not be a screen for power impositions of some group over the population. The reason for the difficulties is the industrial society dominating the social relationships and in fact hindering the maintenance of political community. This is to say, there is a tendency toward social and away from political constitution of the state. The principle of equality maintains that no one can compel another person except through the public laws, and that each individual can reach for the attainment of all her talents, desires, fulfillment of her chosen tasks within the framework of public laws. There are no inherent birth rights of one group over another, and no privileged line of descent. No caste can claim a higher position and exclude others from any public participation in any affairs. Fundamentally, no “masterslave” relationship is available. The latter still maintains a residuum of “natural” rights, which, taken by themselves, may be operative in the social, but are completely inadequate as a basis of political community.

From the conception of public domain, autonomy and equality of each member of political community follow each social member’s independence as a duty bound law giver. If this were forgotten, then we are
exposed to despotism. A law, which is valid for all, stating what is permitted and forbidden, is a matter of a mutual decision. Such a law, stemming from a decision of everyone over everyone and herself, guarantees that no one is treated unjustly, since no one would decide to treat herself unjustly. Injustice can be perpetuated against the other or imposed by the other, if one is excluded from participating in the public domain. In this sense, no individual’s will – even if an individual were to claim that he is the most “qualified” to master the affairs of the whole and hence should be acclaimed as a lawgiver – can be a law giver; rather, the law is polycentrically agreed enactment. This is the basic law: mutual consent. The origin of such a law consists of three components: (1) freedom of each in the sense of a right to shape his life, (2) equality, in the sense that all are subject to the law, and (3) a mutual consent, in which each individual makes a decision over others and himself. By the eighteenth century, this basic law was called “original contract”. While this might sound like Rousseau, it is founded differently from him. This law stems from a rational and hence free decision of any human, who, as an individual, lives with other individuals in a society. Rational beings as free can guarantee their freedom by a free and mutual agreement, and the latter is the political act in a society, which transforms a society into a political society.

This thesis of “contract” has been attacked by all sorts of romanticists and conservatives, from Hegel through Marx, and up to date in various social, historical and evolutionary theories, proclaiming that the current laws have emerged historically and are composites of social interests and powers, sanctioned by long historical traditions. The problems of “historical traditions” have been addressed in the previous chapter. In brief, they are social laws, and as such, depend on drives, needs, power positions, group “dynamics”, resulting in “ideologies”, which sanction the private imposition of one person’s rule over another. But precisely, these claims make the law depend on “factual” components and relationships, on irrational power struggles and postures, which cannot yield a law, to which one must submit by choice, but a law, which is identical with a material force. In this sense, we would revert back to the processes depicted by Thucydides. “Politics” ceases and becomes a means for a social aggrandizement of power positions, possessions, and expansion. Social, political, and economic “sciences” share in this conservativism not by dint of their
Marxian explanation that even sciences are ideologies, which support the given power relationships in a society, but by their very constitution, which compels them to regard political society socially and historically as a complex interaction of cause and interests. The argument by the “scientists” is pushed further: there is no “historical” evidence, in which a state was established on the basis of some original “contract”.

All these arguments miss the point of the Enlightenment and, specifically, the principles, which comprise a modern understanding of what it means to be human. The contract is a necessary condition of rational and free beings living in a society, if such a society is to establish a political state, and not a social empire. “Scientific” accusation supposes that philosophers are attempting to derive a political state from an “idea” and not from historical reality. After all, ideas reflect reality and not conversely. If one were to decipher what is meant by the “idea of contract”, one would discover that it is a complex of very concrete factors. To speak phenomenologically, the “idea”, or more properly eidos of original contract, relates to the individual as a being of interested activity, who, while living with others in a society, is related to them in various modes of influence and dependence. The contract is in a society and becomes political, when the individuals take upon themselves to establish the public domain and correlative their own autonomy; from this follow mutual laws, presented as a constitution, to which all agree to submit. Second, the manifold of the eidos allows the law giver to enact laws, which originate with a mutual consent of the members of political society in such a way that such members can approve of and submit to the law. Third, the eidos is not an arbitrarily invented notion, but rather a necessary insight if the human is to be preserved as human and not as a creature of irrational forces. Thus, the eidos does not propose freedom in its abstract essence, but in its concrete affectivity. While essentially a rational being is free, what has to be understood is how this freedom relates to other freedoms in a social setting. Hence, the concrete reality of this freedom first manifests itself in an original contract and not merely in social life. The eidos is what first determines objective political reality and practical interactions in public arena, and not the private-subjective and social arena. A theory of political society has the task to decipher and to reveal this manifold eidos, as was offered above, in various social and historical obfuscations and rhetorical
devices. This is to say, the essence of human freedom becomes concretely autonomous only in a contractual political society.

While the three principles enunciated above constitute the basis of political society, specific laws do not stem directly from them. A written constitution, ratified by citizens, proposes various requirements to be followed as a framework for establishing laws. Individual laws depend on the changing surroundings and changing human interrelationships. In this sense, any law must not only be in accord with the *eidos* that includes rights and responsibilities, but also must be interrogated with respect to the range of its necessity. The person appointed to carry out the law, or called upon to establish a law, can make mistakes in two directions: first, he might not notice that his specific implementation might lead to violation of rights guaranteed by a constitution, or that the very law leads to an unjust conclusion, and second, he might be mistaken as to the justifiable necessity of a law in a given context. Given this situation, the constant duty of a citizen is to engage in a dual critique. This builds, to speak metaphorically, a “podium of public justice”, inclusive of every member’s right to offer an open critique without fear of reprisals. Whoever accuses such a critique of being against the state, or against the people, harbors apparently despotic tendencies. When the representatives of an open political society proclaim that criticism and open debate endanger the state, what they are saying in truth is that they are worried about their own misdeeds and positions. They actually fear what they do and begin to hate any critic and open discourse on public issues. In fact, they begin to intimate that the critics are in fact a hateful and disruptive element of the state, counter to a “free” and “just order”. They fear their own misdeeds and accuse the members of the public, who dare be critical. Such inhabitants of public trust should be dismissed with all dispatch.

The laws, stemming from appointed law givers, are binding to the public only to the extent that they represent the agreement of the public. What the public cannot decide about itself, neither can the representatives. And this is the very “self-purpose”, which constitutes political society: neither the representatives, nor the public can abolish the existent freedom of public and mutuality in the public domain. Any such action would contradict the very concept of political society. The political community does not arise from the necessities of life, but conversely. It is established
and maintained because the human can preserve in it his freedom in a life of community and a life of needs. Of course, in industrial society the law giving function has been submitted to numerous social demands and power relationships. In this sense, the social practice of arbitrariness and power is being tied to the juridical political society in such a way that the state is becoming social juridical state. And this is what creates a tension between the social arena of interests, and the political arena of rights and public freedoms and duties. There arises a strong tendency to drag into the public arena the “interests and necessities” of the social powers and irrationalities. Subsequently, we shall address this issue in terms of “legitimation crisis”.

The coupling of the state with society, indeed their mixing, was offered by Hobbes. His, and the like theories, understand the state as a relationship of humans for the purpose of achieving maximum “happiness”. The latter term, at that time, meant the satisfaction of natural needs to a maximum degree, duration and intensity. Of course, the individuals think of happiness and well-being differently and, indeed, radically differently at different times. Thus, it is impossible to give any circumscription of what the term “common good” would mean. Moreover, in this conception it is impossible to correlate the numerous private wills under a common law, and hence the state would have to be a society ruled by power and interests. This is to say, the Hobbesian notion of natural selfpreservation, dominating human relationships of power, leads to a society, in which the only solution to singular confrontation of powers is an invention of one power; the latter need not follow any law and thus it is arbitrary, capable of maintaining the “happiness” of the sovereign. To escape the notion that all relationships in social life are founded on material interest and power, Hobbes has no other recourse than to extend society into a power society, in which the only adjudication is material, leaving out the possibility of rational consent and law.

These conditions are at the same time at the source of individual anxiety: the social fabric seems to be exposed to chaos and a possibility of anarchy. And, thus, the democratic mode of life, in an effort to avoid anarchy, calls for a concentration of power. And this concentration is not a sole product of the specter of anarchy, but is unique for democracy. If all are equal, then all should be submitted to the same laws, chosen by all. Obviously, this
general tendency of equality to establish common laws may be specified by regional and more specific laws, but the first impetus is “equality under the law” of all leading to a central rule. After all, in face of equality, it would be most distressing if a law were to apply to one and not another citizen. At the same time, a condition for an acceptance and legitimation of a government is, in principle, possible in democracy if the governmental legislative practice is applicable equally to all. In brief, centralism is legitimated since those, who are empowered to legislate, are called upon to do so equally for all. Not only for all, but also for all groups, corporations, organizations, and interest parties such that they too have no more rights than the individual, i.e. they too have the same obligations and requirements before the law, and this includes the legislative power, regardless from what origin this power might be; it too must submit to the laws as any individual and hence cannot be above the individual. Yet, the more the will to equality emerges, the more the individual seems to disappear into the “crowd”, leading to a consciousness of unity of legal forms stemming from the state. In this sense, the individual begins to regard the state as the source of law, power of action and favors, and at the same time this individual begins to appear increasingly smaller and insignificant. This is one of the catalysts for citizens in a democratic state to cease their participation in the public domain, engage in public debates, regard all those, who run for public office with suspicion, and public institutions with mistrust.

Yet, the citizen is to be reminded that it is his/her duty not only to appoint a government, but also to hold the government accountable and under constant surveillance and critique. This sort of “interaction” is what allows for a continuous maintenance of political society and of the knowledge that the public arena is free and open, and that arbitrary powers are constantly monitored and thwarted. This knowledge is what should determine the actions of those appointed to public office and entrusted with legislative enactment and executive implementation of laws. This knowledge is coextensive with the conception that the entire political society is directed by unified laws, comprising both rights and duties of everyone. After all, everyone is dominated by a basic conception that the political society and the power that is invested in it is freely posited by the citizens over themselves, and hence freely accepted by them. Even opposition to given laws and procedures, the call for changing of laws, is incorporated
in political society and open to all citizens, indeed called for from the public and groups. These are the constants of a democratic political society. In all the transformations, they maintain coherence and continuity. They constitute the indices of a democratic ethos. Once again, it should not be understood that it is something “immanent” in the human, such as freedom of choice; rather, it is constituted on the basis of an idea of autonomy, equality, and willed in praxis.

Individual

Before explicating the modern, equal individual, it would be beneficial to sketch another mode of life world that could not allow equal individualism. Such a life world is Medieval (it includes other life worlds dominated by autocratic principle, one of which is just mentioned rule by a monarch, extolled by Hobbes), in which a society is ruled by one personality, in many cases conflated with created images of a divinity, with which a given autocrat is identified as King of Kings, Lord of Lords, at times having “divine right of kings”, not to be questioned by anyone. Philosophy demands that every position should be disclosed within its context, providing the very principles that such a position must follow. Hence, it is essential to explicate an autocratic tradition that the modern West (and, indeed, the classical philosophy) escaped, but presence of which still appears in various guises in Lithuania and the West. It is to be noted that for modern West, the crucial question of legitimacy of government has been resolved in favor of the autonomous, equal, having rights and responsibilities individual, exposed to the “insecurity” of novel experience of being “self-created” and a creator of his political society.

But modern West had to contest a vast tradition – indeed an entire autocratic civilization – wherein the individual was not available or, at best, completely suppressed. Thus, what is the legitimacy of the autocratic “government”? In case of the latter, the ambiguity of legitimation can be dispelled by magical legitimation in mythological imagery. The mythological region is peopled by figures that are structurally isomorphic with the power holders inhabiting the “solar palaces”. There is the celestial Lord-King, his Queen, their retinue, their subservient supplicants and worshi-
pers, each with a sign of appointed and anointed rank, and hierarchical position. This is precisely the imperial regality, and in the final analysis the celestial mythological region, inhabited by divinities, coincides with this ruling composition. This is to say, there is no legitimation here, since the mythical does not justify the imperial deeds, but is identical with them. The emperor can claim without a fear of contradiction that “we are divine”. Thus, we find that the Persian imperial morphology and the Judeo-Christian-Islamic composition also coincide. The ruling emperor is the law giver and the law, and there should be neither deviations, nor questions concerning the power of such law. The language here is one of edicts and imperatives. All that lives and exists must obey and be subordinate to the edicts, indeed must act in ways that would constitute a support and enhancement of the edicts. No one can question the imperial force of the law, specifically when the law coincides with the mythical imagery that is also the magic of “making of the world”. The imperial powers make the world by their commands, and their divinities make the world by uttering appropriate words. “Let there be dogs” and dogs appeared by verbal magic. Hence, the divine edicts are not some ethical commands of how humans must live, but are identical with the way humans are. At this level, we are faced with an understanding of verbal power that becomes coextensive with making, and indeed with an in-distinction between word and event. The power holder’s every uttered wish becomes coextensive with law, deed and reality. While we have indicated this activity to be identical with ritualistic and verbal magic, there is also its extension into the language of social relationships. At this juncture, we must point out that the disclosure of this tradition is premised methodologically on philosophical hermeneutics, wherein all events, all our understanding, is mediated by a tradition, which horizon is identical with its language. The Philosophical hermeneutical circle is closed insofar as everything in the world is determined by the limits of “divine” edicts coming directly from the emperor, the ruler, or the king. Here, no individual, as a reflective consciousness, is possible, because everything that a human is belongs to the tradition and, in the final analysis, on the way a tradition defines everything and everyone.

Up to date, the cult personalities are called “lords, masters, lord of lords, king of kings” and the followers of such cults must live on their knees, slither on their stomachs, sing “praises to the lord”, go to “places
of worship”, be grateful and thankful to the lord, pronounce that every-thing depends on the “will of the lord”. The lord is an absolute and infinite power; he knows and does everything – a sort of panoptical being – and demands that the transgressors of his rules confess their misdeeds. He is magnificent, perfect, vengeful, and once a while may be merciful. Let us be clear on these points at the metaphysical level. The human being, made by the power of magical words, must continue to be shaped and ruled by additional words. Hence, he may be declared a “sinner” not as some characteristic of his human essence, but as the very essence he acquires due to the verbal pronouncement, which he cannot escape. When some high shaman of these personality cults pronounces that a person has been “excommunicated”, it does not mean, as it is usually taken, that he is separated from the group, but that he has become by the power of excommunication a transformed entity – most likely demonic. This verbal power to make and remake is evident from the rituals of “forgiveness.” One can become transformed back into a humble follower not by one’s own efforts, but, in the final analysis, a declaration of forgiveness by some supreme authority or by an appointed servant empowered to forgive the “sinner” and remake him into a worthy being. It is important to understand the extent, to which the notion of being a “sinner” is pushed. While one is made in the image of the lord and master, one is born inadequate, a “fallen angel”, and must be made complete by a magical ritual, usually called “baptism”, where mysterious words are pronounced to ensure that this being is truly a human and, therefore, worthy worshiper and, if need arises, an obedient warrior in the service of the lord’s army. Another significant aspect of these cults is the ranking of human beings in a hierarchy of social positions: while everyone is made by the same magic words, in this life each is destined to have a specific place in society, which he cannot alter. If he is born a peasant, he will not be able to become aristocrat, no matter what he does. It is the will of the lord that he is born and must be nothing else, but a peasant. An aristocrat is born to be nothing else and regardless of his fortunes or misfortunes, he and his children will be aristocrats. While everyone is equal in the eyes of the lord, this equality is postponed for a life in the “other world”, but not in the world of flesh and blood. And everyone is watched to insure that the established “order” is observed – one cannot escape the all-seeing eyes of the lord. Thus, even the body belongs to the “lord”, the king, the aristocrat, and not the individual.
Thus, it is not only the emperor, who has spies everywhere – eyes and ears that see and hear everything – but the ultimate authority forever knows everything a priori, wherein no one can escape his gaze. Any hope of hiding is completely abolished. The servants, the appointed shamans of this “panopticon” are empowered to “hear the confessions” of the sinners and to pass judgment as to the status of the very being of those who confess. While the shamans act as eyes and ears of the supreme master in the sky, the extent of their vision depends on the total vision of the master: the sinner may attempt to get away with some omissions in the confessional, but he cannot escape the vision of the ultimate master, the lord of lords. This is evident from the rituals of the personality cults, where no mediating shaman is required for confessions. The individual must admit his misdeeds and transgressions directly to the master and proclaim that he was forgiven and, therefore, restored to the “ranks of the faithful”. One aspect of this ritual shows up with the so-called “evangelicals”, who are “reborn” as one with their master. The appropriate shouts and noises, words repeated from some fable, empower them to become totally different persons and, in principle, they too become empowered and commanded to “spread the word” by any means.

The current fever in the United States among such groups to “spread the word” around the globe that translates into military crusades for the conquest of the “unbelievers” or “infidels” is just one outcome of such empowerment. Some may object that the members of their group do not use weapons to spread the word, but are engaged in good works among the poor and the unbelievers, or believers in “false gods”. That may be the case, but using weapons to kill may be more kind than destroying people’s entire worlds as a way of life that made sense, was meaningful and allowed them to live in their simple ways. To make these people live on their knees in front of imported personalities is worse than death: it is enslavement and destruction of any vestige of human dignity. Of course, among the fables of the original texts of personality cults, slavery is sanctioned. That is why the slave trade, practiced by the members of these cults, was not considered to be evil. In fact, it was regarded as doing a favor to the unbaptized, heathen savages, including the Lithuanian pagans, who needed to be subjected to the true faith and, thus, saved from their own erroneous ways. As we know, the conquest of the new world included the destruc-
tion of total populations in order to make them subservient to the new masters and their divinities. In principle, everyone has to be a possession of masters, inevitable historical destinies, having not a shred of selfhood that is not pervaded by the hermeneutical circle, which no one can escape.

The suggestions so far also delimit an entirely different concept of the human than that offered by philosophy. Not the free person empowered to question and interrogate all positions in an open forum with others, and not even the initial autonomous subject of modern thinking, but the one that is “subject to...” is subjected to edicts, to the various strategies and techniques of controlling human actions and his very essence. There are, obviously, various levels of strategies and techniques, which not only address the human, but, as noted, primarily invent it on the basis of verbal power. One might want to argue that the human is pre-given and his various characteristics discovered, as would be the case in genuine philosophy, yet one will be hard pressed to offer any evidence of the preexistence of such humans in the autocratic tradition prior to their articulation as an “ought”, as permitted and prohibited, normal and deviant modes of being. At the very outset, the humans (and all things of the world) are defined by what they “ought to be” and not “what they are”. Such notable as Emanuel Levinas, while rejecting philosophy, could not escape the pull of his tradition, where the “ought” is prior to everything, where everything is measured by mysterious infinity, which “freely” creates the other. Here, we have a reappearance of the arbitrary will at the highest level of the tradition of personality cults. The latter can be seen as a variant of autocratic tradition and apart from the above mentioned lord of lords, god of gods, or divine right of kings, may extend into secular dogmas of communism and fascism. We shall address them shortly.

The emperor who builds a fortress, a castle, brings with him the legitimating rigidity and absoluteness of monotheistic personality cult. As a nomad, he generalizes everything as being under one will and law, lending the settled nomad a legitimation not only by supreme authority, but ruling in the name of its will: thus, his word is the law and before it no power can suffice. From his fortress, he sends his mobile forces to enforce his will. The eyes of thousand spies see everything, and his long sword is everywhere, withheld, yet manifest. This manifestation appears in the power spectacle that punishes the offender of the ruling edict, the imperial
proclamation. The withholding of power is an economic way of maintaining it; it is poised everywhere, it pervades all and can become active at a moment’s notice. Yet, it has to be guaranteed in an occasional spectacle in order to demonstrate to the populace that in face of this power everyone is absolutely powerless. Any member, who violates any edict, is seen as a direct attacker on the emperor and the supreme lord. The emperor deems it necessary to demonstrate that the power dis-equivalence between him and the violator of an edict is infinite. This demonstration constitutes the basis for the public scaffold and spectacle. The violator is made to die many deaths before the final death in order to reveal the thousand triumphs of an edict over the condemned. Since the commands of the emperor and his lord are absolute, any deviation from them is equally absolute, where the transgressor and the public are to experience the spectacle of public punishment as a demonstration of the absolute non-being of the transgressor in face of the absolute being of the emperor and his counterpart, the heavenly lord. There are no degrees of transgression that would warrant different degrees of punishment. Every transgression from an absolute position is an absolute transgression, to be punished absolutely.

There is, then, invented a verbal anatomy correlative to the body technology of degrees of pain and torture. Precise implements have to be coded for precise infliction of pain, correlated to precise hierarchy of edicts, violation of which is a depiction of an exact degree of assault on the imperial and divine persons. Their “justice” pursued the victim beyond all possible pain into eternity. Even in the latter, there are verbal rules as to the prescribed tortures. But the body, subjected to the coded anatomy of torture and pain, must also be seen as the manifestation of the truth of the royal and divine judicial system, the interrogation, the confession, and documentation; in the proceedings of the imperial court, the accused is a priori and of necessity guilty and must be made to confess through degrees of torture. Everyone must confess, and those, who do not confess, are the ultimate enemies, filled with demonic pride and arrogance and must be subjected to extreme punishment, lasting for days, if not weeks. Indeed, the subjected body is the law made visible in flesh. The technical implements are a way of writing the story of the ultimate figure of the personality cult and its edicts directly into the flesh, the broken bones, and at the same time of stating the guilt of the victim, the absolute power of the law and lastly the impotence of the transgressor.
It is impossible to think of the relationship between commands and punishment in equivalent terms in this autocratic world, the Byzantine, i.e. arbitrary and unlimited parade of power. The commands pronounced to be laws are rather designed to demonstrate the direct presence of the total superiority of physical power of the emperor on the completely impotent body of the victim. This public spectacle of protracted torture is not designed as deterrence against crime, but as a way of making present the commands and rules of unrestrained power of the ruler on the victim’s body. The public execution of thousand deaths does not reestablish a balance, equivalence through retribution, a justice, but reactivated power. The meaning of justice would be, here, a manifestation of force, a justice as the physical, technical, overwhelming force of the ruling power. Being a ritual of armed law, it manifests the emperor both as a head of law and of war. Thus, the public torture has this function: victory of an armed struggle, which is decided in advance by the asymmetry of powers in complete favor of the ruler. The body, completely destroyed, torn to bits, broken on the wheel, disemboweled, burnt to ashes and thrown to the winds was a public spectacle manifesting the infinite power of the emperor and the total impotence of the victim.

This is a legitimation of power by elaborate liturgy of prescribed inscriptions in flesh, each a punishment and an atonement to an absolute source of law, standing on the side of the emperor. This kind of absolute atrocity cannot be attributed to some concept of retaliation, but has to be coupled to a truth and a war. The ruling aristocracy or theocracy or, in a final analysis, ideology of a ruling party, exacts truth through torture from the victim and reveals itself as an armed power that stands on the side of “truth and justice”, and resultantly could exalt itself as chivalrous, a chivalrous power that declares war against those, who are engaged in civil war, and who must be taught in a public spectacle that the power is not only omnipotent, but also omniscient. It knows all events at all times and reveals its secret knowledge periodically in a public spectacle. The spectacle was a multifaceted representation of the hidden struggles of an individual against various impositions of imperial edicts, a struggle in which the representatives of the empire – the police, the magistrate, the priest – were equally small and insignificant; thus, the public spectacle was a magnifying device, to make the small deed of the “guilty” into an enormity, and the deed doer into a public monster, and the
sudden appearance in the public not just of the magistrate, the priest, but of the total imperial and divine absolute power. Obviously, the one, who was condemned, had another option; instead of repenting and accepting the demands, he could defy the terrorism on his body and show that despite the absolute thrown against him, he will not bow before the power; he will die defiant and unrepentant. Such a person can be a heroic sign to the public of resistance and a danger to power.

In the autocratic and, in many cases, anti-philosophical tradition, those in power assume that everyone is guilty, a rebel, a suspect if not for deviant deeds, at least for unacceptable thoughts. Thinking is silent and hidden and, thus, is a greater danger: it must be brought to speech, to admissions of being mistaken, possessed by dangerous and demonic forces, by influences of class and social position and even by ignorance of truth. Hence, confessions of one’s thinking will reveal falsehoods in face of the truth possessed by those in power. Such a truth, as noted, is absolute and, as Kierkegaard suggested, is unreachable by humans. In face of it all, our thinking is a priori false and all our actions are unethical or criminal. In this sense, one must be forced to make a public confession in order for the spectators to realize that they too are harboring false thoughts and are engaged in evil activities. There is only one truth, written in cryptic language of fables, known only to and understood by the authorities, the priests, the shamans, the party heads. Any other writings are false and to be burned with the authors of such writings. Above all, philosophical writings are the most dangerous and to be avoided lest they infect and mislead those with weak minds. Coupled with this syndrome is another claim: what is being done to the victims of such a power is done for their good, for their salvation, and indeed for the salvation of a fallen, mislead and ignorant humanity. It does not matter whether the authorities are theocratic or ideological – no one is in a position to know better than they. Hence, the modern fever to save the world by those, who have total knowledge and understanding of historical destiny of humanity, cannot be questioned.

The harsh civilization explicated above has variations, claiming to be secular, but in fact comprise a continuation of autocratic mode of governing. It can be said that once an autocratic power takes over, it must maintain itself as absolute, must possess all social means of sustenance of all members of society and possess such members as property of the
autocratic government. The Russian revolution has not changed the social position of the population; in principle, one form of autocracy was swept away by another – at the top – one head was replaced by another but the body remained the property if not of a divine monarch, then of the head of the state, who knew the inevitable destiny of history and had to use every means to abolish everyone, who would not be a true believer. Not only body, but all thinking had to be managed, controlled and always suspect, leading to the rituals of verbal incantations of dogmatic words, which sense eluded the lowly population – not the head, but the tail of revolution. This history need not be recounted here; it is well known autocratic control, autocratic decisions to eliminate every suspected person, who might have a thought of his own, every child, who might have acquired some ideas from his parents, even everyone, who knew how to plant a potato without government’s direction. Even Maoist China had public confessions of those, who were born into the wrong class or had some thoughts of their own. Even wearing glasses was regarded as a sign of an educated person and, hence, an enemy of the autocratic state. The followers of such trends claim that the “people” never do anything on their own; all that they do is due to the lord’s will and action, to historical necessity, to genetic causes, material and psychological impulses. In other words, this is the magic language that is totally isomorphic with monarchic, aristocratic, autocratic and theocratic social orders of power. Those in power, the worshipers of their own divinities, truths and ideologies cannot, in principle, live in the world of freedom and responsibility; their initial and continuous consciousness is still pervaded by slavish attitudes and behavior, their self-esteem is identical with being a servant of the lord master, of history, of scientific necessity and their ethos coincides with obedience. Of course, the phrase “Scientific Enlightenment” sounds modern, but all the premises are autocratic: cause and effect, “natural laws” as edicts, and those, who know and manage society, are omniscient.

The human person disappears and is simply a result of “lord’s will,” of call to action by universal justice and salvation of humanity. Any thoughtful questioning of such will and its edicts is forbidden and will be punished if not immediately, then certainly in an “after life.” And the emperors, as heads of “state and church” with their priestly retinue, place themselves at the gate of death and proclaim to possess verbal power to send the “good”
for rewards and the “evil” for punishment. In many cases, the “good” are the ones, who are required to sacrifice their lives in some holy war and, thus, are immediately transported to enjoy heavenly sex with eternal virgins. It is the continuation of verbal magic to transport the submissive followers to rewards and those, who dared even to think of questioning the “higher or the highest authority”, to punishments. As we shall see, without the awareness of our own worldliness and temporality, our finite existence, the priestly classes, the ideologues would cease to hold such magic power. Yet, in a unique extension of this power, the modern scientist is also at the gate of life and death. This will appear clearly in our discussion of technological ontology and metaphysics and even of the new paradigm in the post-Soviet Lithuania.

It is to be noted that the emergence of the imperial powers can be correlated to nomadic means, and, according to well-known practices, such means were the horse. It is a “technology” that corresponds to other “domesticated” technologies, except for the difference in power and speed. The horse is mobile and fast and allows the nomad a wide range of rulership. This is to say, the horse can be a means by which one is capable of wasting one settled community and then going to the next for conquest and subsistence until this too is exhausted. The nomad will build his fortress, from which it can rule a region and can protect his conquest from others like him. Hence, the economy of settled peoples, i.e. agrarian and domestic, is an attraction for conquest by the mobile nomadic people, who become the robbers yet with a claim to “superiority” in power and “birth”. There is the promised land of “milk and honey” and we must claim it since our lord, our father in the sky, has promised it to us. Of course, the claiming will require the elimination or enslavement of the local “unbelievers” as inferior beings fit to serve the new masters and their lord. The conquering nomads are the leisure class, i.e. unconcerned with the production of the means of subsistence, but very much concerned with the “art of ruling”. This division into “settled” and “nomadic” can be extended into the division between warlike and peaceful, power seeking and ruling and the ruled. Such ruling by the nomadic power of the horse rider-warrior can be equated to the power of modern warfare with powerful and mobile machinery of war: tanks, ships, airplanes, rockets, nuclear nirvana, i.e. the magic of the word of the rulers of contemporary global-technical empires, which can proclaim “let it not be”, press a button and all life will be gone.
One characteristic of the imperial divinities is that they have no specific place or time and hence are positioned as “transcendent” or “beyond” space and time and hence can be a means to legitimate the occupation and violation of any region: our god rules over everything, and if he is not the only one, then at least he is more powerful than any of your gods, and, thus, we can rule over everything. Having conquered a given place, the nomads will proclaim that it was promised by their divinity and, hence, it belongs to them legitimately and beyond the questioning by any mere terrestrial being, especially the conquered and, hence, lower beings. This claim was and is used by Israelites, by Jesuist conquest of the New World and the destruction of the local heathen and infidels, by Islamists, who swept across Arabia with the view that truly their victories and harsh rulership by power were legitimated by their ultimate divinity. After all, the current pope’s pronouncements about Islam’s spreading the “faith” by sword as some sort of immoral action forgets the same actions by Israelite and Jesuist brethren. Any means, any action, any dispossession of others’ lands are legitimated “in the name of the lord,” all the way to the claims that such lands are promised to them by their lord. It is an autocratic notion how the royal ruler allots all the lands to his vassals.

We need not forget that the conquerors of the New World claimed the lands “in the name of the King” and, in the final analysis, “in the name of the Lord”. It is equally no wonder that the Islamic personality cult proclaims the right to rule over the entire world since in every place there already appeared prophets, who announced the rulership of one master. The universal Caliphate is a given fact and only its realization is to be accomplished by subjugating the people everywhere, who have not heeded the pronouncements of such prophets. There is only one master and a holy war must be waged against those, who are still the unbelievers and do not wish to be servants to the master. We should not be misled by the “clash” among the three Mid-Eastern personality cults: they all have the same power aims and the battle is a family affair as to which of the “prophets” is a true follower and revealer of the ultimate father’s commands. The current rage concerning “clash of civilizations” is not between West and its claim to be “Judeo-Christian” and Islam, but between philosophy and Mid-Eastern metaphysics of the will, and ultimately autocracy. Once again, the communist variant had a historical destiny that did not belong to a particular place or time,
but was proclaimed to be universal with its final victory over entire world. While “nowhere and everywhere”, such autocratic position is nomadic: its proponents have a duty to invade and conquer anyplace, establish a center, from which to rule the local population and indeed be served and supplied with sumptuous life style as “elites”, who are “saving” the ignorant populations from their own ignorance. The Soviet invasions around the globe, and specifically the Baltics, set up centers, from which local people could be monitored, controlled and “educated” by various means, including concentration camps, deportations to labor camps, torture and death. Those, who are so treated, are deemed to be deviants from historical destiny of humanity and their presence is a disruptive and negative component, lagging behind, a residuum of past and, thus, irrational – they must be eliminated as less than human. The nomadic masters must decide what shape the “new humanity” must possess.

It is also interesting to note the current “interfaith debate” among Hebrew, Christian and Islamic cult members, where such questions as to whether your understanding of the image called a god is too transcendent and, hence, inaccessible to humans, and our image is rational and, therefore, superior to yours, are paraded quite seriously, as if the “debate” had a subject matter and addressed some “real issues”. After all, how is one to adjudicate in the context of such a debate which position is “true” apart from appeals to some written stories by self-appointed “prophets”. Moreover, such appeals are radically impossible, since such stories are full of fables, allegories, metaphors, all sorts of allusions, and all of them open to indefinite interpretations. This is to say, in the final “analysis”, the debaters can say whatever they will and find “support” in the fables of their prophets: in brief, all that the debaters can say is that “it is so because I say so”. Yet, more fundamentally, these debates take the texts they cite in an autocratic fashion, wherein each appeal to the text is at the same time legitimated by the text’s “authority”. This was the case of Soviet autocracy, since the autocrats constantly appealed to eminent texts of the “prophets” of historical aim and necessity and, thus, could not be questioned without becoming heretics to be eliminated. The autocrats, meanwhile, were not bound by any law, since, by virtue of their being the qualified readers of the eminent texts, whatever they say and do is beyond questioning. The servants, entire populations, are bound to obey and indeed spread the
message of salvation offered by autocrats. Armed with the one universal “truth”, the faithful warriors have to wage a holy war against the fallen world blind to its own salvation. The most misleading claims of the modern autocrats are their illegitimate use of and shift to philosophical reason, which does not belong in their context. It is the same story of philosophy becoming a hand maiden to autocratic closed hermeneutical circle.

We are articulating the principles of thinking and acting of an autocratic civilization and not some form of atheism, agnosticism anti-clericalism or even some anti-medievalism or communism. Such thinking does not accept the world and proclaims that the latter is under the power of some supreme personality that demands all sorts of self-sacrifices, servitude, tortures, wars, self-rejection, denial of dignity, honor and responsibility. We are not rejecting the presence of this mode of thinking and life; rather, we are suggesting that it cannot be made into philosophy if it is taken strictly within its own limits. We are well aware of the claims of this civilization that it is “good” and “rational” and, hence, should be treated as equal to the philosophical tradition. But such notions as “reason” and open discourse, unhindered by the requirement to accept a priori some eminent set of stories, does not belong to this tradition. Borrowing from others and then intertwining these notions to claim equivalence is simply bad faith. As Abelard had demonstrated, the borrowing of classical Greek rational thought in the form of logic and using it to evaluate the numerous pronouncements of the high priests of one of the Medieval cults showed the irrationality of such pronouncements.

What is interesting in the use of reason and logic in this context consists of the mistaken notion that logic proves the existence of some reality. We have known since Kant that this is not the case. To have any validity, logic must have perceptual content. The phrases from the fables, inserted into logical form, have no perceptual content and resultantly the logic frames simple verbal images. To avoid classical and even modern Western philosophical thinking, Mid-Eastern autocratic civilization and its Marxian variants simply banned philosophy. After all, philosophy might promote thinking and questioning and reveal that all the eminent texts are full of wondrous figures, images and deeds and, therefore, should properly belong to history of aesthetics. From the side of philosophy, we would want to agree with this assessment as to the fertility of human imagina-
tion, as long as it does not lead to terrorist practices against those, who have other types of aesthetic histories, specifically those that are classical, i.e. satisfied with the forms of life of this world without intertwining them with some images of “greater” beings, historical aims and cosmic rules.

This corresponds to civilizational topographies that include Persian, Byzantine, Mongolian, Christian, Russian, Holy Roman, Islamic, fascist and communist empires; they extend the conception of autocratic-absolutist power, correlating to an autocratic mythological structure, and magical pronouncements, in opposition to these, the Hellenic demos backed by discursive, interrogative and rationally correctable mode of life that correlates to the logos of nature, to which the human belongs. What is natural is what contains appropriate strength. Thus, it is natural for humans to use fire and it is inappropriate for someone to use power to deprive them of fire. There is a possibility to strike bargains, change them and contest them in the public arena. Greek mythology, for example, reflects this way of natural bargaining. The understanding of power must be adjudicated discursively and not imposed by edicts. Accordingly, this “freedom” is what characterizes the West and at the same time what deflects the imperative absolutes of the Middle East and its autocratic civilization: no individual, no rights or responsibilities, and not being a master of one’s own thinking and body – all of these are property of autocracy.

Having suggested earlier that the consciousness, constitutive of the will to equality, institutes an open public arena accessible to all without exceptions, we must now consider how equality, once it has been realized, confirms such a consciousness. Once equality is posited and begins to be realized, each individual has neither a master nor a servant; he is thrown back upon himself. He tends to assume an attitude of individualism, all the way to proclaim that his body is his own “property” and cannot be appropriated without his consent. Freed for his own success and happiness, the individual could hardly tear himself away from his private concerns and tends to leave the public arena to the representatives and to state power. The individual is concerned with the public arena solely to the extent that his private interests are affected. In this sense, he is independent; he can follow his wants and need not be concerned with anyone, and need not expect anything from anyone; he becomes detached and, in face of the state and society, completely insignificant. His independ-
ence is the point of his pride, and yet it is also his weakness, because he is completely isolated and helpless in face of the overwhelming social events. The sole recourse for help, then, is the state; all other help would be simply “voluntary”. Thus, the proud individual has only one real neighbor, who is duty bound to help: state. As if naturally, his appeals must turn to the state power. Thus, the individual feels both independent and completely dependent. One could even call this a “natural dialectics” of democratic consciousness that generally and in principle denies what in singular cases it affirms. The academicians want their autonomy without any interference from authorities; but as soon as there is unrest in their own domain, they call the authorities.

This is the general dialectical duality: demands for independence and call for the state to constantly intervene and restore peace. Another factor of this dialectic reveals that the will to independence contains its own call for state support in a democratic society. Being independent, the singular cannot withstand the impositions that social groups or organizations might exercise over him; hence, he needs the state to guarantee his independence. Indeed, the state is called upon to guarantee not only independence, but the right of the singular to be different, to be a peace disturber in the sense of a right to demand changes in the law, to express his opinion, to protest, and in general to exercise his freedom. All these demands by the individual result in an increment of state’s power, since the latter, while legitimated to protect the individual, is also legitimated to protect the counterdemands of other individuals against the “disturber” of peace, the exerciser of freedom. This may be the background of universal conformity.

It has been noted above how the will to equality tends to create a centralized, unified and uniformly functioning powerful state. The increasing realization of equality has a tendency to increase the role and power of the state to such an extent, that it appears as a kind of natural presence and not as a result of decision. This is, of course, a troublesome, but not the final note in a democratic revolution; after all, the will to equality is also a will to freedom, and the latter is capable of guarding against infringements, especially when freedom subsumes equality under its own demands and makes it its own deliberate base. Yet, we should point to a difference between democracies: some have emerged among the people, who had an understanding of independence and freedom prior to calling for equality. Once they have
gained equality, they retained a strong sense of individual freedom and a sense of opposition to any governmental decrees that would limit freedom. Others have begun with equality, e.g. the European monarchic absolutism, which had established equality without offering freedom. In this case, the European development tended toward equality and the call for state guarantees of equality even if freedom is to be either limited or suppressed. This is the difference between the AngloAmerican and the Continental trends. The English, who settled in the new world to found a democracy, were accustomed to deal with public matters. They had customs that allowed freedom of thought, of expression, personal freedom and local selfgovernment. They took these freedoms as self-evident and built their new world democracy. Equality was founded on freedom. For the Americans, thus, freedom is the older over equality. For the Europeans the case is reversed. Thus, in France, when the democratic revolution was established and equality achieved, all power went to the state. The lacuna could not be filled by any other means. Equality requires that there should not be any rank distinctions and indeed not even singular differences in freedom.

In complex democratic political society, there is a “natural centralization”, while local independent administrations play a lesser role. Given this centralization, the public’s ability to insure the proper function of the government requires knowledge, participation and education. Lacking these, the dangers of power usurpation become obvious. If the public is ignorant of the principles, paths and efforts required in order of maintaining democracy, then democratic despotism looms imminent. Centralized government is then in a position to either attract the few, who are educated, and hence form a ruling elite, or incorporate the uneducated, yet “committed”, to rule by blind power. In this case, the possessors of power tend to perpetuate themselves by various tricks. One of the common ploys, which we have seen with the Athenians, was a constant pressure on the public through a threat of war, through an invention of “enemies” everywhere, calling for increasing power of the central government, and promising fame abroad and security at home. This ploy gives the holders of power not only means to diminish the power of the population, but of any member or a group of a population that might question the “authorities”. The latter is in a position to extend the dangers of the state to include “internal” enemies and “collaborators” against the people. The “external”
enemies are “internalized”. Fearing its own defeat, the population is called upon and is ready to surrender more freedoms in order to “protect” freedom. The power holders of the state can begin to dispense with the public arena and transform the Polis into a social system of powers, favors, secrets and manipulations. While Europe had made numerous revolutions and counterrevolutions since the French experiment, all such revolutions had one constant point: centralization. Fascism and communism are the most extreme examples, although each attempts to back itself by appeals to the sciences. These threats must be seen in light of the democratic “formula”, although subsequently they will have to be seen in terms of a more pervasive power of modern scientific ontology.

The eidos of the democratic revolution is equality through freedom. Yet, the equalities established by freedom pose dangers for freedom. One wants to be free in order to be equal, yet once equality takes root, freedoms begin to shrink. As the French Revolution has shown, with one act the people acquired freedom, and having established equality, again abolished freedom. But what is more troublesome and unintended is the tendency of equality toward the median, the average and a distrust of any outstanding or at least publicly glorified personalities. This does not lead to a blatant tyranny, does not abolish public institutions, but has a peaceful pressure against freedom. Freedom of course can never vanish in political society that maintains the hard won equality. Equality could not long survive without the former. Thus, democracy is crisscrossed by two trends: on the one hand, the trend calling for the centralization of political power and the direction from such a power, and a tendency to demand freedom. One usually thinks that these different trends could be mediated by the election of the occupants of political power positions, leading to a seeming combination between central power and freedom. But what does it mean for a citizen to enter the public arena for one moment to elect the officials and then to disappear back into social life and its numerous interests. The periodic elections do not at all guarantee that the central power will act democratically, and indeed lends the citizen the pretense of “participation”, while at the same time weakening his political will. The latter is always exposed to dissolution with a simple “refusal” to vote.

This is to say, the citizen enters into the public arena because of the pressure from mass opinion propagandized by mass media: vote. But
these momentary excursions do not demand of the citizen to be an aware participant in the public domain, to exercise his political thinking and activities. Lacking this, the citizen begins to mix the political with the social, leading to the results of regarding the political as a solution to social issues or as something that is controlled by the “others”, who have “higher” social positions and controlling power in the public domain. The latter view leads the citizen to believe that he cannot “win” against the socially powerful and it is best that he leave the political alone. Moreover, the citizen is told that the issues are so vast and complex – almost cosmic in scope – and, hence, accessible only to experts and not to persons, whose political concerns should be focused on “local budget”. At the same time, “the man on the street” is asked his opinion on every subject matter and this opinion becomes the standard of truth for the day.

Having asked the central government to exclude the citizen from participation, except on the election day, we are in turn asking the nonparticipating citizen to offer an opinion on all public matters. Moreover, the centralized powers would find it difficult to deal with a public that is both politically and judgmentally incapacitated or both politically and judgmentally sophisticated. In the former case, the appointed officials would have to attempt to guess constantly what the momentary public whims are and at the same time reduce the operations of the public arena in order to make them appear as if they were responses to the tandem “this is what the people want now”. In the second instance, the centralized power would be on a constant notice concerning its operations; the appointed officials would be compelled to adhere to the public duties, for which they were appointed. Are these states of affairs in a democratic political society a permanent condition, or can they be so constituted as to avoid the pitfalls suggested above?

The democratic revolution takes for granted that there is no rigid or fixed form that democracy should assume; it remains open and variable. Usually, there is a concern with the well-being of the public, but not an overly great concern with grand purposes. The individual is “independent”, although the social enterprises tend to subsume him and exercise power over him.

While customs are established and maintained, they do not have the force of law or inevitability. Even the laws have become “humane” guaranteeing not only rights, but many other amenities, such as protections against social powers and their incursion into private lives, possibilities
of public education without ideological impositions and manipulations. Of course, life lacks the magnificence that was once the province of the rulers, at the expense of the ruled. Whatever remains of ceremonial differences is simply a residuum of previous undemocratic times. Equality, in short, is abolishing such differentiations. The abolishment is no longer a task of some dedicated individuals, but is an effort of civic duty performed by many, i.e. educators; the latter is to be regarded as a way of increasing equalization through educational advances. Indeed, while social classes still exist, politically one should note an increasing necessity for crosssocial work and cooperation. The call for increasing knowledge, in order to be able to participate more fully in political society, is universal; what remains is its full implementation. This can no longer be avoided. Of course, in this situation neither an individual nor a group can make any claims as to “whither” we are tending or what is our “destiny”. These notions are decided provisionally with constant shifts in aims and means. Novelty itself seems to be the main outline of the democratic life.

If there are drawbacks in democracy, there is one basic means of checking them: political freedom. The formula is shown in political ethos. If freedom, which owes its realization to equality, is not to disappear behind equality, then these two determinations shaping democratic consciousness must be reversed. The democratic consciousness has assumed equality to be preeminent. In this sense, freedom is used for the establishment of equality. But if this is not to lead to the despotism of equality, freedom must be backed by equality of freedom. This is not a surrender of equality, but rather recognition of the main factor, which made equality possible. This reversal allows the establishment of the initial equation of freedom and equality: the will to equality becomes the basis for the will to freedom, while freedom becomes the determining viewpoint for the will to equality. But the transformed consciousness is not adequate for the realization of the eidos of political society. We suggest the fulfillment of three conditions:

1. The thought of freedom cannot be forced upon a person externally. No placards and proclamations can make one free; one must recognize one’s own task and responsibility. Indeed, one in a way “knows” this freedom and responsibility, yet one must insist upon exercising it. This “knowledge” is equality and the latter is a prop for the reversal of equality and freedom in order for freedom to be regarded as a basis of equality.
2. The establishment of this transformation in reality is called for when one recognizes its necessity, i.e. when it is endangered. If freedom is not seen as threatened, then one will continue to maintain equality, but not allow, or at least will not call for, the founding of equality on freedom. It could be well argued that freedom currently is endangered and precisely by equality. The more equality becomes preeminent, insisted upon, the more is freedom restricted. Thus, what has to be limited is the all-pervasive power stemming from equality, appearing in the above discussion of the phenomena of mass opinion, political nonparticipation, privatization, technocratization, and subjection of the person under heterogeneous power of interests. This power is what necessitates and demands retransformation of democratic consciousness toward the priority of freedom as its own purpose and not as means for various interested material equalities.

3. This necessity is not something “natural”. Rather, it is a task to be taken up; if the citizen does not take up the task, then freedom ceases to be a factor. Freedom is not a state of being but a deed, an insistence and persistence. No doubt, this kind of transformation of democratic consciousness elicits in the social arena numerous tensions and conflicts. The will to freedom reentering the domain of political society turns against all the tendencies in democracy to limit or even abolish freedom in favor of equality. Yet, such a will is in a position to dissolve the contradiction, into which democracy sinks. This is the mentioned contradiction between the will to independence and the tendency toward conformity, between the sense of freedom and the careless surrendering of freedom to the “officials” or to social groups in a position of “authority and leadership”. It is precisely this logic, which makes for the danger and the possibility of freedom in democracy. The citizen is in a position to exclude the social and even public powers from his life, but at the same time, in case of “trouble”, the same citizen calls for immediate social and state interference in his life. In this sense, the democratic consciousness swings between independence and submission. While this discussion has suggested a distinction between freedom and equality, it did not imply that a democratic polis could exist solely on the basis only of one or the other. Ultimately, both are a condition and must be treated as mutual.
Since Thucydides, we have known that every political decision also raises a question of power. Yet, we also know that power is not the sole problem; it becomes a problem, when it is not submitted to political ethos. We also know that an appeal to morality is completely inadequate to deflect the abuses of power. Only political society with its arena, where freedomequality comprise a unity that the political ethos can maintain, power claims in check. If such an ethos is abolished or has not yet been achieved, the human is constantly exposed to power abuses. The aim of the democratic revolution is the establishment of this ethos. This revolution of modern democracy takes for granted an underlying conception of reflection.

In our discussion of methodology, we claimed that the philosophical hermeneutics, with its closed circle, is necessary for the understanding of modern West, but not sufficient to explicate the open horizon that is tacitly present in this hermeneutics. The tacitly present aspect is twofold: one, Western philosophical recognition of human essence as fallible and, hence, open for self-correction and, thus, correction of laws and institutions, and two, the correction and extension of such essence by way of methodological reflection. In this sense, methodical reflection and its relationship to freedom is most crucial for our understanding of equality. Indeed, we are called to reflect upon consciousness structures, social structures, methods, aims of sciences, freedom and equality, interrelationships between science, society, economy and politics. How is such a reflection founded and legitimated? In fact, there appears another problem. The political progressives call for a change of social relationships through concentrated effort and at the same time insist upon protracted reflection. But reflection is a theoretical-rational attitude that is at the core of autonomy. How do we relate reflection that turns to theoretical positions with activity? The usual notion of reflection is borrowed from the medieval philosophies of “intention recta” and “intention oblique”, where the first means a direct seeing of something, while the latter means a glance toward the seeing. This does not explain how the second could become preeminent when the first is the founding one; would this not mean a perversion of a natural priority. Indeed, the common conception of reflection would not lead us to the priority of the second mode, which is constantly demanded in our world. This mode could be called “objectivating”. We know well that Descartes
has posited a mode of thinking that starts with the very essence of thought and the certitude of the *I am*. But this also means that everything that appears to consciousness does so in light of the certitude of consciousness. The modern experience of reflection is not a mere act of cognition, but of being, of an ego, and with others, of inter-subjective world. The essence of the subject consists of an activity that is determined by selfconsciousness. Said in other way, subject consists of a self-conscious and willed activity. Obviously, the will, determined in its activity by selfconscious reflection, is a selfwilling. A being that thinks itself as selfwilled can offer numerous possibilities of selfwilling and determination: as a spirit, reason, ego, life, and the latter as a instinctual process, as in Schopenhauer, or as a higher conscious affirmation of life, as in Nietzsche, or an existence that is singularized, socialized, nationalized.

It is obvious from our discussion of methodology that a being founded in reflection allows various metaphysical positions. This is to say modern metaphysics is at the outset pluralistic, and modern pluralism has its source in this metaphysics. Today we experience consciousness primarily as social and political and, thus, our will as political self-determination. If we conceive consciousness in this social-political sense, then the two questions raised at the outset can now be answered in the following ways: (1) the basic character of consciousness is reflection. If this is achieved, then we take an objectifying position not only to this or that, but attain freedom toward our own consciousness. If this consciousness is primarily social and political, then this consciousness lends us freedom in relation to social and political domain, in which we reside. The enactment of conscious reflection constitutes a freedom of ourselves toward ourselves in such a way, that the social and political relations become objects of free knowledge, willing and affectivity of the subject. The call for reflection is founded in freedom, which allows reflection, and reflection is elicited for the sake of freedom. (2) Reflection and activity have usually been related in an order of priority, with the former preceding the latter. Thus, the view is that reflection considers the aims and the means for the achievement of the aims. Such a reflection belongs to every type of praxis. Yet, what the modern reflection adds to the activity is the inclusion of the process of the reflective consciousness itself.

If we remind ourselves that reflective activity is liberating insofar as the social and political domain can become an object of concern and prax-
is, then it should be noted that such a reflection precedes both theoretical and practical reason and makes both possible. It makes the theoretical attitude possible insofar, as it posits consciousness as an object of scientific analyses and at the same time transcends such an analysis. Reflection also enables the practical attitude by showing how consciousness relates to the object of want and act. As a source of theoretical relationship of consciousness to itself, reflection is more theoretical than all theoretical knowledge, and as a source of praxis, it is more practical than any wanting and activity. In their source of liberating reflection, theory and praxis refer to their initial unity, from which they originate. If we recognize this source, we are also called upon to decipher what constitutes this reflection.

In the ruminations about reflection, we note that it allows us to reach a freedom, through which consciousness becomes an object of knowledge and activity. What then is this free region that is opened by reflection? Within it, everything appears as an object of knowledge, planning and activity. The free domain, which is opened by reflection, remains related to the objects of cognition and want. It is a basic condition for objectification. But this does not yet tell us what comprises the experience of this free region. Indeed, reflection surpasses and transforms all objective knowledge and volition by making them possible, yet as this enablement it remains tied to cognition and volition and their objects. Reflection, thus, is in no position to decipher the essence of the free region, which it opens. Here, we encounter the limits of reflection, limits, which are not some inadequacy of reflection, but rather something, that belongs essentially to it. The region taken up by reflection, in which consciousness and want can appear as objects of theory and praxis, is itself not something objective. The free region cannot be represented in any objective form; does it mean that it is something irrational and, therefore, subjective?

This would lead us to traditional blind prejudgments. After all, reflection takes place, and in a certain sense it is thought and, thus, it is not irrational. It is thought by us as a condition of free access to ourselves, i.e. to a consciousness, which determines us. But it is not thought in its own right. This means that we can decipher this free region in a mode of thought, which is not itself a reflection. This leads to a peculiar shift. Reflection occupies a region of free turning to ourselves. It occupies this region, but does not establish it; it takes this region for granted. What reflection posits
are objects of cognition and want. In this sense, freedom is not a con-
sequence of reflection, but rather reflection owes its freedom to the region,
which reflection takes up although is incapable to decipher. The decipher-
ing requires an entirely different mode of thought, which we do not pos-
sess, but which is the sole access to the essence of freedom. To open such
thinking would be the main task of current philosophy. This should not
mean that this thinking can become something that we want. All wanting
is objectifying. Thus, the access to it is in not wanting and not objectify-
ing. And this is our dilemma: in order to trace out this region, we seem to
require objectification, and at the same time we take for granted this very
region. What we seek is perhaps a playspace, in which all that are appear
in their open options without impositions such that we too are drawn into
this open play space. In the political arena, this would suggest an opening
of play region, in which each and everyone could participate without the
objectified social aims and means, without the power presumptions stem-
m ing from such objectification. Here, reflection itself would find itself in
a domain, in which it too would be decentered from its own objective
and indeed subjective postures. It would be the free reflection upon and
tolerance of every individual as the source both of will and rationality.
This is also an inter-subjective domain: it opens every individual to every
other individual in tolerant and free relationships. It is then the source
and equally the ground of democratic political society. But, in turn, the
constant establishment of political society as a free domain is a condition
of free reflection. One cannot be given without the other. In brief, we con-
tend that the freedom of reflection and the establishment of political soci-
ety are one and the same event. In the second part of this volume, the very
ground of such a reflection will be disclosed.

IntentionWillPower

Given the free region of reflection, there appears a shift toward the
priority of the “subject” as the decisive factor with respect to what the
world is and what the subject decides itself to be. As already mentioned,
the subject wants equality of everyone; yet, obviously, there are notable
inequalities in abilities, desires, exertion of effort in the political arena to
maintain one’s voice and participation, and in the environmental condi-
tions. It seems then that equality, and indeed freedom, is something to be achieved. The effort to achieve freedom and equality dominates the modern age and its understanding of power into the contemporary Lithuania and Europe. To get to the roots of this understanding, it is essential to decipher the two major intentionalities unfolding through the modern age. While both take for granted the above deciphered modern Western revolution, they also require investigation into the ways that the mentioned revolution could be implemented. In his work *Power and Humanity*, Schabert, in fact, suggests that modern West moves along two lines of development in an effort to reach a historical accord between equality and freedom. And in his work *Tractatus Concerning Human Power*, Fink traces the development of modernity only to discover that modernity is created by a very specific conception of power, created as if out of nothing. The following discussion will include the works of the two thinkers. Other authors, such as Volkmann Schluck, Luhmann, and Husserl, will appear in appropriate places of our discussion. While the question of power might not appear directly, it will be implied in their works.

Although there is a continuity between the classical and modern traditions with respect to the basic conception of the equality of the human, the modern thought redefines this equality in terms of freedom without any inherent essence that would determine the human to be a specific being. The indetermination initially separates the human from nature. The modern “experiment” is an attempt to replace the rule of nature and its theological support by some transcendent being. In such a setting, human becomes an image, an *Imago Dei*, and the surrounding environment reflects the limits imposed by the transcendent creator – the just discussed autocratic ruler. It is important to note that while the medieval claim insists that the natural world and its divinely imposed laws cannot be transgressed, this theological understanding includes an ambiguity between the creator as a law giver, and as a will. First, the creative act is the act of will, and second, the creator can change the course of nature by all sorts of “willful miracles”. This lends priority to will. Such a view will be accepted by modernity at the human level, giving priority to the metaphysics of will over the ontology of reason. This is a unique conception in human history, leading, according to Richter,
to a selfevaluation of the human as omniscient and omnipotent. We shall analyze the ground for this claim in time. Meanwhile, it is obvious that with writers such as Bacon and his conception of knowledge not as something that is interested in the understanding of nature, but in the effort to change it, to control it, to submit it to human power, there appear both the theological and the human primacy of the metaphysics of will. His *De Regno Hominem* promises human domination over nature. Indeed, Bacon already names the modern conception of man’s power to change the world at the price of disregard for others and for nature. His moral dictum becomes the following: happiness is either the stupidity or death of others; he is even fond of an old saying: no serpent can become a dragon until it devours other serpents. This is, of course, already the Hobbes’ notion of a struggle of all against all, and the emergent social morality bolstered, subsequently, by scientific technology. This morality holds a view that what is unpleasant or unacceptable in the environment can be changed or abolished – but only on the basis of autocratic science.

The process of transformation from the “old” to the “modern” lived world stretches from late medieval through the Renaissance. Yet, the issue is basically one: the emancipation from all traditions, from the environment, and building the future without hindrances either from the past or from divinities. Each generation should be free to repeat the break with the past and to create its own world and itself in accordance with its own willed designs. While initially there were still debates concerning man’s fragility, contingency, subsequently, such views were pushed aside. In 1350, Johannes von Tepel in his work *Der Ackerman aus Boehmen* depicted a debate between Ackermann and death, in which death reprimanded him for his selfevaluation. Hundred years later, Pico della Mirandola in his work *Oratio de Dignitate Hominis* completely rejected the “arguments of death”. For him, man is *magnum miraculum* and extends this notion to *theos anthropos*. Pico developed the divinization of man from three assumptions: (1) there is no specific nature of the human, (2) the human can make of himself what he wills, and (3) the great wonder in this world is the human who, in his selfdetermination, can become divine. Indeed, as an unconditional source of reason and will, he is identical with the traditional definition of the divine.

The way Pico depicted the creation of the human reveals the modern assumption of complete human freedom and his destiny to control the
world. According to Pico’s depiction, the creator told his “new son”: “I have not assigned to you any fixed place nor have I given you a specific form. I have not given you any talent that would be appropriate to you alone. You will have to determine your place, your form and your talents in accordance with your wishes and your measure. I have created you neither as heavenly nor as earthly, neither mortal nor immortal, so that you could create yourself freely from your own power, shaping and transforming yourself to a form which you wish to acquire. You can reduce yourself to an animal or elevate yourself to a divinity”. In principle, the human has no natural form – once seen as the mainstay of human belonging to nature – and resultantly he can be a maker of himself and, indeed, of his world. This indefinable human is, of course, the above discussed region of reflection, allowing the constitution of numerous views of the human about himself and his world.

Pico’s view places the human in a light that favors the human even over gods. The latter are fixed by their nature, while the human can become anything. Pico stresses persistently that the human can become what he wills. This is the “wonder man” of modernity, constituting a philosophical anthropology to fit the modern age. Without this anthropology, it would be difficult to understand the development of the autonomous, free being who is a maker of himself and his world. This is the modern revolution. By the eighteenth century, one had an enlightened view and an enlightened anthropology. Condillac has no longer any question but that the human creates and exists from himself. One of the initial interpretations of this selfelevation was “naturalistic” in the sense, that the human follows his rational selfinterest. The world was reinterpreted as a geometric machine to be arbitrary manipulated by human interests. Condorcet designates the Philosophie Nouvelle, with the terms “true, rational, scientific”, and the old with mistaken, nonsensical and illusory. The rejection of the old is not a loss, but a gain over errors and illusions. Fontenelle goes so far as to claim that we ought to be thankful to the old philosophies for having exhausted most of the false opinions and for having set us free from their nonsense. The previous humanity was a youthful stage, while the modern man has reached maturity and need no longer be in error. Thus, it is no longer a question whether current human activities are good or bad, have good or bad consequences, have value or disvalue; rather, each activity is justifiable if it replaces something
old by something new, something “progressive”. This is one of the sources not only of progress, but of the view of truth as historical. Whoever lives today is superior to those in the past because he is more modern and novel, has acquired a greater mastery over the environment and resultantly more truth. Not only is the novel more true, but also it is better – improvement of humanity through science and technology.

The method for achieving the truth is mathematics. By the time of Descartes, the final theoretical formulation of nature had to be mathematical quantitatively. There is nothing in the world, including divinities, which are not submitted to the laws of quantification. With the latter, the motive for mastery and conquest of nature reaches almost lyrical stage, a stage that allows the human to equate himself with divinity. The world is material, atomistic, and mechanical; it functions in accordance with mathematically precise laws; hence, if humans can decipher such laws, their knowledge becomes equal to divine knowledge. With Galileo, there is no qualitative difference between human and divine knowledge. With this equation, we acquire another elevation of the human over nature subtended by an intention to master and have power over all. If human knowledge is absolute, then he is in a position of a creator of the world. As Galileo ruminates, the human is so great that he should envy himself. The literature of the Scientific Enlightenment is replete with this narcistic view of the human. Not only Galileo, but Bacon and even Newton repeatedly emphasize their conviction that the new *Filosofia Naturale* will place man in such a superior position over nature, that the human will have power even over himself.

The only writer of note who objected to the over inflated exuberance was Montaigne. Although his voice was not heeded, his analyses reveal a particular psychological composition. The self-elevation does not stem from philosophical theoretical reflection, but from arrogance. The arrogance overheats the imagination and propels it with pictures of extreme self-importance and superiority of being a measure and standard of all things. The overheated imagination might be even a protection against what Richter calls the real condition of modernity: complete human insignificance. As the modern human emerges from the security of an all-encompassing, protective, and alive cosmos of medieval period into the materialistic, mechanical and indifferent world, the human needs compensation – perhaps overcompensation – a self-constructed imagery of
absolute significance and power of man. The overcompensation might be seen in two respects: (1) being a child of some divinity, the medieval person feels worthy, yet his worth depends on another being, a being that makes everything worthy, but, as we saw above, also subservient to a master. Such subservience guarantees that no one leaves his assigned social position. A peasant is born to be property of his master and could not even imagine being an aristocrat; after all, this is an order established from the “beginning of the world”. A revolt against this conception requires the human to become the source of worth of himself and of the world; (2) the materialization and mechanization of the world requires a certain vivification of the cosmos, a source of value and worth for the world; all this must come from the human, who, in order to become the source of all value and worth, must become supreme, a ruler, an omnipotent master.

Of course, the omnipotence requires that humans acquire a complete knowledge of the mechanisms of the material world. Without such knowledge of the “hidden secrets”, human dominance could not be complete; without the equivalence of his power with nature, the human could not dominate the world effectively. As long as something escapes human control, man is still “inferior” to nature; hence, the task is to uncover all the secrets in order to subsume them under human technical designs. The new cosmic center is the sole source of value and beauty. As Buffon proclaims, the human is capable of transforming the Nature Brute into Nature Novelle. As he ponders the world, he suggests that if we look at the world, where no human has yet settled, the brute nature, we find it to be ugly and dead. It is I, solely I, who makes nature attractive and living. Everything changes only through me, and a new nature comes from the hand of man. Man, the master over the regions, has changed and renewed everything in this world, and his right is founded on nothing else than his right as a conqueror. Nature is the “raw material stuff” and the human can shape it in accordance with his wishes.

Given this direction, there is an admixture of scientism and freedom. One is free to use science in order to master and control nature; yet, in turn, the human too can become part of the natural environment and, hence, must submit to the controls of sciences. And this is one of the major attitudes emerging with the view of mastering everything through science. Having made an absolutist claim, i.e. that science with its math-
ematical method can acquire divine knowledge, this knowledge then can be applied to the human. Hence, Bacon has no question but that even politics could be reduced to physics. It is instructive that Bacon, one of the fathers of modern scientism, has persistently opposed the then emerging Political Enlightenment and its rejection of all political absolutisms. In the well-known case of Bacon and Coke, Bacon supported the absolutism of monarchy and its power against Coke and the “superstitious population”. It is up to the new science to control all human affairs without any need to respect the views of the population. It is obvious that once again we encounter the split in modern consciousness between the Political Enlightenment and the Scientific Enlightenment, such that the latter, with its absolutization of science and those who are in charge of science, form an autocratic movement, specifically Marxism and its variants, and disregard humans as a labor force to be subjected to the material needs and material production. In this sense, freedom and equality, human dignity and respect, have no place in scientific socialism. As we shall see subsequently, this trend constitutes some of the political technocracies of our age. While humans are in charge of scientific reconstruction of the world, and the human, only some of the humans, the ones in the “know”, i.e. the scientists, the ones in charge of scientific progress and the aim of history, should be the rulers over the masses, of course, for the benefit of the masses.

The concentration of power in the hands of the human calls for a specific attitude: distance from nature, i.e. making nature into an “object”. One cannot rule over something if one remains a part of what is being ruled. One has to be a nonparticipating observer. This distance allows the human to survey all nature indifferently, from no particular vantage point and, thus, from no particular place. In this sense, the human has no specific place in the world and must establish the place in accordance with his methods. Pascal, in fact, suggests that the modern man has lost his appropriate place in the order of the cosmos. He becomes the Archimedean point, from which the world can be mastered. According to Descartes, Archimedes still conceived of a point, from which he could move the earth, yet, the only certain point we have is the thinking and acting ego. Only from the ego that one can develop Philosophie Practique as a means of domination and power over nature. The ego is the Archimedean point outside of nature which, in its self-certainty, can think, will and remake
the world. The shift from the power of nature to the power of the human is almost complete. From this external point, nature is determined as a copy of a primordial archetype designed by the human. By the nineteenth century, there is no longer any question concerning the superiority of the human and, specifically, the will. As Fichte announced, nature is the servant of the ego. Everything must correspond to my thought and will, and I will in accordance with a freely projected aim. This will is ultimate and is not determined by anything higher; it rules the body by virtue of which the ego constructs the surrounding world. I will to have influence in the world in accordance with my powers, while the surroundings cannot have any influence over me. I am the Archimedian point, from which the world is moved – I am the sole power – omnipotent. As Schelling announces, if you are a being in itself, then no opposing power can change your condition and limit your freedom. Thus, strive to become a being in itself, absolutely free, to subordinate every heteronomous power under your autonomy, and through your freedom strive to extend your freedom to absolute, unlimited power.

While this being in itself might be limited by the resistance of the environment, nonetheless the extent to which the resistance is experienced depends on human expansion of power and, thus, is a manifestation of this power. This is to say, the very resistance is determined by human striving for power. It is the human power, which defines the conditions, which will be seen as resistance. Thus, the human is the *Ens Realisimum*, while nature becomes an appearance in the actualization process of man. This is the principle of the human as totally self-determining. To be self-determining is to be autonomous. This is the result of the conception that the human has no pre-given nature, no essence, and that by discovering the appropriate method he can be a master over nature.

Obviously, this background comprises two factors: first, the human is in principle self-determined, autonomous being, and second, in this self-determination he must determine the world by remaking it in his own image. As Marxism would have it, the material nature, and the material man, must be humanized. And this is also the background of the emergence of the previously mentioned two intentionalities: Political Enlightenment calling for the free autonomy of each individual and Scientific Enlightenment calling for the mastery of the environment and the human – remak-
ing the human in accordance with an improved material design. These two intentionalities lead to two divergent, although inseparable modern histories. One wants to guarantee human freedom through institutions, the other wants to postpone freedom until the environment and the human will become completely determined by human power. This is to say, one history considers the human as autonomous, omnipotent, even totally narcistic and self-regarding, whereas the other is the reality, which lags behind the concrete establishment of this freedom due to the still inadequate controls of the material world. Despite all the varieties of Marxisms and their efforts to establish the “new man”, in principle Marxism is premised on the notion that freedom and equality of everyone will be realized by reshaping the material conditions to be totally under the will of the human. We shall depict the “logic” of scientific socialism and its continuous “delay” of the final solution of the riddle of history.

At this juncture it should be pointed out that one of the “motives” to master nature is inherent in the democratic revolution. Each person, in this revolution, has to be a maker of his own life, his own destiny; he must be independent from others and secure his own means of well-being. He owes nothing to anyone, and he cannot expect anything from others. Thus, the basic striving is to accumulate means of survival, to guarantee one’s own well-being and security. But this direction begins the long road of privatization of all the public domain, and finally the privatization of political society. The setting up of the Political Enlightenment also set up the institutional conditions for the adjudication of what is public and what is private; the stress on the individual’s selfreliance, nonetheless, compromises the conflation of the political with the private and begins to force the private into the public, and conversely. This is a hidden side of the danger for democracy, since the latter can easily be mistaken for the sum of private interests and not an open arena of maintenance of freedom and equality. In this mixture, the individual “participates” in the public only to the extent that his specific interests require. Everything else is left to the officials and other interests. Thus, he ceases to be a continuous founding of political society.

Here, we have reached a multifaceted tension: first, there is the tension between freedom and equality – even if they are initially and in principle mutually founding. This tension becomes apparent in the democratic political society, when in the public domain freedom and equality
are maintained as inseparable, but in the social and private arena, there appear noted material inequities. Second, there is a tension between an effort to establish human mastery over nature and over traditional views of human essence. Third, there emerges a tension between the human as a source of power and mastery, and the human, who becomes subject to the very power means created by the human. Fourth, the tension between the social and private demands to secure material means of well-being, and the requirements of maintaining the democratic public domain as a guarantee of autonomy and equality. Fifth, there is appears a tension between the constant requirement of maintaining the freedom of the public domain both as the result and the source of reflective consciousness, and its restriction to specific and reflectively established, i.e. free projects of will. Indeed, the very projects as free are founded on this very public reflective domain. All in all, these tensions are not a given; they depend on the requisite activities that constitute them as given.

Given this context of modern Western world, it is now necessary to extend its ground into what comprises the basic hermeneutical tension and confrontation between two modern trends, although both seemingly founded on the same prejudgment – autonomy and equality. As we shall see in the next chapter, there is a struggle between two powerful interpretations of the world, both claiming to be the best and most beneficial ways of life for humanity. As already mentioned, Lithuania was in the middle of this tension and it still faces the issues unresolved by its liberation from the Soviet Union, specifically, as we shall see, the modern West is at the basis of both, Scientific and Political Enlightenments, such that both are unavoidable and, in many cases, incompatible. Now, it is necessary to expound on the philosophies of the two Enlightenments and how they provide context both, for the paradigm of the former Soviet Union and for efforts to establish a new paradigm. In this text, we shall have to decide whether the interpretation of the new paradigm is adequate, and if not, what is lacking.
Suggested Reading

Wagner, H. Philosophie und Reflexion (Muenchen: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag, 1959).
Fink, E. Traktat ueber die Gewalt des Menschen (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1974).
Richter, H. Der Gotteskomplex (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982).
Schelling F. W. Neue Deduktion der Naturrechts (Darmstadt, 1967).
CHAPTER IV

INSTITUTIONS AND LIBERATION

Introduction

Methodological hermeneutics has disclosed a complex way that a tradition or one aspect of a tradition can oppress another tradition and how the oppressed might become relevant to the oppressor and, thus, regain its position if not of superiority, at least as an unavoidable presence with which one has to contend. Following the methodological requirements, it is now possible to explicate the background philosophical principles of the Scientific Enlightenment and the ways that it led to its opposition to the Political Enlightenment, an opposition that is clearly established by Marxism as a paradigm of the society of the Soviet Union. It is significant that the Marxian paradigm, interpreted in the Soviet Union as scientific socialism and as an extension of the Scientific Enlightenment, suppressed the Political Enlightenment. It is important for Lithuania, as part of the former Soviet Union, to understand in principle what comprised the tension between the two enlightenments and how such a tension is playing out in contemporary Lithuania. While the analyses in the last chapter indicated a tension between the two enlightenments that included a broad sweep of the principles of any autocracy and its opposition to freedom, human individual, dignity, self-respect and respect for others, it is now essential to suggest the efforts of each enlightenment to maintain itself.

The development of modern philosophies toward the Political and Scientific enlightenments has resulted in two contemporary political directions: one stressing the defense of democratic institutions and all that these institutions guarantee – equal rights, freedom of speech and press, belief, opinion, and occupation, with a requirement for responsibility to the law and its maintenance. The other direction consists of “liberation” movements, up till the recently occupying Soviet Union and its satellites –
including various regions in Africa, Latin America and China. Since both directions originated in modern Western consciousness, the task of this chapter is to develop one ontological layer that constitutes the framework of contemporary tensions still prevalent in Lithuania and even across Europe in the form of freedom counter equality and conversely, between those emphasizing market economy and those emphasizing the role of government in planning and maintaining some areas of social life, including education, public transportation and in part health care. The controversies, in fact, include the supporters of the views that democratic institutions are ideological expressions of private interests, leading to inequalities and oppressions, and the views that factual and historical developments of private interests have no necessary connection with the developments of democratic institutions and all that they guarantee and sanction.

Interesting and important as these controversies are, the discussion in this chapter is directed toward “ontological consciousness and its intentionalities” providing a context, from which unfold the liberal Political Enlightenment with democratic institutions and the Scientific Enlightenment calling for “liberation” from such institutions in favor of reconstructing society in accordance with scientific establishment of material conditions in order to achieve scientifically projected results. No doubt, there are various affinities and differences between those two Enlightenments. They are a base for numerous orientations in sociology, economy and politics and controversies among them, but we shall treat them all as expressions, second level phenomena, founded upon more basic development of ontological consciousness for understanding the “crisis” of modern consciousness. Our quest is not arbitrary but, as Bernhard Waldenfels points out in his edited work *Phaenomenologie und Marxismus*, the roots of our current predicament has been opened up by thinkers, such as K.H. Volkmann-Schluck, L. Landgrebe, and E. Fink. Although without numerous references to their works, we shall follow their spirit in digging to the roots.

As we saw in the last chapter, the Political Enlightenment consists of consciousness, which rejects any claim that humans belong to nature or to divinities, which rule over nature. The result is a dramatic effort by Modern Western person to achieve an omniscient and omnipotent position. The understanding of the basis of this effort comprises modern reflective consciousness, suggested in the last chapter. Given this rejection,
there is only one solution to social/political domain: the governing must be based on laws agreed upon by the public and institutionalized. Institutions would have to guarantee every person’s autonomy, rights, value, respect and responsibility. Freely created by autonomous persons, the institutions negate the possibility of one person’s rule over another person, the taking away of freedom of another person, the abolition of equal rights, the rejection of toleration of other’s opinion and its free expression, and the negation of free decision concerning one’s own life. Intent on further securing human autonomy, the thinkers of the Political Enlightenment institutionalized governmental division of powers in order to prevent the possibility of government to rise above the institutions and establish domination of person over person. In this sense, institutions could not become instruments of individuals or groups seeking their private interests and elevation of power. As the jurist Martin Kriele claims, without the division of governmental tasks, democracy is not guaranteed, since there would not be checks and balances between administrative, legislative and judicial domains. Laws are equal for all, including for the elected officials. But he argues quite convincingly that institutions cannot be founded either on natural interests or on a power of a group. Interests and power abolish the modern principle of human autonomy and subject human actions to causes, leading to abolition of rights, responsibility and equality. It should be noted that the modern consciousness of human ontological autonomy is found not only in the Political Enlightenment, but also in other areas of understanding. The awareness that humans are creators of laws, that they are “divine beginning”, extends from early Renaissance and goes through the Romantic claim that man is “original creator”, a “divine genius”, all the way through the Narcistic and ego-centric self-glorification and Nietzsche’s reach toward the “overman”, who, in his free exercise of power, creates and destroys divinities. Even for Marxism, as we shall see in the next chapter, this ontology is in the background – although in an interpretation as “free activity”, such that by creating the conditions of his material existence, man creates himself. The historical human aim is to establish material conditions, which will not only consist of humanization of nature and man, but also the liberation of man from material necessities to allow man to live as free self-creator. Of course, Marx failed to grasp this ontological stance fully and reverted to “causal explanations” of human
history and life, and in doing so abandoned philosophy and the Political Enlightenment, turning the latter into a social arena for power confrontations and struggles.

The Ontology of Nature in Scientific Enlightenment

While we disclosed the will to control the natural environment and pointed out that the Scientific Enlightenment requires a devaluation of nature, we shall have to add a more basic dimension – the ontological and metaphysical, allowing such a devaluation to become “practical”. But this devaluation differs from that offered by the Political Enlightenment. For the latter, devaluation of nature was designed to elevate man above nature, while for the Scientific Enlightenment devaluation meant the stripping away all essential characteristics of the great variety of beings and a reduction of such beings, including humans, to homogeneous matter. This also means that for sciences man is to be reduced to material being, such that all his actions could be subjected to and explained by causes. Material world has no value or meaning. Prior to modern revolution, nature had beauty, goodness and value. For example, if a person desired something, it is because the desired thing had an intrinsic goodness and value. After the modern revolution, something has goodness, value, beauty and meaning because a person desires it. In brief, all the perceived qualities no longer belong to nature, but to human subject. Thus, nature is “unmasked” and appears in its plain, material reality. As Buffon in his work *La Nature* announces, brute nature has no beauty. Only I make nature attractive and alive. Everything changes through me, and a new nature flows from the hand of man.

Although this elevation of man and devaluation of nature is based on the ontological consciousness of autonomy, this consciousness is insufficient to guarantee human autonomy in nature. Humans are in nature, which far surpasses human powers and, thus, is a hindrance to autonomy. In order to achieve complete autonomy, man must become a master over nature. In other words, he must become a law giver not only to himself and in agreement with others to society, but also a law giver to nature. Galileó claims that nature is material and functions in accordance with mathematical laws. Since man is in a position to understand such laws completely, his understanding cannot be distinguished from divine wis-
If material events are known from divine vantage point, then man’s knowledge encompasses all totality. This, according to Schabert, means that human knowledge, respect and value are equal to divinity. Indeed, Galileo is so overwhelmed that he proclaims that man is so grand that he should be envious of himself.

Modern political confrontations between those, who support democratic institutions, and those, who want to discard them in the name of liberation and even equality, must be understood within the context of opposition, which flows from general liberalism of Enlightenment. Holding strictly to the principles of the Scientific Enlightenment, everything must be reduced to matter, which is transformable into material conditions and predictable results flowing from them. In this technocratic logic, the human must also be reduced to material process. Based on the ontology that humans have no specific nature, unique human form, it follows that humans can be made into anything and, given specific conditions, they will have to be regarded as results of such conditions. In turn, humans can be treated as material conditions – labor power – to yield projected results. As we shall see, this is the ground for the Marxian claim that given new material conditions, there will be a “new man”. Yet, in this sense, humans are results of material causes, and just as everything else are predictable products of scientific calculations. This is the principle, which formed the “grand experiment” of Marxism in the form “scientific socialism” presumably established in the Soviet Union – with a promise of a future autonomous new man. What distinguishes this autonomy from that of the Political Enlightenment is the ruling of society by “scientific technocracy” directed by social autocratic elites, using technology and humans to maintain state power. To better understand this ruling and its relationship to the Political Enlightenment it is necessary to distinguish between three types of modern liberalism. First liberalism is founded on the ontology of autonomy and equality, and the liberties, rights, value and responsibility implied by this liberalism. The latter guarantees autonomy, etc., by institutions allowing for pluralism, tolerance of opinions, political directions, religions, moralities and diverse ways of attaining them. These guarantees are further enhanced by the division of powers into legislative, judicial and administrative. Within the context of this liberalism, man lacks one right: the abolition of institutions, which guarantee human autonomy and
equality in the public domain. Such abolition would contradict human autonomy and the equal autonomy of others. The abolition of institutions would lead to abolition of equality of all under laws agreed by convention and an establishment of man’s rule by other men, resulting in a society of power confrontations by different groups.

This scientific wisdom is not for the sake of itself, but as an instrument to construct material events in accordance with human designs. Schabert points out that this constructionism is one of the most fundamental motives in the modern consciousness of human ontological autonomy. For example, Bacon is not interested in understanding material events for scientific curiosity, but primarily for the acquisition of power to rule over nature. After all, his main work contains a subtitle De Regno Hominis (human rule). Human rule, this intentionality to dominate requires complete knowledge of possible material combinations, since otherwise humans would not be in a position to subordinate them under human standards. If there is something in nature that still escapes human power to control, then humans are still in an inferior position with respect to nature. When all the secrets have been “tortured out” of nature and ruled by humans, then humans will be masters; all the surroundings and human intrinsic nature will be transformed by new standards. According to Schabert, not only the modern “scientists”, but also modern philosophers had the same intention. For example, Descartes reveals this intention by claiming that the purpose of the new sciences is to become instruments for the subordination of nature under human domination. When human knowledge becomes an instrument of domination, then knowledge is already regarded technically – means for power, and above all, means of power over humans reduced to mechanisms.

The subordination of nature under human control correlates with the elevates human power. Its incrementation is based on technological conception of science and reification of nature. Such reification allows everything to be treated as “stuff” or “resources”, which can be shaped and changed in terms of human projects and technical capacity. In this sense, “liberation” proposed by the Scientific Enlightenment has the following morphology. Every material state of affairs can be calculated mathematically; from such states of affairs it is possible to calculate and predict the results caused by such affairs. But the material states of affairs can be changed by human
hand in accordance with human calculations and from such reworked matter humans can calculate what results will be caused. The calculated processes then become “conditions”, which yield predictable results. Such shaping requires human activity, called labor power, that at base is “free activity” constituting a specific human ability and a specifically constructed environment, but for modern West, also increasing technical sophistication and power. The outcome is an increasing reversed process: humans can calculate material results to be obtained and establish material conditions for attainment of the calculated results. The more results humans project, the more technological conditions must be established to achieve the results. This is called “progress”. Thus, nature is not discovered as it functions from itself, but as it must function in terms of human wants. This consciousness yields an “if-then” logic of action and nature: if we wish for certain material results, then we must establish required conditions for such results. As Hans Jonas points out, the shaping of matter into new technologies opens, in turn, demands for newer technologies and discoveries. If scientific technical means leads to new discoveries, then such discoveries lead to new technologies. While this is progress, it also means that it has no end. After all, no achieved end is final or perfect, and every invention suggests new and “better” inventions. Thus, every achieved aim and purpose becomes means for other purposes and aims. The Scientific Enlightenment elevates human power and is presumed to lead to increased liberation from surroundings, including from human nature. This, according to Robert Spaemann, comprises human modern aim at ontological autonomy in the material domain.

Two essential points must be added: first, the increase in technical means and aims leads to “instrumental reason”, such that everything in human environment, once established as achieved aim, becomes means for other aims, such that when the latter are achieved, they too become means – to no end. Second, instrumental reason ties in with “progress”, which also seems to point to means for an achievement of aims, and aims becoming better or more sophisticated means for other aims – without end. If we were to ask an ontological question as to what is the purpose of progress, the answer of the Scientific Enlightenment would be “more progress”. To speak in plain terms, the ontology of progress is self-referred to the extent that its purpose is itself – a self-generating process for the sake
of self-generation. But it is also clear that to progress humans must also become “stuff” for use and transformation, for remaking and constantly “improved” technologization, increasing division into capacities called “expertise”. The expert is unique since it is from his narrow perspective that he acquires an “ego” and a position, a center in the geometric coordinates of material space to create “new nature”. We arrive at Descarte’s “ego” and a Philosophie Practique. Above all, the technical expert has a social value required by the state; in this sense, the expert does not question his position, since he has no latitude to demand of the state any other position apart from the one valued by the state. The latter need not justify to the individual why his position is valuable, since such a justification would recognize the person as having some sort of responsibility, rights, dignity and even honor.

The second type of liberalism, dominating much of social and political thought, is “relativistic liberalism”. The following are its major theses: (i) human values, rights, equalities and freedom are relative historical-cultural expressions of a specific civilization, in contemporary world, modern Western civilization. During other times and in different civilizations, there was no consciousness of autonomy and equality. Resultantly, the modern consciousness of autonomy has no universal necessity. (ii) The modern ontological understanding of man as self-created, as someone, following his own interests, can make of himself what he will, leads to the view that institutions emerge as expressions of temporary interests. This implies that changing interests might require not only different institutions, but their irrelevance. One party rule or one dictator’s power are cases to demonstrate such irrelevance. (iii) Speaking most fundamentally, institutions may be reduced to advance material or psychological needs or interests of a specific group. This usually applies to capitalism, where institutions are means to advance economic interests and, thus, they and the laws they represent are not above individuals, but serve some against others. While not a direct rule of man over man, it is a rule by interests and the cunning of those, who can compel to establish laws to favor them.

To what extent is such relativism valid; can it maintain itself as liberalism without reaching a contradiction? On the basis of relativistic liberalism, it is impossible to defend the institutions of freedom, equality, rights, duties, tolerance, since such institutions are temporal, expressing tempo-
eral interests. Indeed, this liberalism cannot pass any negative judgment on social systems, which have no freedoms, rights, responsibilities, equality—the interests in such systems do not require liberal institutions, since the main interest is to stay in power at any cost. Yet, the question must be directed to the right either by a government or by a majority consensus to abolish irrevocably the institutions that guarantee autonomy, equality and rights. Relativistic liberalism would have to accept such abolition and yet it would have to contradict itself by claiming that we must tolerate the views, rights, freedoms of others. After all, it allows the abolition of institutions that guarantee freedom and tolerance of others. In other words, if every political orientation, including the one, which abolishes democratic institutions, has equal validity, then power orientation, which abolishes such institutions, according with the thesis of relative interests, has an equal right to abolish such institutions. As just mentioned, even despotic systems, as expressions of material, psychological or even theocratic interests, must be tolerated. Whatever occurs within such system should be regarded as “internal matter” precluding any right of external intervention.

Relativistic liberalism opens the door to “scientific” progressive liberalism. The latter is closely related to the Scientific Enlightenment. Although the first intention of the latter called for man to be a master of nature, its principles are also at the root of reduction of everything to material process— including humans. This state of affairs leads to the oppression of the first intention premised on establishing autonomy by scientific technology and oppression of the Political Enlightenment and its institutions. Instead of liberation, there emerges a consciousness of the causal logic of “conditions-results”. Armed with scientific ontology, progressive liberalism can claim that political institutions are results, products of material interests and conditions and have no universal necessity. Indeed, such institutions are a hindrance to scientific technocracy to establish a scientific society. Using this planned society as a base, Marx proclaimed that although the Political Enlightenment liberated humans for the freedom of religion, opinion, expression and the rights guaranteed by institutions, such liberation is inadequate, since humans were not liberated from religion, from autonomy, and from institutionalized laws, under which all are treated equally. True liberation is possible only through scientific-technological planning of material conditions, which will liberate humanity from the
Political Enlightenment. What this means is that such institutions must be oppressed, disallowed as obstructions to the Scientific Enlightenment.

Following this logic, the elite, armed with scientific knowledge, elevates itself above laws and institutions in order to carry out the planned “liberation” of humanity. Historically speaking, such institutions are no longer valid, are conservative and reactionary hindrances to progress. The scientific consciousness incorporated in the liberating elite must justify its being above laws by the future society constructed by the followers of the Scientific Enlightenment, such as Marx and Marxism. It should be emphasized that in this context freedom must be suppressed, while equality is promised on the basis that the entire population is equivalent to labor power that can be treated as equal means for the production of the future society and the new man. The progressive liberal regards himself as one who knows what kind of conditions are necessary to cause the human labor power to be transformed into a different entity. The elite technocrats are above the law for yet another reason: since the working majority lack scientific sophistication, they are in no position to know what is good for them and their opinions cannot have any weight. Hence, freedom to express an opinion would mean spreading falsehoods and detracting from serious duties of the technocrats. Indeed, the majority does not realize that institutions, formed by one group’s material interests, are designed to make the majority accept enslavement under the illusion that everyone is free and equal. The scientific elite, having seen through such illusions, can rule the population for its own liberation from such enslavement. Thus, the scientific elite will not allow any interference with the building of scientific society.

Progressive scientific liberals, Marxists-Leninists, armed with a historical mythology – to be explicated in the next chapter under the rubric Soviet Paradigm – propose a “materialist-technical-economic” explanation of all human affairs. The scientific technocrats, whose aim is to acquire power, become rulers (humans over other humans) and lead history and, of course, humanity to the future society, shape of which is known only to them. Thus, all liberation movements must be supported and, if need be, helped by eliminating the populations that still cling to the illusions of outdated institutions. This means that no deviating opinions and no different consciousness is to be tolerated. According to Landgrebe, the consciousness of the Scientific Enlightenment explains the transition from
Hegel to Marx. According to Hegel, only the absolute knows the direction and progress of history. Armed with scientific consciousness that knows the conditions and results of all material events and thus the very aim of history, the scientific technocratic elite finds itself in an absolute position. Marxism-Leninism becomes the absolute spirit of Hegel and, thus, assumes a position that cannot be challenged – their rule is one variant of an autocratic civilization depicted in the previous chapter. Thus, there is a conjunction between the knowledge and power of the elite – absolute. This is the point at which the population need not interfere and simply obey the pronouncements of the leaders. Being in absolute position, the leaders need not submit to any laws, while the population is the means for the leaders’ plans. Here, even “free press” is irrelevant, since what the public must know is what the omniscient elite decide to pronounce – the great achievements and progress made in the material domain by the elite for the benefit of humanity. In brief, such “luxuries” as free press are redundant and, for the most part reactionary, based on outdated subjectivism and, thus, illusory beliefs. As we shall see subsequently, the logic of the Scientific Enlightenment, interpreted within a paradigm called “Dialectical Materialism” attempts to show that everything that one might want to say, such as freedoms, equalities, rights, responsibilities are qualities of the humans of the past, and thus scientifically surpassed by progress. It is significant to point out that wherever scientific technocracy and its progressive liberalism appears and assumes power, wherever liberation movements become successful, there also appear immediate efforts to dominate and shape human consciousness; the educated and the industrious usually provide a target as the exploiters of “the people” and must be eliminated. In comparison to this notion of liberation from rights, the state with rights is only a second best. What is required to achieve the best is the change of conditions, and to achieve this, revolutionary movements demanding the chance to establish such conditions. This suggests that we should not fall into the trap of confusing this kind of liberation as if it were an extension of the state with institutionally guaranteed rights. While both have modern origins, they have different aims.

The opposition between the two notions of liberation, liberation through right or from right, has become a fundamental global conflict. How are we to understand the millions of refugees, fleeing the “liberated” lands
both of the newly established third world regimes, from Vietnam, Cambo-
dia, Mozambique and the second world of the former Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union, and currently from the same regions, although renamed
Central Europe and the Russian Federation? It seems that their rights have
been denied both individually and institutionally. The problem is that the
Western liberalism is sympathetic to this experiment of liberation and is,
therefore, silent; the youth is taught the same kind of view: change the con-
ditions, which will liberate from institutions protective of rights (Kriele).
If someone announces the violation of rights, then that someone is either
discredited, or when this fails, the violations are justified by such notions
that these second and third world regimes are interim structures, which will
disappear once the material base and true technocratic rules are established.
They might even be a necessary defense against imperialistic infiltration and
an attempt to reestablish the old institutions. At times, one even claims that
the true liberation was betrayed; one simply has to correct the system and
liberation will follow of necessity. In brief, the ones who will engage in lib-
eration will not betray the true establishment of the necessary conditions
(Gorbachev, 1987). There is a kind of double standard: the people of the
non-Western people, according to Western intellectuals, should enjoy equal
rights and protections and the Western “imperialists” should desist their
interferences; but the same, intellectuals neither demand the same rights for
peoples under the rule of the second world regimes, nor the interference by
these regimes in the rest of the world, an interference which abolishes the
rights. The only way that this attitude can be explained is the common intel-
lectual presumption that the true liberation is liberation from rights and in-
stitutions on the basis of establishment of conditions, which would abolish
the need for rights (Revel, 1985).

The second revolution will use means to establish the scientific-ma-
terial conditions for liberation and hence will manipulate the institutions,
the opinions for this purpose. One problem is that this revolution does not
tell anyone what will take the place of rights, what is the aim apart from
the vague notion of liberation from, i.e., negative liberation. It is charac-
teristic of the second liberation movement that its proponents claim that
the evolutionary way, the inner adjustment of the institutions to abolish
residua of rights violations is functioning within the institutions; hence,
the only way to liberate from such rights is through revolution, the sup-
pression of rights and their institutions. In this sense, those, who affirm the institutions, are seen as conservative, regressive and those, who declare their abolition, are seen as progressive. Here, the eschatological salvation turns into a political hope; here, the regressive maintenance of institutions is bad consciousness, while the progressive and revolutionary is good consciousness.

The catch words of the second revolution are determined negatively against the rights of the first revolution: dissolution of rulers and rules of man over man, mastery of material conditions, equality, total autonomy, etc. Yet, in a unique reversal, this leads to the submission to the rule by sciences, specifically of “scientific socialism”; spontaneity is transformed into technocracy, and freedom becomes a “consciousness of necessity” (Wetter, 1963). It is possible to decipher what this liberation is all about, specifically in face of such confessions as those of A. Koestler, I. Lepp, M. Sperber, and in face of the excesses of Leninism and Stalinism, and why the cultural milieu is still there, which subsumes and blinds so much of intellectual acuity. In the second revolution, humans are to be liberated, who are not yet aware that they need to be liberated. Primarily, it is the act of liberation, which depicts the “objective” conditions that allow the subject to realize that he was not free. As long as the liberation remains in the future, we are not aware of the need for it and, hence, live in false consciousness. What this presupposes is that despite living under objectively oppressive conditions, some people, whether due to their inherence in the proper class or whether due to their reflective acuity, anticipate the condition of freedom. Thus, they have to educate the rest; they relate to the population like teachers to children; later, you will see that what is now done to you is for your best (Sloterdijk, 1985). This is a variation of the divine complex.

This notion of liberation divides society into two classes: the enlightened and the unenlightened, the liberators and the liberated. The liberators define the conditions, under which the rest are unfree and under which they must be free. Thus, the left would say that although the population might believe in the ideology of private possession of means of production, the population lives in false consciousness. The liberators claim the right to oppose the majority. In a state with institutions affirming human rights, each individual is regarded as capable of understanding his needs and interests;
the liberators, on the other hand, proclaim that the very institutions hinder the population to come to awareness of the true needs: the population must therefore be educated. This is the justification of the liberators. The claim by the liberators is the claim for power to control, without any institutional hindrances, the opinions and the direction of human interests. This is not only a two-class system, but above all the liberators need not follow any laws or respect any rights, since they themselves know – and not the public – what is the liberated situation and are in a position to get us there. This is why when a state is called to defend the institutionally guaranteed rights it is called by the liberators as “oppressive”, “authoritarian”, “fascist”, “reactionary” and even “imperialistic” (Lakoff, 1974).

With the second revolution, “good” is what abolishes the institutions supporting such rights and progress is the tendency toward absolute liberation from institutions. We find, here, a hidden return of man’s rule over man. This change of the meaning of concepts is usually obfuscated till finally the “intellectuals” find themselves using them in the name of liberation through whatever means. The result is a change in the conception of morality, which reaches from the political to daily concerns. This is manifest in the political arguments, when an argument is not refuted by a better argument but by designations, such as “conservative”, “reactionary” or even “fascist”. Thus, the question whether the argument is true or false is not even taken into account. Those, who have or are using opposing arguments, are perforce discredited by such imputations that they represent the ruling interests. What is obvious is that those, who so “discredit” the argument are no longer interested either in truth or falsity, nor are they interested in maintaining the semblance of rights, not to speak of the institutions, which support them. Why are the liberators attempting to disrupt the institutions founded on and for the sake of rights? The institutions defend the freedom of individuals. But the quintessence of liberation is to dominate the mind. Although superficially, it seems that one is intent to abolish private property, capitalistic imperialism and exploitation. Indeed, these play a role, but only an instrumental and not an essential role; the ultimate and fundamental aim and the fascination is the domination of mind. In place of the freedom of consciousness, we should have liberation from consciousness. After all, the Marxian liberators could insist, on the basis of their own theories, to guarantee the economic base and let the
mental development free; yet, precisely the opposite is the case; they ruin the base and use it as means for the domination and control of minds. The communistic states should not fear to embody the International Agreement of Human Rights, proposed in 1966 and established in 1976.

This pact does not claim the freedom to private property (Kriele, 1980). What this pact demands is an all-encompassing protection of human rights against all state intervention; it demands independence for judges from any political commitments, right to travel, believe, communicate, express, gather and debate. But this is not embodied in the technocratic states; this means that such states want precisely not liberation from private property, but domination and control of human thought by controlling all property, by allowing all means of subsistence to become state property. The abolition of institutions, which protect the freedom of thought means the taking on of the task to control human thought by arbitrary decisions of individuals or groups; after all, they would be above any institutions and laws due to their self-appointed wisdom. What is the best way of controlling human thinking? By controlling human means of subsistence, by allotting social functions to individuals as a reward for obedience. While this is more obvious in the communist nations, the same tendency appears globally in the guise of technocratic bureaucracy. The proclaimed ability to establish conditions for equality should, in fact, be the condition for the public discussion and solution of the persistent economic problems; all this is obviously not the case. This suggests that the basic interest is not in helping “the people”, but in controlling their thinking. And this is indeed the reason for the fascination of Marxism exercised over the Western intellectuals. They are well aware of the “base” problems in the “communist” societies; yet, they overlook them. This suggests that the basic aim is not the socialization of the means of production, but the “spiritual liberation” along the lines to be taught by the intellectuals. This is the reason for “spiritual dictatorship” and also for the justification of terroristic activities.

The liberation from rights is the liberation from the ontological justification of rights and, hence, a fundamental rejection of human value and the conception that humans are ends and not means. It is a form of reductionism exposing the human being to be means, to be something that can be manipulated through opinion formation and material conditions. Ter-
rorism, i.e., the use of humans and even the taking of their lives as means for the liberation movements, becomes justifiable. Liberation from rights is also a liberation from the ontology supporting such rights; but this means that we would lack any justification for treating humans as valuable, i.e., it is an attempt to subvert and pervert any consideration of the human being as something special. What permits this perversion is the obfuscation of the end. The obfuscation is such that one is made to believe that the basic striving for liberation is founded upon human worth; but implicitly with the abolition of final justification of human rights, human worth is also abolished and what one offers is a liberation from this worth leading to the notion that the human being is a product of conditions and, hence, the self-appointed “wise” can change the conditions, manipulate opinion, i.e., use humans as means for the nebulous liberation. The purported battle against injustice, exploitation, imperialism, etc., is fundamentally a battle against the conditions, which allow the human rights and the institutions, which enhance such rights (Hoeffe, 1979).

One variant of this liberation is behavioral psychology, which projects a scientifically liberated situation: there are the controllers and the controlled; the latter live in peace, without aggression, but also without biography, history or decision and “superstitious” notions, such as freedom. It is a life without joy, suffering, tragedy, purpose, without destiny: functional mechanisms. This liberation, indeed, frees one from freedom, dignity; they are surpassed. There are, nonetheless, classes: the controllers and the controlled. This is Bacon’s dream realized: elite scientists and the thankful population. Hence, the abolition of institutions, which protect human rights, where the latter, in fact, can force the change in the institutions, is a permission of the establishment of this second liberation. Lars Gustafsson in his novel “Sigismund” tells a story of a person, who made a pact with the devil and was permitted to see hell; there he finds a population, whose all needs are satisfied. It takes a while to realize why it is hell; what is missing is what constitutes our humanity. Hell is the realized scientific utopian liberation (Kriele, 1980). Indeed, Skinner placed his hopes once on the Soviet Union and then on China to realize precisely this two-class scientific utopia.

This is the fundamental sign of the liberators: the elimination of human value and the reduction of the human to a creature of needs in the context of technological understanding. This is “the new man”, whether
Soviet, Chinese, Skinnerian or technocratic. This is the aim, although it remains obfuscated by the notion of “liberation”. Of course, one may argue that such a consequence is not a consequence of technological-materialistic interpretation of the world, but a product of the political system and its institutions, which can be surpassed through liberation. But once such institutions, supporting human value and rights, are abolished, all one is left with is technical and materialistic control of human life and thought. This is to say, the human being is also reduced to matter or material process and, hence, exposed to technical controls instituted on the “higher” ideas and their realization of the controllers; they become “divine”. This is what Richter calls the “divine complex” (Richter, 1985).

It is indeed remaking of man. As Skinner suggests, we have not yet realized into what man can be made by man. This is the rule by scientific elites, whether such elites are behaviorists, liberators through scientific socialism or technocratic bureaucrats. Liberation, thus, means: in place of rights man is ruled by man and things. This is to say the technocratization not only to master and control material events, but also human thought. A creation of an organism, in which human rights of free expression, association, belief and dignity become disruptive factors, which must be suppressed. In place of institutions, there emerges the elitist machine, in place of a person having an occupation, there appears a functionary, and in place of occupational ethics, there appears functional obedience, in place of equality, there appears a two-leveled society with the lower level having no recourse to check the “upper” level, no institutional protection against the arbitrariness of the elites. In place of a moral judgment, the necessary aims established by the elite, and in place of conscience, there appears functional readiness. The aim of the second revolution, freed from the enlightenment’s political rights, is the monopoly of control of human life through technocracy. Thus, an absolute liberation turns out to be an absolute dictatorship by the technocratic elites, specifically using scientific means to control human thought. It seems that we still live in the shadow of Hegel, except now the absolute spirit and, thus, subject is the technocratic process, for which the human must be an object, a means for the realization of the divine elitist dream: total control of the human.

Democracy presupposes the juridical validity of human rights and the division of state powers. Without the security of such rights and the
separation of powers, the citizen would become an object of the whims of the state. The development of human rights presupposes democracy, i.e., the freedom of the population to establish the laws and public control of the three institutionalized powers. Thus, the circle closes; division of powers presupposes democracy and the latter presupposes human rights. The three comprise a unitary process. If one of the factors is lost, all are lost. The division of powers is more important than the catalogue of rights, since without such a division the executive powers cannot be checked. Indeed, the technocratic and the liberated new states subscribe to the U.N. catalogue of “human rights”. But due to the lack of division of powers, such a catalogue is meaningless. In this situation, the executive and juridical power is one and, hence, stands above the law (millions of people have been eliminated or incarcerated).

The Political Enlightenment claims that all are equal; freedom and value of all and not of some. Each has a claim to freedom, respect and equality. Humans are not to be “made” equal, but rather have an equal right to self-determination in political and social affairs. Free people are never equal with respect to their talents, wants and aims. What is at issue is the right of each to realize such aims with respect to others. It is claimed that there is an unbridgeable opposition between freedom and equality. The more freedom, the less equality, and conversely. This thought is analyzed in a volume by politologists in a work with a sub-title called “The Square Circle”. It says that in a political system of freedom there emerges social inequality. The stronger, the frugal, more endowed have more chances to attain power and fame. Thus, there emerge inequalities, dependencies and in extreme cases exploitation and suppression. If one wants equality, one must limit the free unfolding of the talents and in extreme cases to abolish freedom. Freedom is achieved at the expense of equality and equality at the expense of freedom. This is the alternative, which purportedly distinguishes technocracies from democracy. But is this a necessary opposition? The political thought of the enlightenment did not think so (Volkmann-Schluss, 1975).

When extreme freedom leads to extreme inequality, to dependence and suppression, then it also leads to unfreedom for the dependent and the suppressed. Hence, in the land of freedom, the United States, there were slaves and there is still poverty, which promotes unfreedom. In turn, if the establishment of equality is promoted at the expense of freedom,
then there is no equality but inequality between those in power, who attempt to enforce equality and those, on whom it is enforced. An example was former East Europe with the Soviet Army on its borders enforcing “equality”. There would still be the oppressors and the oppressed even if one were to establish equal pay (by some miracle). This means that the alternative between freedom and equality is not an alternative at all. Whoever attempts to take freedom over equality also must accept unfreedom; who takes equality over freedom must accept inequality. This means that in principle freedom and equality are not alternatives, but mutual. This is the wisdom of the enlightenment; the claim to freedom is equal to all, and equality means freedom. What this leads to is a conversion of the question: how can freedom be grounded to the question of how limitations of freedom can be justified. The classical answer was offered by Kant, who said that the freedom of one must coexist with the freedom of others. The freedom of each must be respected and freedom limitations are justifiable when they are necessary to establish equal freedom of everyone. We shall consider this question in the last chapter of this work. This guarantee appears in the ideal case, when there is a consensus concerning a given law. Even if a total consensus cannot be established, the majority must guarantee the right to the minority “its day”, i.e., to allow the minority to work for the restriction of the law.

Although necessary, the democratically established laws are inadequate. After all, the law forbids equally the rich and the poor to beg, sleep under bridges and steal bread. Who lives in poverty is not free, but is compelled constantly to grub for survival. Hence, the abolition of poverty, exploitation and dependence is not only a matter of equality, but also of freedom. Thus, freedom means more than the deflection of state’s interference and arbitrariness; after all, freedom is threatened not only through despotism, but also through hunger, need, ignorance and material dependence. Hence, there must be economic, cultural and social rights. This is the fundamental demand of the social revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries. But this should not be seen as counter to the idea of freedom, but rather has the same philosophical roots of the conception of freedom. The “equalizers” are in error, when they think that freedoms must be sacrificed; rather, such rights must comprise an enhancement of freedom.

It would seem that the scientific-technical enlightenment would provide the means useful for the socio-political enlightenment, where each
individual has a claim to freedom, dignity and self-determination. In this sense, the Scientific Enlightenment should be politically and socially neutral; a means for human self-realization. While Horckheimer and Adorno claim that Kant, Sade and Nietzsche were the final expressions of enlightenment, it is essential to differentiate between Kant and his conception of dignity and self-determination of the human from the other two. Now, if we were to raise the scientific question whether each human has an equal right to freedom and dignity, we would have to say that there are no grounds for such a claim. If that is the case, is it then a superstition or is there something more between superstition and science? (Kriele, 1980)

It might be necessary, with Kant, to differentiate between scientific and practical philosophies. This distinction is abolished, when in scientific-technological comprehension we reduce the practical to the “theoretical”. For Kant, theoretical reason cannot decide practical issues and, hence, is to be subservient to practical reason. The reduction, thus, is not liberation and progress, but a regression. Positively, the scientific reason is in no position to demand the abolition of institutions established by practical reason: democracy, self-determination, dignity, freedoms and rights. This means that the regression to the claim by technocrats to scientific reason is not a claim of that reason, but a claim by power seekers wanting to “master” others, including the institutions, i.e., their will to subvert the very technological process and, thus, the primacy of practical reason.

The key to unravel this subversion lies in the notion of liberation. The scientific-technological conceptions are efforts to liberate the human from the rule of nature in the form of becoming masters over it. Hence, massively introduced technologies seem to contain the notion of liberation from everything and liberation from such reactionary conceptions as human rights, which too must be seen as products of a humanly technologized world. This technical liberation is then seen as the new morality. Horckheimer and Adorno, despite their insights into instrumental enlightenment, did not raise the question whether the enlightenment required the abolition of political institutions as a condition for liberation. And this is what allowed the revolutionary youth to proclaim that they remained half-way without demanding full liberation. They are wrong insofar as they claim that the evils come from the “dialectics of enlightenment”. The problem is that the scientific-technological enlightenment
wants to subsume and even abolish the other factor of enlightenment, the socio-political (Kriele, 1980).

Bacon, the major force of the Scientific Enlightenment, battled Coke’s attempt to insure the freedom of Peacham’s expression – to criticize the absolutistic tendencies of the monarch – and the separation of powers. The behavior of Bacon is troublesome. After all, the scientific process should have nothing to do with political process, and indeed should allow such process its own direction. In short, the basis of science ought to be truth, while the Political Enlightenment deals with freedom. Whoever claims to be a representative of truth might have some inclination to a tyrannical claim to elitist mastery, since freedom is not scientific (although freedom is a condition to engage in scientific pursuits unhindered by anything). This is not only a psychological inclination, but an attempt is made to justify it by scientific truth claims, in which politics should be reduced to physics. Politics and morality belong to superstition and the population is full of superstition. Freedom, in fact, would allow numerous religions, which would confuse the people. Hence, it is best to have one religion for the sake of politics capable of maintaining a unitary political order. The best way to achieve this is to reduce all to physics.

While for Bacon science is power, for his follower Hobbes science currently is small power, but in the future it should gain unrestricted domination; this is the scientific-technological enlightenment. This is somewhat contradictory, since scientific progress presupposes political freedoms. After the scientific-technological enlightenment will have overcome the primitive stages, then it must become a Political Enlightenment and, thus, must surpass the institutions established by the Political Enlightenment, i.e., liberation of humans from religious freedom by freedom from religion, from opinion freedom by the scientific-technological explanation and manipulation of opinion. In brief, the political institutions of democracy will be shown to be ideologies and will be replaced by scientific legitimation. The problem is that this claim is a facade for power of self-appointed elite; the abolition of political freedoms in favor of scientific rule allows the elite to rule over the population by a temporary scientific dogma, whose truth is contingent and fallible, and, hence, its imposition as “truth” constitutes a dogma, which, while in operation, might force the population to live under fallible conditions. It is a pseudoscientific dogmatism. Scientific
truth cannot become a dogma without ceasing to be scientific and becoming merely a political tool for power claims. This power elite, imposing its dogmas of truth, would in fact demand restrictions in sciences and, hence, pervert the scientific freedom. The essential condition for science is the guaranteed political freedom from imposed scientific dogmas. Freedom, in brief, is what allows science to grow. The opposite of freedom in science is orthodoxy, which is counter-scientific.

At base, the liberation in the name of science would be placed in the hands of technocratic bureaucracy, which would be the silent force advising and indeed compelling the political institutions to adhere to current scientific dogma. It would be an institutionalized problem solver and, resultantly, a controller both of political and social life. The liberation movements, and those in Central Europe, who even today advocate their resumption, are claiming the duty to bring humanity to realization that salvation lies in the Scientific Enlightenment, capable of solving the “riddle of history”. In this sense, the progressive liberals place themselves above subjective views and desires and can sacrifice contemporary generations in order to abolish the illusion of freedom and even to eliminate vast populations as obstructions for the attainment of future known only to the elites. Somehow no one to date has raised a question why is it that wherever progressive liberals took power, there was an immediate and deliberate killing of millions of “enemies of the people”. These enemies were of two kinds: people, who were literate, thinking and thus critical of any proposed dogma, and people, who were productive and knowledgeable in practical affairs, whether they were shop keepers or good farmers. The case in point is Lithuania after its occupation and annexation by the Soviet Union. It was decreed that anyone who owns land is enemy of the people and the working class. Imagine the absurdity of such a claim, where seventy percent of populations were farmers, whose entire families were working their land, indeed doing hard labor to provide for themselves a modicum of “good” life – they all became enemies of the people to be shipped to concentration camps and even killed in their homes. Those, who were not killed or deported to concentration camps to be “reeducated”, were herded into collective farms to be equal labor power for scientifically managed production – what followed this “scientific experiment” was precipitous drop in simple food production, almost reaching levels of starvation. Yet,
mass media, under the management of elites, lauded this state of affairs as a shining victory of “scientific socialism”. Of course, there were mass murder and deportation of the educated, the teachers, doctors, writers, who were a major critical group that might challenge the claims of the Scientific Enlightenment in the name of the Political Enlightenment and its institutions. The latter are the last hindrance to the power and arbitrary rule of the liberators. But the joyous media pronouncements were replete with examples of “equality”, where no one could be different from others, where individual initiative was regarded as redundant showinism.

Suppression and the Suppressed

While there are numerous critics of modern consciousness, specifically of “objectifying” of the human and the quantification of all events, thus, emptying life of meaning, there is another and more profound issue that stretches through the Soviet Union and current Lithuania: it is a confrontation between Modern History I and Modern History II. Although in divergent ways, both histories developed together. The basic principle of both was freedom and equality and, above all, human autonomy to create an environment and correlative a specific human that by creating a specific environment he also became limited to what he has created – material conditions. The Political Enlightenment promoted a creation of institutions, required to guarantee human autonomy and equality. Yet, the Scientific Enlightenment, as a technical promise to create a scientific society, led to reduction of everything to material production and, hence, to a separation of freedom from equality. One is free to select ones occupation, education, free to engage in enterprises, specifically in those that began to require greater technical sophistication and, thus, increasing reification of the environment, making the latter into “material resources”. Those, who were capable of advancement in the management of such resources, their production into “values”, claimed their right and freedom to engage in these ventures. Yet, they ceased to be “equal” to others. Hence, freedom to do what one could in material, technical sphere led to social inequalities. The Scientific Enlightenment demanded the abolition of freedom in favor of material equality, managed by scientific technocrats. The latter
had to demand the suppression of freedom in favor of equality – creating a project called “scientific socialism” as a future solution to the separation of freedom from equality. This is to say, once scientific socialism is established, freedom and equality will become identical.

Meanwhile, equality is to be maintained, but freedom must be suppressed, since the latter might lead to separation of people into unequal social, economic and even educational positions. Since for neutral science there cannot be any objective value standard, then all positions are functions for social benefit and neither are more or less valuable. Of course, there is an issue that scientific socialism has not resolved: while no gradation of social value can be ascribed to labor power, the elite of this socialism have assumed that their functions are most significant and that their lives – at least in a foreseeable future – must have greater rewards. Perhaps this claim is premised on the view that the working classes are in no position to understand the complexities of social life and the aim of history, while the elite, armed with absolute knowledge, must be above the mere mortals. Indeed, it is their very “immortality” that permits them to understand how much more important they are in comparison to the working class. Besides, if the working class were allowed to have possessions and even some “luxuries”, then it would become decadent and reactionary. The elite, enjoying all the luxuries it desires, will not be corrupted. It is like the clergy, telling their flock not to read certain books, because they might corrupt the soul, while reading those books themselves without becoming corrupted. This suggests that in scientific socialism there is a class distinction between the corruptible and fallible masses and the omniscient, incorruptible elite. There is no need to go into the lives of the incorruptible immortals – volumes of jokes have told us otherwise.

We can now point out how the hermeneutical methodology has played a crucial role in the analysis of modern West, its philosophical arguments for the appearance of the Political and Scientific Enlightenments and how their initial prejudgments formed a horizon of consciousness that contained two distinct circles, such that while, the political, allowed both Enlightenments to live together, by the logic of the other, the scientific, the political became redundant, since scientifically speaking such notions as freedom rights, responsibilities are not aspects of science. Hence, in order for science to function without obstructions, by reducing everything
to material base, including all human functions and “wants”, no one can demand rights, freedoms, dignity or honor.

Nonetheless, the question of the supremacy of the Scientific Enlightenment cannot be settled with the suppression of the Political Enlightenment, specifically when notions, such as the “purpose of history” or “new man”, constantly are employed to justify the grand Soviet experiment. Without a purpose, such an experiment would be mechanical, perhaps increasing in power, but having no other reason apart from increase in technical power over nature and society. But it is obvious that the logic of power is unrestricted: “more power” for the sake of more power. It is also obvious that power and its accumulation is equivalent to accumulation of more means for the sake of accumulation of still more means – but for what? This question can be shifted to scientific technology and its constant translation of ends into means for the sake of more ends, which will become more means but without answering the question what, in the final analysis, do these means serve? The answer cannot be that they serve humans, because humans are equally designed to be means, results of conditions as means to yield a different “man”, who, in accordance with the logic of instrumental reason, will become means for other ends, and the latter will be means for still other ends. And yet, the logic of power and of scientific technology as instrumental reason must bring in Political Enlightenment as an answer concerning the final purpose that can offer a criterion whether all the progress, all the accumulation of power and technical mastery run on mechanical wheels for their own sake and have no direction, or whether such means and their direction can be judged by another standard, which does not belong to the context of instrumental reason. Here, the suppressed interpretation of what a human being is “in itself” reappears and challenges the entire mechanical universe. The human “in itself” as an unavoidable criterion cannot be suppressed, even if on the surface it seems that scientific technology and all the experiments to remake the human into a “new human” still require the “human”.

There is no doubt that scientific technology, instrumental reason and progress have performed brilliantly at improving the lives of vast populations, and hopefully will continue to do so. We can even suggest that the scientists, who engage in reductionism of humans to various material (genetic, biological, chemical and even physiological) domains, are well
meaning persons; but it is equally the case that they tend to forget the “more” in human life than the sum of such material parts or functions. It seems then that the technocratic dominance which, if left to its own logic, becomes man’s rule over others, requires the institutions maintaining human autonomy, equality and rights. Otherwise, the entire modern project would be a failure. No doubt, the institutions may be flawed since in contrast to scientific omniscience, humans are fallible and equally responsible to correct their mistakes. This is one reason why the Political Enlightenment required not only autonomy and equality, but also tolerance, since its suppression means that there is someone or some group presuming itself to possess absolute truth. In this context, it is instructive that the Soviet elite, while forbidding any “negative” news and, thus, attempting to convince itself, the population and the world of infallibility, constantly had to revise scientific prognoses concerning the dates for the appearance of scientific socialism. In brief, this was a silent admission of fallibility. Of course, scientific technocrats suggest that the institutions have no precise edicts and lead to constant abuses and corruption and, thus, they should be abolished and replaced by imposition of strict discipline. This argument misses the point. It is not the fault of the principles and institutions of the Political Enlightenment, but of the citizens, who fail to live in accordance with autonomously established laws and, thus, disqualify themselves as free and equal. The argument is equivalent to saying that mathematical rules should be suppressed because people use mathematics for cheating and stealing. In brief, principles do not cease to be valid simply because persons fail to live up to them. Human frailty does not comprise an argument against principles. To the contrary, a judgment that humans fail is a demonstration of the validity of the principles.

We have reached a level of discussion that requires an extension to understand the ways that the Scientific Enlightenment will accomplish the task of mastering the environment and submitting it to human controls and above all human remaking of all that is not under human power. This extension is most important for the understanding of the Soviet “experiment”, insofar as it is premised on the rhetoric of “scientific socialism” and, above all, on constructing the conditions for the possibility of a “new society and a new man”. The Soviet Revolution, after all, did not follow the “logic of history”, wherein the building of communism was premised on
the established industrial-productive conditions of capitalism, leading directly to workers appropriation of the means of production. The entire industrial base had to be planned and constructed in order to begin the long journey to socialism. In this sense, the logic for the construction of such technical conditions had to be at the basis for the establishment of such conditions. The following is an explication of the modern logic of constructivism that is completely involved with the Scientific Enlightenment.

As already noted, the theoretical-methodological, or termed otherwise, the quantitative-formal, are not within the domains of the contingent world, posited as transcendent. It is not found even in the directly intuited morphological composition of the lived world. It is regarded as different from these domains. Not having any other locus for the formal, the thinkers of the modern age invented a container called “mind”, in which these quantitative and formal components reside. They belong to the immanence of the subject. The immanence assumes an ambiguous status: it is the container of the theoretical-methodological formal necessities, and yet it is factually contingent substance. This contingency is expressed in Cartesianism in two ways: first, the formal composition, with respect to a posited absolute being, cannot be regarded as necessary. This is to say, the absolute being can will different formal systems; this is an analogical expression of a conception, which offers an initial indication as to the arbitrariness of the formal. Second, the formal is seen as capable of continuous analyses; any break in the analyses is a matter of decision. In this sense, the formal domain swings in the ambiguity between necessity and will, rules and choice. The importance of this “indecision” consists precisely in the option to either regard the formal as a priori given or as a construct of the subject. Various expressions are offered at the dawn of the modern age to indicate the shift toward the latter option. The notions of nature as created in accordance with mathematical laws comprise one such expression. When this notion is coupled with the view that even the mathematical-formal domain is subject to an absolute will, the result is obvious: the emphasis is on the primacy of construction of the formal systems. They too are chosen, although they cannot be regarded as contingent in the sense of the contingency of the material world. Their emergence requires unique intentions that have to be regarded as capable of formal construction and of arbitrary signification. Moreover, such intentionalities must include the
possibility of extending and proliferating formal compositions and divisions at will, and of disregarding the perceptual, intuitive content.

A brief analysis of this disregard will clarify the constructive intentionality, necessary for the understanding of the composition of power in the modern age at the level of signs. To note, while the conception of homogeneity of the transcendent reality can be described by geometrical structures, corresponding to the morphological and perceptually intuited world, the shift from the geometrical signification to the mathematical and formal abandons any kind of intuitive correspondence between the shapes of geometry and the morphological compositions of the lived world. Hence, any theory of representative correspondence, copy of the world in the “mind” substance, has to be abandoned. The signitive symbolism of quantitative and formal compositions does not offer any intuitive counterpart in the perceptual world apart from the sounds or marks, selected arbitrarily. But these marks, while part of the morphological world, do not resemble the theoretical-methodological composition; they simply provide the arbitrary means for perceptual expression. While there are many complexities in the constitution of the quantitative-formal modes of theoretical-methodological “thought”, in principle, this thought does not offer any possibility of correspondence between theoretical-methodological compositions and the perceptual world of shapes and structures.

The operations with signitive symbolism – the perceptual side of the quantitative-formal – offer themselves in a precise order: they must be arranged sequentially and uni-directionally. They must follow a temporal sequence and must be constructed as sequential. The perceptual intuition into the morphological side of such signitive processes offers an awareness of “progression” from a “starting” point to a “finish”. The problem of the finish is not to be taken in a finite sense: the formal procedures lend themselves to indefinite progression and articulation; hence, what could be regarded as “finish” is a decision to stop the formal articulation of theoretical-methodological compositions. As noted above, the quantitative and formal processes can be continued indefinitely; any cessation in our operations with them, as was already noted at the dawn of the modern age, is a matter of choice. Phenomenologically speaking, there appears a specific “lack” on the basis of the transformation from the morphological lived world, present to perceptual awareness, to the formal signitive symbol-
isms, expressed serially by arbitrarily selected marks. The intentional direction toward the perceptual world, capturing the morphological constitution of the lived world, can be designated as “vertical”. The maintenance of the vertical intentionality requires the presence and continuity of the directly intuited morphology; this intuition can be unfolded horizontally, and if need be in horizontal performances composed of grammatically structured marks or sounds. Thus, the morphological awareness of a particular object can offer a possibility of eidetic variation to yield a pure geometric figure, whereby the morphological awareness becomes an intuitive exemplification of a corresponding eidetic structure. Each morphological variant has a representing capacity, i.e. it can give an intuitive similarity to the eidetic structure, held by vertical intentionality. Yet, the constitution of the mathematical-formal needs no longer signify the object present to vertical intentionality. It becomes free from any morphological moorings and vertical intentionality and can be explicated on the basis of its formal procedures horizontally. This is to say, it can “progress” uni-directionally in a process of either increased formally analytic differentiations or even an indefinite repetition of functions.

The specificity of this horizontal process consists of the fact that the criteria of articulation, differentiation and analyses are intrinsic to the formal “discourses”. This is quite fitting, since the criteria of the experienced world, the given morphological structures, are no longer signified by the formal processes. After all, what the formal process signifies is its own arbitrary selection of means of expression. The formal can be still regarded as “necessary” and the selected expressive “material” as contingent (although with the previously mentioned ambiguity), yet what leads the process is the possibility of increased formalization of propositions, resulting in the concept of formal systems, which can be differentiated into formal sub-systems and or splitting up of systems into distinct formal systems. Disregarding the morphological composition of the lived world, this process pretends to subsume under itself all domains of the world not on the basis of any intuitive content, but on the basis of formal designations and differentiations.
Contingency

The previously indicated problematic of the transcendent world emerges here in a new guise. The excluded morphological lived world yields, in accordance with formal systems, no visible necessity. The posited homogeneous world, the so-called “material reality”, transcending all perceptual and intuitive access, does not offer any viable view, which would make its necessity present. This is to say, it too must be regarded as contingent. Being inaccessible, it must be posited in accordance with the formal definitions and procedures, necessity of which would provide a “model” of explanation not for the perceptual components, but for “possible construction of conditions to achieve projected results”, as was the case with Marxism-Leninism. The contingent is so designated because its necessity comes from another and in two senses. First, from the formal articulations comprising the theoretical-methodological domain presumed to be correlative to the posited transcendent reality, and second, from a presumed act of an absolute creation (Galileo), such that the theoretical-methodological composition is the very way, in which reality is created. This is the symbolic support designated to “necessitate” the functioning of this reality and to guarantee that our theoretical-methodological forms constitute adequate descriptions of reality, thus, the Galilean exclamation of our “greatness”. Analogous symbolic ploy was used by Descartes to guarantee the necessity of the objective phenomena. This persistent insistence on securing symbolic assurances for necessity of the processes of the transcendent reality indicates a fundamental realization that left “to itself” such a reality is contingent, unless it acquires its necessity from elsewhere. This is to say that an appeal to an absolute geometricalian is not an attempt to placate the ecclesiastics, but a symbolic effort to legitimate the necessity of an otherwise contingently construed reality and the correlative necessity of the presumed objective theory and method.

If we were to exclude such a symbolism, we would be left with a contingent reality, necessity of which would come from another and this is to say from the theoretical-methodology. Contingency excludes at the same time essentiality, i.e. the possibility for a vertical intentionality to maintain something permanent with necessary characteristics, accessible to perception, or in case of induction, essentiality with universal validity in the sphere
of ontology. The abolition of essentiality (the Greek notion of essential composition of something real) opens the door to the notion of an access to this reality in terms of “possibility”. This is to say, since what “is” cannot be perceived, and since its being posited as transcendent reality does not offer any necessity for its composition, then it can be accessed and dealt with in accordance with theoretical-methodological formal possibilities. This is precisely the juncture, at which it becomes “necessary” to regard this transcendent reality in accordance with what it can possibly be. Before continuing this line of constitution, it is advisable to interject the first moment of power, which offers itself through the articulations presented so far.

Power

The problematic of power have been discussed from ancient Far East all the way to modern political thought and even post-modern semiotics. The last has admitted that power is not to be located anywhere, although its exercise is everywhere through discourse. Such an admission is well taken, but without a proper grounding in awareness. The task at hand is to indicate what grounds power in awareness and why it cannot be located. To recall the previous discussion and its basic composition: the lived world of morphologically constituted and intuitively accessible events and objects is bracketed under scientific skepsis; the posited transcendent homogeneous reality is inaccessible to perception. The constitution of the theoretical-methodological formalisms has no intuitive counterpart, i.e., no vertical hold. They can be articulated horizontally in a serial, uni-linear progression in accordance with their own intrinsic rules. The homogeneous transcendent reality is contingent and hence open to possibility. As a result, there is no necessary connection between the theoretical methodological formalisms or their signitive functions and the transcendent reality. The connection is arbitrary. This is to say, it requires a specific intentionality, which is not necessitated by any real compulsion or law to connect the formal signitive factors to the posited reality. The arbitrariness appears under various guises: the “application” of theory to “praxis”, the most lyrically stressed intoxication that the purpose of all science is its reshaping of the environment in accordance with human designs, the humanistic efforts to “humanize” nature and the “human animal”, the aims at improving nature and the exclamations
that something is good because we say it is good in accordance with our own tablets, etc. In principle, the intentional connection between the formal domain and the posited reality has no hold in anything, and it need not respect any prescription and qualitative composition of the lived world. And yet, it is a required nexus between the theoretical and the real. After all, the signitive formal compositions do not point to anything that would be intuitively similar to them. In this sense, arbitrary selection of formal components for possible correlation to the homogeneous quantified world offers no other option apart from the imposition of the formally constituted methods on the real. One variant of this requirement is the Marxian pronouncement that all theory must become praxis.

While this might seem obvious, there appears an unnoticed requirement for this correlation: concrete activity. The latter is directed by projected choices of what is materially possible, i.e. what can be made. The formal compositions, not having any similarity to anything intuitively present to perception, cannot be correlated to anything perceptual; if the perceptual awareness is excluded, then the correlation requires an active intervention and construction of the posited homogeneous world in accordance with the formal requirements. Since the latter are constructs, they too are invented for the sake of the reconstruction of the material reality in accordance with our chosen projects. All this seems to rest on nothing. Indeed, Fink has argued very cogently that modernity emerges as if out of nothing. In this sense, the formal requirements comprise pos-sibilizing arrangements, which lead the construction of the real or the real in accordance with formal constructs. This is to say that the “intention” to control the environment under whatever guise is not a power aim of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Buffon, the capitalists or the Marxists, but the constitution of the possibility of arbitrariness with respect to the connection between theory and “reality”, an arbitrariness of the priority of will over reason and nature. It should be obvious that the “praxis” of Marxism can disregard any norms and regard everything, including humans, as material conditions to be arbitrarily used, controlled and even discarded in accordance with the “will of the party”.

Arbitrariness, as a ground for power, might run counter to the usual notions that only set restrictions comprise power, e.g. discursive practices of a tradition. Indeed, it is possible to extend the argument that the classical
conceptions of human nature and essence, and indeed an essence of every-
thing else, submitted nature to power under the guise of limits, restrictions
and impositions; yet, such restrictions were not external, but comprised
the very way of being without violation. It could be argued that a continu-
ows or at least somewhat stable framework restricts activities and disallows
violations “without notice”. Yet, arbitrariness lends itself to an emergence
of power without “reason”, or at best from psychological whim, enhanced,
prompted and fed by “unlimited possibilities” of formal and, as a result,
material constructions. This turns out to be one of the bases of technology
and of reason as instrumental. The intentionality emerging here between the
theoretical and the “real” swings between two possibilizing structures: the
formal possibilities, operating purely with arbitrarily selected signs, reach a
point of realization that the formal processes are also arbitrarily constructed
and, hence, can be reconstructed at will, purely empty significations with-
out any immediate fulfillment in the perceptual intuition. And the formally
designed possibilities are also in a position to align the transcendent real-
ity toward intuitive fulfillment by human intervention into the processes
of the lived world and, by disregarding the given perceptual morphologies
of that world, to shape the presumed underlying homogeneous matter in
accord with formal designs. This shaping comprises the source of both, the
labor theory of value and life – the primacy of homo laborans – and technol-
y, inclusive of the appearance of political technocracies, which promise
to redesign the environment and the human in line with theoretical-meth-
odological requirements: a world produced by scientific technology. Some
scholars, in fact, suggest that the modern world has two intentional histo-
ries: one that is completely unstructured world of autonomous individuals,
and two, a complete redesigning of the world in accordance with the formal
designs we ourselves posit. Yet, in either case arbitrariness is assumed and
the intentionality of the will that swings between the formal and the transc-
cendent is the decisive arbiter – without precedents.

This intentionality is not identical with Kantian autonomous will and
with Nietzsche’s will to power. Its engagement is with possibilizing con-
stituents both at the formal and material levels. The possibilizing allows for
formal variations and differentiations of processes into systems and sub-
systems, until the sub-systems can become distinct sciences, carving out
their own fields and accessing the environment in accordance with their
formal requirements. This simply means an increased refinement of application and realization of the formal constructs in the material sphere. This is the technological process. As Husserl argues, technologization posits formal operations, with a total disregard or indifference to the meaning and truth of nature in the lived world. Such formalism, coupled with the homogeneous and “indifferent” reality, results in two structural processes when introduced in the lived world. First, a complete disregard of the perceptual phenomena and their horizons, including their enactments in the lived world, leading to increased contingency of the environment, and second, the detachment of the formal and technological structures and processes from intentionalities that connect the subject to the morphologies and the phenomena of the experienced environment. These points constitute the problematic of the relationship between contingency, detachment and nature.

Both, the formally designed systems and the transcendent material nature, comprise a detachment from the lived world and allow an arbitrary correlation between them. One can treat everything from a vantage point of detached formalism and regard qualitative and essential distinctions with indifference. As already suggested, the formal indifferent and disconnected constitution lends itself to a horizontal division and increased formalization of language in such a way that there emerge increased formal differentiations of formal systems themselves. Correlatively, the material world can be increasingly differentiated and reconstructed along more complex and yet more distinct technical masteries and controls of the transcendent reality. In short, an incrementation of formal complexities and differences is coextensive with an increase in the contingency of the material domain, leading to more possible rearrangements of the indifferent material nature. As Jonas suggests, every refined and produced material process offers possibilities for further formal refinements and material rearrangements. The lateral differentiation of formal systems and their correlative material structuration provide a basis for disciplinary differentiations, each having its own formal approaches and each capable of possible construction of material realizations.

A brief note should be inserted to point out the reasons why the delimited constitution is the condition for the possibility of discursive power. The very languages, the formal systems and their differentiations can access the transcendent world only by remaking it, by subjecting the materi-
al to formal and technical transformations. Thus, the more one subdivides
the formal domain into increasingly refined concepts, the more one is able
to criss-cross the material by technical procedures in terms of the formal
definitions. In this sense, the very language of the disciplines is coexten-
sive with the power of shaping the indifferent material to fit the definitory
requirements. One could argue, furthermore, that this continuous divi-
sion and formalization of discourse is coextensive with the militarization
of language and society. Each increasing refinement is correlatively a re-
striction of signs to signals followed by an attendant restriction of human
functions to being a reaction to precise and efficient codes. In this sense,
the discoursive power to make leads in two directions: the making of the
environment and the control of the human. In general terms, this process
of militarization is one of the bases for the emergent language of “war”.
We are at war with each other, the environment, poverty, affluence and
with our own divided selves.

While this process requires the adherence to its principles of formal
and material detachments, it “progresses” toward a differentiated inclusion
of all events, both “natural” and cultural, and thus constitutes a formally
differentiated world, where semi-independent spheres call for semi-inde-
pendent functions and “work”. What is relevant in human life depends and
is contingent upon the manner, in which the formal constructs divide the
human “material”: the human is economic, social, chemical, physiological,
psychological, biological, etc. set of differentiated “behaviors”, each semi-
independent of the others. It would be redundant to analyze the obvious:
the “power” of these differentiations comprises also the separations of social
functions and tasks, leading to a society of semi-independent groupings of
“expertise”. Yet, what each expertise produces within its own sphere has no
necessary connection with other spheres. Hence, the results of “research”
in a specific domain can be picked up by military or by art. For the experts
of each domain, there is no recourse to any external criterion concerning
the intentionalities, which would correlate the results as possibilities in an-
other domain. This is to say, the material, i.e. technically produced forces,
can be selected at will, arbitrarily by other social domains, such as politics
for possible “application”. The lateral differentiation decentralizes respon-
sibility, thus, increasing the contingency and arbitrariness, and the latter is
increasingly unchained from any constraints. Every formal rule and every
material result made to fulfill the formal design become totally arbitrary, offering possibilizing formal and material combinations without end. Each domain is released from the concrete lived world implications, each an “expert” in its own sphere, need not relate to any other sphere; each can claim that there is no such thing as “conclusive” evidence precisely because the formal systems and their fulfilled material arrangements are arbitrary designs and carry no necessity; they are, insofar as they make, and with the making they produce their “reality” and, hence, increment power and “prove” their momentary success. The significance for understanding the continuous postponement of the communist society to a future “final” scientific liberation from the material environment rests on this continuous division of experts, capable of continuous reconstruction of the environment and the human, never reaching a final position. And this leads to the requirement of increasing controls and subjection, leaving the human as an intersection of many disciplines.

It would be redundant to speak of “needs” since the latter are part and parcel of the possibilizing procedures and become at the same time needs and fulfillment. We can make it, therefore, we want it, and we wanted, therefore, we can make it. What this suggests is that the process of increased contingency and arbitrariness as sources of power comprise a self-referential domain. This means that there are no restrictions for the “search for truth”. After all, such a search has lost any boundary and any distinction between knowledge and object. Even in social understanding, the relationship between the formal and material processes is determined by “science”, i.e. the very self-articulation and production. One, thus, cannot find any trans-scientific criteria to check this process. And each domain has no built in reason to stop the proliferation of its own form of knowledge and praxis. There are no physical reasons to cease making more physical experiments and refinements, no economic reasons to stop the economic “growth”, no biological reasons to stop remolding the living processes along new combinations, etc. Limitation would be regarded as an infringement on the “autonomy” of “research”. Any science, which would proclaim that it has become complete, would cease to be a science in the context depicted above.
Progress and Instrumental Rationality

Given the key intentionality, which swings without any essential necessitation between the theoretical methodological and the transcendent homogeneous domains, there emerges the attendant factor, which is permanent: “progress”. It must be without regression, without death, and all formal systems and all transformations of the lived world into calculatively remade world are enhancements, maintenances of this permanent structure. What is peculiar about progress is that it has no “subject” that would progress. It must be recalled that for modern philosophy, despite various surface claims concerning human nature, the sole objective reality is basically a sum of material parts and humans are no exception; at this level, humans cannot claim to be essentially different from all other material events. In this sense, humans are also a function to be calculated within the context of various formal systems and their ability to design a new man. All formal systems as rational are instrumental, where a positing of a specific aim requires calculation of material means for the attainment of such an aim. Yet, the attained aim will become material means for other aims, while the latter will also become means for further aims, but without any final aim. In terms of instrumental rationality, progress cannot have a final aim and hence it cannot have a direction. Its aim and its subject is itself and, thus, it is self-referential. Progress is its own destiny. It constitutes its own increasing formal refinements, efficiencies and “perfectabilities” without, of course, attaining perfection. No attained construction is left without possibilizing and, hence, “improvement”. In this sense, one could say semiotically, and yet on Husserlian basis, that the signifier and signified are one.

The question that arises in this kind of progress, and as pointed out, its proliferation of increasing arbitrariness with respect to all phenomena, is the appearance of crisis. What is immediately notable is the disproportion between the sub-system called science and the rest of the culture. The efforts by the theoretically-methodologically designed systems to “master” the “material” nature have become exponential. Let us be clear about this: there can be only one domain of progress, and this is the coded and formalized transmission of practices or “techniques”. A culture can increase its mastery and practical control through the increase of formal differentiations and physical interventions in the environment, yet it cannot in-
crease what the environment as a whole has to offer. There is no “progress” in nature. We cannot increase material resources, but only the efficiency of their uses. Only the latter can progress. And this is precisely the point of crisis: the sciences are entering human life on the basis of this “use”, i.e. making humans function in accordance with the very prescripts that are imposed on the presumed physical world. Thus, the question arises: is this a progress for human life, or is this the arbitrary treatment of the human and, hence, the subsumption of the human under arbitrariness and its opening up of power over the human? Obviously, the “use” and interference is inherent in the processes of modern science, requiring the intentionality, which can connect the formal and the material. The human then is submitted to and subsumed under an arbitrariness, which includes her own operations. That is, the human also functions in this modern intentionality and treats, or at least is exposed in principle to treat everything arbitrarily, i.e. violently. Arbitrariness is a “power”, which opens an initial experience of violation. But this violation cannot be avoided within the context of modern understanding of theory and method and their “application” or, to speak with Marxism, their “praxis”.

The brief discussion of the emergence of power in the modern tradition resulted in sign systems as all-encompassing eidos of power. Other traditions should be deciphered and variations performed in order to discover the complete noetic-noematic correlation constituting power. One notion seems to be warranted in the context of our discussion: it is not the discursive limits that exercise power – after all, Greeks were capable of linguistic “dance” within a well-designed form – but an arbitrary proclamation of a homogeneity and an imperialism of a method that reduces all phenomena to a transcendent and reified realm that lead to a disregard not only of the limits, but also the uniqueness of any individual. Arbitrary “lingualisms” that violate experienced limits is what will yield modern power. This can open our understanding of political rhetoric and, specifically, its extension toward political technocracy that subtends the so-called “ideological camps”.

No doubt, numerous thinkers of this century, specifically in hermeneutics, semiotics, linguistic analysis, have rightly argued in favor of the priority of language and its power to designate. The task of this essay was to explicate the conditions for the possibility of such views. The conditions are neither epistemic nor ontological, but more fundamentally the
appearance of a set of issues that led to the selection of a certain theoretical and methodological prejudgment that textually constituted ontological and epistemological problematic leading to the postulation or at least tacit introduction of mediating functions that were neither theoretical nor ontological; rather, they opened the portals to indefinite selectivity of productive methodologies leading to a transformation of the material surroundings. Such demands are, in principle, arbitrary and, hence, power laden.

Russian Revolution

The various major critiques of enlightenment, from Adorno through Heidegger, Habermas, Derrida, Levinas, to Deleuze fall within the parameters of one or another variant of the enlightenment, whether it is rationalism, psychologism, sociologism, economism, biologism and, above all, preoccupation with language. Valuations that are available, such as utilitarianism, deontologism and voluntarism, are equally variants of the enlightenment. It is essential for our task to show what sort of life world was being offered to Russia before the revolution as advanced and progressive and how Russians received such a world. Hence, the task is to extricate the life world of the enlightenment from such variants at its very limit in order to reveal its eidos. The first is the well-known dualism of subject and object, the former is mind, the latter is matter. The subject is the unconditional source of all theories and values, while the material world is an irrational and valueless sum of homogeneous matter to be constructed in terms of the subject theories and values. Second, the subject is unconditionally autonomous source of all laws in both the social and material realms. Since there is no other criterion concerning the material and social worlds, then all subjects are equal concerning the way that the material and social worlds are to be constructed. Third, construction is unconditional to the extent that no causes can be assigned to the structures and procedures, by which the subject interprets and shapes itself, social relationships and the material environment. In the language of the Enlightenment, all are projections of human autonomy. Various terms have been used for projection: objectification, alienation, humanization and even self-realization. It is important to note that the term “projection” is basic
to the Political and the Scientific Enlightenments. The Political Enlighten-
ment posits the subject as an autonomous center of the public domain
and all public rules and appointments of governing entities. Moreover, the
public domain of autonomous subjects is strictly distinguished from the
private-social domain of needs, wants, desires and their fulfillment. If the
latter entered the public domain, it would abolish autonomy and equal-
ity. The Scientific Enlightenment posits the subject as a rational bearer of
theoretical and methodological constructs, by which to manage the mate-
rial environment in terms of projected human “needs”. The latter are to be
understood either biologically or psychologically and, thus, can be satis-
fied by scientific invention of “techniques” of fulfillment leading, to what
is known, the reduction of scientific reason to instrumentality. Fourth,
invention of history and its progress toward a utopian society; the lat-
ter assumed various interpretations, yet common to all is the notion that
humans can construct a material and psychological setting, wherein all
previous ills would be abolished. It is obvious that this utopian notion, as
“the aim and end of history”, is a mixture of the Political and the Scientific
Enlightenments. Fifth, the reason that this mixture had to be posited as a
future aim is that the Political and the Scientific Enlightenments became
incompatible; the Scientific Enlightenment, and its promise to fulfill mate-
rial and psychological wants, had to abolish the interpretation of human
life as autonomous, unconditional and self-creative. The first requirement
and interpretation of human life became material and psychological sum
of wants and their immediate gratification. As we know, current reading
of life and experience is regarded as a multiplicity of intensive pleasure
nodes, each clamoring to be tickled, gratified, in order that new pleasure
nodes could pop up for more gratification. Utilitarianism is the general
ethical position, wherein all things and humans have a value to the extent
that they produce pleasure. Second requirement is the massive technol-
ogy and its progress, designed for the constant fulfillment and constant
invention of needs. The conjunction of these factors results in the aboli-
tion of historical aim and its replacement by progress for the sake of pro-
gress. This is obvious from the essence of instrumental rationality. Sixth,
the notion of autonomy, the view of the subject as self-creative, had to be
postponed and forever deferred, and also regarded as scientifically irrel-
evant and contradictory. It is impossible to claim that once the material
and psychological conditions are fully established, then they will cause the human subject to be autonomous. As we know at the outset, autonomy cannot be caused. As just noted, this is equally problematic due to progress that can never reach any end and, hence, establish all the necessary conditions for emergence of autonomy. Every new condition, as a result of instrumental reason, becomes means for new conditions and new needs, and the latter split up into more novel needs. In this sense, it is impossible to fulfill all human needs and then establish autonomy. Seventh, we are left with a democracy, which principle of human autonomy and the public domain, wherein such autonomy is maintained and exercised is no longer available. It has been completely pervaded by instrumental rationality and the proliferation of needs and their fulfillment. Hence, the members of a political and democratic community are reduced to material life, psychological titillations and chemical prolongation of boredom.

It is now possible to turn to the essence of the life world of the Enlightenment: it is a process of valuation. Everything in the universe assumes a value to the extent that it serves our interests. Contrary to claims that the world has no value, the world constructed by the Enlightenment is full of values: labor theory of value (accepted and expounded by Radishchev), values for sale, values produced and to be produced, values of stocks and bonds, values of education, family values, religious values, ideologically constructed values, the changing and the new values, value of life and even calculated death, social values, and persons are judged as to their value in all of these settings. Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is valuative selectivity. It should be clear also that awareness and perception are no longer given in some pure empirical sense, but are selected on the grounds of valuation. In this sense, what is given as a plethora of empirical environment is, for the most part, ignored. What is perceived depends on its specific value. Indeed, there are social mechanisms that not only consist of values, but evaluation of values that select specific ones deemed relevant in terms of future value projects. It has been argued that all these values are human and, hence, the primacy is placed on modern subject as the source of values. This claim would hold if the human were a distinct and decisive category, wherein all other categories and processes were subservient to humans. But this is no longer the case, since other values, such as technologies of various sorts, from electronic media to genetic biochemistry,
compel the understanding of the human to be equivalent to the rest of the values. This means that genetic biochemistry will not treat the human as a special category, but will have to reduce all human functions to biochemistry. Thus, the environment, that is constructed on the basis of the process of valuation and is deemed to be objective, requires that the human be treated equally objectively in terms of what such an environment demands, i.e. interpretation of the human as material, chemical, biological, physical entity in order that such constructed technical values could be applied and, thus, useful and valuable. Russian literature follows this trend as scientific modernization, expressed in writings of persons, such as Turgenev, Chernichevski, Pisanov and others, where “objective” value constructs abound in the form of the new society.

We are now in a position to extricate the fundamental intentionality that constitutes this life world that means it in a very specific way. To have some sense of this intentionality, it is necessary to explicate the directly lived awareness that could not be posited as an object by the thinkers of the enlightenment. It ought to be understood that such a lived awareness is transcendental and, hence, accessible only reflectively from the meant objects that such a lived awareness intends. What then are these objects? While the process of valuation of events in favor of human “needs” was briefly indicated, i.e. various reductionisms of the human to biochemistry, genetics and mechanics, the lived awareness subtending this process intends an objectivity, which is unique to the Enlightenment. One level of this objectivity is designed to be accessible to quantification and, hence, it has to be measurable homogeneous matter. This design, of course, is meant by a specific exclusion of the entire perceived world and, hence, in no wise accessible to experience. Yet, covered by this homogeneous materiality as an intentional object is another intended objectivity: temporal possibility. Here again, we encounter the major Russian writers, such as Herzen and just mentioned others, who advocate the total destruction of what has been a tradition and its replacement by not yet existing, possible, form of constructed society with the constant rejection of the possibility of capitalist economic system.

The live awareness that intends such objectivity is an empty will, prior to the question of its being free or determined. Phenomenologically speaking, there can be eternal possibilities, as Plato and Husserl have noted, but such possibilities have been already enacted theologically and, in part,
metaphysically. The Enlightenment rejects eternal possibilities and is left with temporal, although in the first lived intentionality, empty temporal possibilities. It is to be noted that the term “temporal” does not suggest “being in time”, but an open horizon without any specific ontological locus. Hence, any temporal location would have to be established within such a horizon. If we attend to the language of the Enlightenment up to date, we shall note that subtending the question of “reality”, there is a prior discourse concerning the “conditions for the possibility of reality.” Such discourses are premised on the first lived intentionality of empty temporal possibility. It opens a horizon of possible intentions and their fulfillment, requiring a second constitution of objectivities: possible valuations of what the will intends as valuable for us, but recalling that at this level all value possibilities are open as temporal. In principle, it is possible for us to be all that we will as valuable in time. This is Enlightenment’s alpha and omega: empty temporal possibility and its temporal fulfillment by all that we value as our mode of final being. Both Marxism and capitalism offer the same intentionality. The intentionality of fulfillment of possible valuations as temporal does not lead to perceptual awareness, since the latter, in its naturalistic mode, is quite limited and merely qualitative. Hence, the fulfillment requires a constructive intentionality that can establish possible conditions for possible reality. One minor aspect for this establishment is the shift of reason to instrumental rationality, which task is to calculate what reality is valuable for us and then calculate the conditions how such reality shall be achieved. Values, in this sense, are calculations of possible results realized solely as material. To achieve any value, the human has to be reduced to a system of interests, needs, desires, power and all must act aggressively against others to fulfill such wants. Indeed, language itself is split into numerous technical discourses. No doubt, the Russian Westernizers took this type of instrumental intentionality for granted, but also recognized that values signify a field of instrumental connections and are not ends in themselves.

The issue of temporal value possibilities is the driving force of the Enlightenment at this level. Transcendent or eternal possibility is abolished; hence, temporality is the pressure that demands a prolongation of our temporal existence. There is no other option; being temporal, we want to live as long as possible and, hence, the frantic rush for the latest technologies that promise to protract our lives. Such technologies have become
equivalent to the value of life and death. The public domain is an arena for the struggle for life itself, and any means can be used, whether lying, killing, wars, all will do as well, as long as they promise to keep us safe, to insure our continuity at any price. All the changing technical inventions promote other inventions as values of life: we want to go on, thus, the political shift to dramatic conservatism. The latter is a promise, by whatever means, to guarantee our security, safety, protection and continuity, as long as we surrender our freedoms to participate in the public domain and to engage in public dialogue. In other words, the public domain, as the condition for other democratic institutions, is no longer maintained, despite all the rhetoric about democracy and its “values”. We are closer to Hobbesian world than to that of Locke and, above all, Kant. The intentionality of the Enlightenment has worked itself out to reveal its truth two centuries later. Indeed, we are living this intentionality as an awareness of our life world in such a way that while speaking of democracy, rights, equality and freedoms, we intend such a world as a struggle for temporal and technical continuity. Thus, all is valuable that enhances this continuity – and purely materially. The life world of the Enlightenment that Russia encountered consisted of possible construction of iron, coal, cement, chemistry, biology, physics and even physiology. The human acquired a material value as producer, maker, a homo laborans, a man of science and ultimately a technocratic functionary in a system of conditions and results that became the Soviet model.

The Great Russian literatures faced this Westernization and “modernization” and, hence, were written between two life worlds: one that was maintained as an established tradition, the other as a construct of the Scientific and the Political Enlightenments of the West. The former, the feudal-aristocratic, was deemed to be decadent, corrupt by some and by others as spiritually superior although of need for revisions, specifically, its serfdom. The latter, the West, while partially unknown and alien, was regarded as the bearer of ideas that would transform Russia and bring it into its proper place as a European nation. While numerous texts categorize Russian philosophies in terms of Slavophiles and Westernizers, idealistic and materialistic, nihilistic, theocentric and secular, our task is to disclose the lived awareness that comprises eidetic invariants, which are not posited as objects of reflection. Rather, they comprise a tacit awareness, in terms of which all judgments are made, whether such judgments
are phrased theologically, politically, ethically, socially or economically. In this sense, the appearance in Russia of Western Enlightenment brought in various systems, from Romanticism through Idealism to Materialism, but the eidos of such systems is what has to be understood in order to disclose Russian challenge to the Enlightenment and its own tradition. Russian writers constitute a point of crisis between two worlds – tradition and Western modern Enlightenments. But to understand these literatures, it is necessary to offer a brief sketch of the Russian tradition before the revolution.

A brief historical sketch is provided by James Eddie, while the significant aspects of that tradition are dependent on the reflective method presented in the second chapter of this text. While tradition demands respect for customary rules and social arrangements (and Bozarov rightly asks from what such respect follows), but respect for them implies something more basic, some lived awareness that connects to the worth of a singular person beyond his/her value and demands a treatment of oneself and the others in an honorable, noble, truthful, elevating manner. In Turgieniev’s Fathers and Sons, there appears a reflection raising the question of legitimation of the traditional Russian life world of aristocratic privilege in contrast to the value of the world of the Enlightenment, and this very question places the questioner in a crisis situation. While we may think that this provides a comparison for choice, in lived awareness there appears an intention that raises a question: which life world would provide actual fulfillment of the essence of a human being as having worth in principle. In the most degraded figures and the most elevated rebels, there appears an intimation of human self-worth. Dostoyevsky gives back the key to paradise because the ruler of paradise values equally an innocent child and a decadent master. For the master, a favorite dog is more valuable than a child, and in the life world of feudal lords this is an acceptable standard. Dostoyevsky’s rejection is an affirmation of human worth for its own sake. He will accept eternal damnation, but will not accept a life world, in which crimes against children are permitted. He raises an absolute question: is life worth living in a world, where such a degradation of human worth is a standard, sanctioned and accepted even by the highest authority. Indeed, the entire corpus of Dostoyevsky’s writings is a striving to disclose this awareness. In Brothers Karamazov, the main figure, Dimitri, insults and degrades an impoverished elderly captain, who no longer has any social value; yet, toward the end of the story, Dimitri attempts to apologize by offering the captain money; impoverished as he is,
the captain refuses to be bought and, thus, degraded again. He reveals his self-worth as being above any price, above any social value, and “compels” Dimitri to recognize his own self-worth in face of the other and his nobility, dignity and honor. In short, it is “illegitimate” to attempt to place a monetary value on human self-worth.

The question of legitimation of a life world may appear in a quiet and solitary figure, such as the one depicted by Gogol. There is no doubt that the main character is depicted to comprise a search for self-worth in face of a most bleak life world. It has been argued that this figure is driven by psychological desire for self-importance or by a search for the appearance of a higher social status. Such desires may well be part of a personal morphology and a social situation, but they do not provide an adequate understanding of the intentionality involved in these drives or desires. Subtending and covered over both by psychologically and socially constructed phenomena appears an almost quixotic quest to reach something psychologically and socially unreachable and yet totally present in his lived awareness: I am worthy, I have dignity, self and other respect, and honor. The point is that such awareness is not within the realm of prevalent social values or psychological feelings, since his social value will in no wise change with the acquisition of the Great Coat. He will remain in his meager occupation, still hungry and without candle light at night, without any hope for a better tomorrow. In brief, he will not get any value out of his struggling and striving apart from the recognition of his intrinsic worth for its own sake. Across Russian literature something given to awareness appears that is akin to Kant’s thing in itself that possesses no purpose, no functional value, yet it is to be respected unconditionally. While the Enlightenment opened up an entire level of constructs called values and announced that the thing in itself is unknowable, Russian literature is intent in showing that any question of legitimation of a given life world discloses a transcendental constitution of human self-worth as the thing in itself.

Let us look at the logic of intrinsic worth. In the life world, where everything is a trash bin of values, there emerge personal actions and expressions that demand honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness, not only of themselves, but of others. Indeed, their actions are equally an indication of intrinsic self-worth of others. The intentionality of consciousness as teleological is accepted both by the “rationalistic” Westernizers, from Be-
linsky through Herzen, wherein consciousness is irreducible to scientific explanations, and the writers, who emphasize Russian spirituality. This intentionality aims at its telos, which is the point of critique of Russian and Western life worlds. Yet, both reject the materialistic-rationalistic West as decadent, purposeless and even nihilistic despite its technical sophistication, and extol the Russian man as a model of salvation. This model is distinguished from Western and Asiatic types by its striving, despite the Russian cultural veneer, to exhibit dignity, honor, truthfulness in action. Thus, Mikhailovsky makes a distinction between types and levels of civilization. West may have a higher level of material civilization, but Russia is a superior type due to its intuitive understanding of the personal dignity and intrinsic self-worth of an individual. Even Herzen and Bakunin, while living as exiles, extolled the superiority of the Russian type of awareness of this dignity. Indeed, all the social degradations imposed by serfdom as a traditional value gradation reveal the common Russian acceptance of the absolute worth of a person. After all, it would be impossible to degrade others without recognizing the other as a possessor of intrinsic self-worth. We cannot degrade a creature who, in its life world, does not recognize a need to justify its deeds, to make a choice between two life worlds; in short, to call a dog – dog, is neither a degradation nor a negation of intrinsic worth. Only another person can be degraded on the basis of recognition of her intrinsic worth. This is to say, degradation, reduction, insult, are possible only when we recognize hers and our own intrinsic worth, honor and dignity. Degrading of others in an effort to elevate oneself is an indication of the worth of others, an indication of our anxiety in face of the other’s intrinsic self-worth, her unavoidable height. Unable to withstand the other’s self-worth, we condemn her to death and, thus, prove that we are unwilling to admit our own self degradation, our own crisis, and cannot withstand the dignity of the intrinsic self-worth of another. The outcasts, the exiles to Siberia, who have lost all social value, still strive to exhibit dignity, honor, respect, and, thus, reveal the final human position for its own sake that cannot be abolished, even when threatened by death. This is the Russian positive negativity. This appears in extreme cases, where the guards who manage prisons immediately condemn to death anyone, who shows self and other respect, dignity and honor. Here is a recognition and a lack of honor and dignity in the guards, who function as valuable servants of the state. This logic calls to the others to recognize the crisis in their lives,
to legitimate the life world, in which they live and to ask whether such a life world fulfills their lived awareness of their intrinsic worth. This is to say, the very presence of the other, who is aware of her intrinsic worth performs a tacit phenomenological bracketing and, hence, challenges a blind inheritance in this life world. One can then raise a question whether such a life world is worthy of one’s intrinsic worth.

The Russian writers were not professional philosophers, but persons who demanded the recognition not only of their own, but of everyone’s unconditional self-worth. All of them (with an exception of Tolstoy who, nevertheless, was excommunicated) placed self-worth above their own safety, wealth, security, social position and were exiled, imprisoned, persecuted and censored. They placed self-worth above their life and dared to say no to their own and that of Enlightenment’s life worlds. In this sense, the claims that various Russian writers, inclusive of Chernichevsky, Turgenev, and even Dostoyevsky, were nihilists are wrong. Nihilism rejects the world of values and meaning without offering anything positive in their place. Not so with the Russian writers, whose transcendental awareness of self-worth is the only viable position, from which life worlds can be illumined in essence and disclosed as to what kind of activity cannot be fulfilled. No doubt, they toyed with democracy and equality of all persons, but they also realized from their experience in the West that democracy was in crisis. West, in general, has abolished the public domain, where autonomous citizens could rationally debate public issues, by reducing it to the clashing sum of private interests and power confrontations. The rationality of Western man, as Dostoyevsky noted, is a facade, under which there lurk all sorts of irrational drives, such as greed, envy, aggression and incivility. Hence, the notion of freedom and, above all, self-worth can no longer be offered by the West. Hence, despite their loss of social value positions, wealth, freedom to write, they subsumed themselves under this absolute awareness of what a human being is and acted accordingly.

It seems that the initial or founding intentionality of the Enlightenment has permitted a partial fulfillment of self-worth in the awareness of autonomy, yet the interpretation of the latter became restricted to the understanding of its period, which mixed scientific explanations with freedom of research, rights to self-invention and subject to no one. Scientific explanations were extolled as the sole avenue to truth and offered categorical divisions of all things, while humanities, wanting to be scientific, en-
gaged in equal categorization of its own disciplines, from theologies and their classification, to literatures. Categorization also subjected the human activity to become substantivated into categorizable characteristics: so and so is valuable, a business person, a teacher, etc., thus, excluding the quest to return to activities that could be the sole understanding of what such categories mean. As we know, suddenly such categories, defining a person, could be acquired by numerous means, including money. Self-worth, as an enactment, a participatory engagement vanished behind epistemic terms. We are all citizens, with characteristics, such as rights, freedoms and even entitlements, but if a citizen is only the one, who actively maintains the public domain as a space of self-worth, then how can one speak of inhabitants, who refuse to participate in public’s life world? This is the point of crisis, requiring of all inhabitants of a society to become citizens. As was noted above, society formed by the Scientific Enlightenment and established by Marxism-Leninism consists of numerous, defined and categorized functionaries with their “value positions”, but unable to raise the question whether such a life world is adequate to human self-worth.

No doubt, the Political Enlightenment comprised a domain of partial fulfillment of self-worth, yet the latter demands more in the sense of integration of autonomy, equality and responsibility. As we saw, the tension between freedom and equality still remains and has to be mediated by responsibility in face of the requirements of self-worth, self and other respect, honor, truthfulness and dignity. These aspects are not epistemic or categorical delimitations of social value functions, but required enactments by everyone. With the other side of modern world, the Scientific Enlightenment, the human is reduced to pure technological value function, completely covering over of self-worth. After all, even “professional” philosopher, such as Berdyaev, parted both with Marxists, who completely disregarded concrete persons, and with Kant because beyond duty there is worth and dignity of a person. For Berdyaev, Marxist ethics were different for each social-historical period without providing a criterion, by which to judge their worth. Resultantly, there must be an absolute standard, an eidos, and invariant as intrinsic self-worth of a person. We know how Marxism-Leninism labored to censor any Soviet writer, who rose above all functional values and demanded a criterion, by which to judge the life world of the Soviet Union. We shall return to this question when dealing
with Lithuania and its transformation to the paradigm of the Political En-
lightenment. What is significant is the way that Marxism, as a variant of
the Scientific Enlightenment, reduced everything to material interests and
labor as the only value, and Lenin brought back the traditional Russian au-
tocracy and, thus, betrayed the fundamental Russian revolution initiated
by writers. This could be regarded as an ultimate liberation from what is
essentially the basic quest of philosophy – who are we?

Suggested Reading

Fink, E. *Traktat ueber die Gewalt des Menschen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1974).
Gilkey, L. The Religious Dilemmas of a Scientific Culture: The Interface of Tech-
nology, History and Religion. In *Being Human in a Technological Age*. Bor-
Kriele, M. *Befreiung und Politische Aufklaerung* (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1980).
Landgrebe, L. *Faktizitaet und Individuation* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1982).
Landgrebe, L. *Phaenomenologie und Geschichte* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1968).
Mickunas, A. The Essence of the Technological World. In *Essaysin Memory of
Richter, H. *Der Gotteskomplex* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982).
Sloterdijk, P. *Kritik der Zynischen Vernunft*. Bd. I. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1988).
Spaemann, R. Unter Welchen Umstaenden Kann Man Noch von Fortschritt
Sprechen? In *Fortschritt ohne Mass.* Loew, R. (ed.). (Muenchen: Piper Ver-
Waldenfels, B. *Phaenomenologie und Marxismus*. Bd. I. (Frankfurt am Main:
CHAPTER V

DIALECTICS: SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL

Introduction

In the following discussion, three major themes will be articulated to show the problematic relationship between society and individual (at base an ontological debate concerning parts and wholes), the appearance of modern concept of history and, finally, the efforts of resolving the problem of parts and wholes by Dialectical Materialism and its failure. While discussing Marxism (which includes the various writings by the followers of Marx and Engels, such as Lenin and, above all, the formation of the guiding theory, Dialectical Materialism), we shall have to address complex ontological and epistemological issues in terms of levels of consciousness, their limitations and their background assumptions. This means that Dialectical Materialism, while by necessity of its logic must suppress some aspects of modern tradition, such aspects will appear as a principle, without which the Soviet paradigm would not be possible, and yet its very appearance will require the transformation of dialectics. This is to say, the concept of “limits” will play a crucial role in understanding what is meant by essence, evolution and revolution. Given this setting, let us open the philosophical question of limits and the way it grounds various problematic levels that lead to unresolvable paradoxes demanding a shift in paradigm from classical philosophies to modern philosophical debates. Indeed, the ontological question of limits also frames the modern tension between an understanding of society as sum of individuals, and society as being “more” than such some in a way that society as a whole has its characteristics and needs beyond those of the individuals. The task of subsequent chapter of this text will require an explication of a paradigm, relevant for Lithuania that would resolve such a tension. The same ontological issue frames the appearance of modern Western notion of history, and thus, in
this chapter, the ontological debate can deal with society and history. We already spoke of the modern West and its two Enlightenments, but now it is essential to disclose the basic ontology that both gave birth to the Scientific Enlightenment and to the Political Enlightenment. The task of next chapters will involve a paradigm that must integrate both, if Lithuania is to become both democratic and scientific without a contradiction.

It has been well established that not all traditions are historical, not even some that belong to the Western civilization. Hence, it is necessary to explicate the philosophical aspects that gave rise to the conception of what, in the modern West, is called history. The subject matter that is at issue is one of ontology. The latter is reserved for the exposition of the basic principles that constitute the very essence of nature. The question of nature formed a debate within and among major schools of philosophy, yet all of them will have to be explicated at the level, wherein the necessity for history arises. Despite some variations, classical Greek thought understood all natural events from their limits (peras). Every being is determined to be a specific kind of being by the limit, which cannot be transgressed. Whether the limit is located in topos noitos (the place of ideas) or is the morphe (the inherent form of a thing), in each case they are the very essence of a given thing. In turn, the essence of a being is what comprises its very purpose, its alpha and omega, its intelligibility such that from the very inception of a given being, the form, the essence is what determines the way the given being will unfold its dynamis, kinesis, its dynamics, the shape of its movement. The dynamics, therefore, is intelligible at the outset because it manifests its own form as the very purpose of its unfolding. In this sense, every being has its own purpose, which is one qualitative dimension of its own essence. This means that the necessity of all beings is inherent in them.

Contingency or accidental encounters do not alter the essence of beings. An animal, engaged in the unfolding of its essence as its purpose, such as grazing, may encounter a lightning, which too is unfolding its essence, would encounter an accident. The latter may be mechanical, but not essential to the beings of either event. Moreover, any notion of evolution is excluded a priori. A being does not evolve from previous beings nor does it evolve from itself by addition of elements from other events. In the former case, a parent does not produce something essentially higher
than itself. It is the rule of aitia, an efficient cause, since the result can be equal, but never more than its cause. In the second case, a being, as a result of its essential cause, cannot evolve, since at the very outset it contains its essence that will unfold to full actuality, but it will not change in itself. A monkey will produce monkeys and cannot be a cause of something more. In turn, beings have no histories, apart from differences in the unfolding of their essence. A human may become a carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but these factors do not change the essence of what a human being is; they are accidental encounters in specific settings. In brief, a human is born and will die a human. That we have Herodotus and Thucydides as “historians” does not mean that there is anything necessary in “historical” accounts. Such accounts depict chancy encounters, accidental intersection, which is subtended by the pursuit of human telos as human essence. In this sense, historical events, such as encounters of armies, will be essentially forever the same, regardless of time and place. Essentially, there is no difference between Alexander, Napoleon, Bush or Hitler, battle of Gorillas or charge of elephants; they all pursue their essential natures. It would be nonsensical to speak of the history of Alexander or a history of a snail.

The question of limits, nonetheless, requires an investigation into the problem of parts and wholes, since this problem also frames Dialectical Materialism and its attempt to account for the “essential” characteristics of the whole, such as society. The problem of whole and parts is concerned with the question of the ontological priority of the whole over parts or of the parts over the whole. We need not go into protracted philosophical arguments framing the problem, since a detailed account is already available in another text (Mickunas, A. Social Value and Individual Worth. Vilnius: Mykolas Romeris University, 2012). This philosophical debate includes anything in the world, trees, animals, humans, and includes the issue of the attributes of the parts and the whole: does the whole possess attributes of its own, as a whole, or do its attributes equal the sum of the attributes of the parts? The modern resolution of this issue comprises the ground of instrumental reason and, indeed, of technological conception of the environment and, finally, of the human. What then is the issue? Let us take human society and ask whether society has characteristics that are more than the characteristics of individual members? Classical Greeks argued for the notion that there is social good that belongs to society and is not identical
with the sum of individual goods. Modern philosophies took the opposite position and accepted the premise that there are only the characteristics of individual members and society is a numerical sum of individuals. In this sense, we get a modern “individualism” such that each individual is separate from other individuals – each is an unrelated atom – and the only social whole is an established agreement to form a political society with all the individual rights and responsibilities. This kind of position is equally relevant for any other thing in nature. The tree is a sum of its parts and there are no characteristic that belongs to the tree as a whole. Hence, the tree is “analyzable” into the smallest parts – atoms, just as everything else is divisible up to its smallest part. If we take the sum of parts and add them together, we shall have an appearance of a thing as if it had characteristics of the whole, but the latter has no objective support. The color green of a thing is not part of the atoms and, hence, the color must be attributed to a posited entity called, in modern philosophy, the subject. As one can readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction between secondary and primary characteristics and, by implication, the subject-object division.

Ontologically speaking, the world is a sum of the “smallest” parts. In this case, the perceived whole, to say once again, is a “mistake of the senses”. Given this irresolvable dilemma, the thesis of the ontological priority of the whole was rejected, and a theory of the parts – atomistic – was accepted. It was granted that the basic ontological unity is a material part that cannot be altered or destroyed in the whole. This suggests that if the whole is a sum of parts, then there is no unity of a whole; everything is an aggregate of material parts in space and time. The visible whole and its perceived attributes have no objective basis; they do not belong to the “things themselves”, but to the perceiver. What is perceived directly must have a “place”, and this place was designated to be a subject, containing the secondary qualities, while the real objective world was composed of primary, quantitative particles – modern materialism. The latter was interpreted atomistically, leading Basso to argue that if the parts in the whole remain unchanged, then there is no unity of the parts in the whole. Everything is an aggregate of atomic or the “smallest” parts, which in contemporary jargon are called “the building blocks of the universe”. The social consequences of this ontology are well developed by modern writers, such as Hobbes, Locke and the British school of the “labor theory of value”. For
Hobbes, contrary to classical Greek conception of the essence of the polis as being more than the sum of individuals, all we have is a society that is equal to the sum of interests of individuals, each seeking to survive and each being at war with each other – war of all against all. The resolution of this war is monarchy with total power to rule by the monarch’s will.

At this juncture, there is the birth of the modern subject, a container, a sack, so to speak, of appearances that have neither status nor place in “reality”. We already discussed the modern notion of autonomous and self-creating subject, and here we presented the arguments that led to its philosophical appearance in the form of a distinction between subject and object. In principle, we are led to the primacy of reflective thought and, hence, to the primacy of the subject as the foundation and validation of theoretical and methodological avenues to objectivity, requiring a rejection of the relevance of things of awareness for the understanding of the world. In turn, this rejection would lead to a “voluntaristic individualism” and the primacy of absolute human self-determination. The success of the arguments for such a reflecting subject is premised on the abolition of the whole and the positing of parts as the primary ontological components of nature. These components are not accessible to perception, but only to a subject as a calculating reason. The result is that whatever is deemed to be real must be established, synthesized, worked over and shaped by the various activities of the subject. Some aspects of this trend are obvious in Kantian synthetic thinking, in Lockean and even Marxian notion of the labor theory of value and even in Hegelian conception of the absolute idea as working itself through history to self-realization. In short, reality in itself is inaccessible to experience. Thus, one needs to devise an access to this reality by other means. What is accessible to experience does not belong to the world, but only to the “mind”.

It must be pointed out that while the modern choice of nature as a sum of material parts has been a dominant trend, sciences and indeed human sciences are in a constant quandary to understand characteristics of things that are different from the characteristics of the parts. All that scholars in various disciplines can come up with is a thesis of “emergent properties” attributed to an anonymous master called “evolution” or to “dialectical leaps” in nature. As is well known, this thesis dominated the dialectical thought of the nineteenth century, while evolutionism appeared again in biology,
genetics and even social and political sciences to “explain” the experienced phenomena of things. Hence, the modern Western scientific thinking is constantly facing its own limitations. It cannot derive the “more” in nature and experience than the thesis of a sum of parts would allow and at the same time must accept due to their own theories the appearance of “new qualities”. As if by unexplicated philosophical intuition, they insist on the priority of perceived things as the most obvious presence to awareness, and yet such awareness becomes unreal and irrelevant to science and philosophy.

The ontological shift in modern philosophy toward mechanistic atomism strips all essential structures from nature and replaces all beings with a sum of material parts functioning in accordance with mechanical laws. Therefore, no beings of nature have any purpose. This ontological conception of all nature leaves one entity, the human as a thinking subject, who has purposes. But such purposes have nothing to do with the real, material world, including human bodies that function mechanically. Moreover, such thinking and its purposes have no fixed rules or laws; it is basically voluntaristic. Hence, human actions, directed by will, make their way that is distinct from the world of ontologically posited reality. Humans make history as a purposive process, which might aim at some final end. The latter has been depicted by various utopian images, including some versions of Marxism. If material events are counted in this purposive history, they are not ontologically material, but practically, i.e. what can we make of the indifferent, mechanical, and purposeless stuff for our aims and presumed needs. As was discussed in previous chapters, the modern story contains progress of technology and human mastery of the material environment (including the material human as part of the environment). We also pointed out how autonomy became a human characteristic and a source of “laws” over nature and society. We also know the story of the efforts to impute into consciously constructed events some sort of causal connections – conditions-results – as a prejudgment of the Scientific Enlightenment and, thus, even make history into science. Moreover, we have been told that historical writing is based on research and, therefore, it is scientific. There is also a plethora of proposals to ontologize history by presuming that it is explainable in terms of material interests in the form of economy. As we shall see later in this chapter, the assumption of such materialism dominated the Soviet Union and produced a theory of scien-
scientific socialism, couched in a theory of Dialectical Materialism. We shall address this theory and its efforts to find a way to get from material parts to an essence of the whole, i.e., to resume the debate of classical thought.

Hence, any qualitative features of the whole are actually features of a perceiving subject. In turn, this means that what the subject perceives are not attributes of the real, while the real, the atomic parts, cannot be experienced. In short, reality in itself is inaccessible to experience. Thus, one needs to devise an access to this reality by other means. What is accessible to experience does not belong to the world, but only to the “mind”. The invention of this modern Western mind that belongs to a subject leads to numerous and nonsensical stories, such as solipsism, subjectivism, psychologism, impressionism, even empiricism and, finally, representationalism, where this mind does not know the world, but creates all sorts of “representations”, from which the world is reached by “inferences” or finally becomes an arbitrary construct of the subject. Moreover, all constructs can become equivalent in claiming that underneath human perceptions reality is material, spiritual, vital, static, energetic, divine and demonic. For our disclosing of the basic modern understanding, this newly invented mind thinks its own thoughts and decides what thoughts shall count as relevant for science or for that matter reality. Yet, as was noted in the methodological chapter, there is no way of simply discarding the entire world understanding that has become not only Western, but global, as well.

Critique of Historical Reason

The notion that history is human and not natural phenomenon leads to the way that modern Western thought had to account for time. All events, depicted mechanically, follow a causal sequence. What is given now can be explained by previous causes. Yet, at present, the previous causes are no longer available; they require an introduction of awareness of the past, called memory. The future not being at present also requires an awareness, which is called projection of temporal possibilities. Both are, of course, phenomena of consciousness. The latter must provide temporal connections, so well recognized by Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and, finally, Sartre. Some, such as Hegel, realized that human memory and projection are inadequate to account for past events, which are beyond
human memory. Hence, an introduction of an absolute consciousness, a sort of all-encompassing, eternity, is manifesting itself in a continuous historical time. Such an eternity is incompatible with temporality to the extent that eternity, as an infinite position, cannot be divided into historical, temporal periods, without ceasing to be infinite. Kierkegaard made sport of Hegel on this point. Once the infinite collapses, what remains are contingent, historical events, having no necessary connections, apart from human memory and projected future. To save the day, scientific reason introduces the method of quantification and the ability to measure mathematically (presumed to be objective operation) of events of the past and expected events of the future. All is well, but the problem is not solved – it is only postponed. First, how can a subject, living in the present, extend its measures on the past if the latter is no longer and the future is not yet? What does one measure? Second, mathematical devices are not temporal and do not provide any clues whether what is being measured is in the past or in the future. Hence, one has to assume awareness of the past and of the future, which, as was seen, are not given, except in the present awareness. Space is no mystery; all spatial events are present now, deployed one next to the other but, as material, do not signify their past or their future. Hence, once again, the signification of both is conscious phenomenon.

Historical reason encounters broader issues. Assuming that there is a continuous historical process, having a future aim as its final purpose that is posited as a necessary condition for necessary connections between temporal events, the assumption results in a positing of historical rules, be they dialectics of Hegelian or Marxian brands or some presumed evolution. In brief, future final purpose is posited as a condition for the invention of necessary rules of historical development. It is significant that the final purpose is in and part of history and, hence, one aspect of history and thus defies the very notion of a final purpose. After all, one historical event cannot be the aim of the whole. After this “final event” is reached, history does not cease and, thus, abolishes such event as final. This outcome forces the thinkers of historical reason to posit a transcendent historical aim above or beyond history. Such transcendence cannot be historical and properly must be designated to be eternal. The results of this transcendent view are as follows: first, the best that can be obtained from it is a changeless dialectical structure or system and, hence, in principle static, yield-
ing no historical development; second, transcendent, infinite being is un-
knowable by contingent historical actors (well noted by Kierkegaard) and,
thus, cannot be a source of claims as to whither of human destiny; third,
infinity has no temporal orientation and would not be an indication of a
purposive direction of history; fourth, historical consciousness cannot es-
cepe self-destruction in terms of its claim to be universal and all inclusive,
because, one, if all consciousness is historical (expressed pedagogically as
an accumulation of knowledge) and must be historically contextualized,
then such a conscious claim is equally historical and must be understood
within its historical context; and two, the very ontology, which gave rise
to the conception of mechanical world, is equally historical. Hence, if the
mechanical universe were to be reinterpreted as one of having open mean-
ing, i.e., signitive, then historical consciousness would cease to be relevant.
These aspects place the current historical consciousness at a complete loss
and crisis. No doubt, the wrestling with this crisis led numerous philo-
sophical and scientific efforts into all sorts of metaphysical postulates of
infinity and cosmic order, all attempting to find some permanent compo-
nent, even an eternal recurrence, as a saving grace. Theories are proposed
and discarded like spring fashions, continuously disclosing our confusion.

What remain, in principle, are the following modes of awareness:
first, material nature and its continuity are premised on necessary me-
chanical laws, devised by sciences. While the material reality is not accessi-
ble to perception, it is accessible to controls by human quantification, i.e.,
by humanly devised method of interpretation – mathematics. Second, the
modern subject, as the sole entity with purposes, is contingent, having no
objective necessity, is free from all the constraints and, hence, can define
itself at will, as noted in previous chapters. It names itself to be an autono-
mous free activity. Only the subject and society of subjects have history
and whatever environment it builds out of the material environment be-
comes part of human history. By making the environment, humans build
their history and, thus, the latter has a purpose or purposes to the extent
that making of history in Modern West is coextensive with scientific tech-
nology and its progress. As we saw in previous chapters, progress is an
increasing control of the material environment for human benefit. But the
benefit must be qualitative as an aspect of awareness and as a condition for
judgments whether there is a progress as judged by an improved quality
of life. Yet, it is necessary to ask the question whether the quality of life can be achieved by an “atomistic” individual subject, or must it involve another sphere of the public, even if such a sphere is social? It is significant that in the modern industrial society, the social factors are more complex than they were in the eighteenth century. The well-being of the population at various levels has called upon the polis to manage social affairs. In this sense, the social principles have become associated with the questions of political principles and rights. But even this more encompassing social activity of the state, an activity, which need not be regarded as totally inappropriate, must assume its fundamental task to be the maintenance of the public sphere of freedoms and rights. If this is forgotten, then we fall back into the social domain and face the composition of the political merely as another social group looking out for its own interests and power against those of others. In other words, Hobbes draws an unavoidable conclusion that the only function of the government is power, since the only domain that is important is the domain of drives, happiness, self-preservation and interests. Within this domain, freedom has no role, and even the sovereign must function in terms of his needs and happiness.

The social-political question concerning the role of the public domain in adjudicating social issues appears in the debates concerning the limits of “political” intervention in social affairs. Despite all the progressive intelligence in many areas of Western societies during the last two centuries, they have failed to understand that the various labor movements only seemed to be social movements for the well-being of the worker. Almost without exception theoretical thinking was concerned basically with the social welfare of the worker. This focus was oblivious to the political dimension. Yet, the basic direction of the movements was the legitimation of each laborer as a full and autonomous citizen having a voice in the public arena. This suggests that one is a citizen only if he is a participant in a public arena as a law giver, a member of res publicum, matters of the public. But in these matters, each individual is a master, having no masters, i.e. he is his own person. This is one quality of a citizen of the polis. To speak with Kant, such an individual cannot be used by others as means, and, as a free being, cannot live compelled by necessities. While understood as a mechanical object, the individual has a right to his body and, hence, the latter is his own property.
The main problem that emerged by the nineteenth century for the *polis* is the industrial revolution, creating a condition for a large segment of the population, whereby such segments have only one thing that is its own: possession of labor power, which this group regards as its property and yet exposed to provide for the needs of sustenance. Of course, this is different from the autocratic understanding, where the body and labor of the “masses” belonged to the autocrat of whatever definition, and yet the modern individual in industrial society has to “contract” his body to another person for a specified fee. This conception leads to the possibility of subordination of one person by another in the area of social powers, creating a situation, in which one group is much weaker than another group. While the modern *polis* might want to equalize matters through laws and regulations, by themselves the latter are insufficient to achieve the quality of individual self-sufficiency and independence. As history has shown, the Marxian effort to abolish private property has failed precisely because it dealt with the balances of social power, leading to a change of social powers instead of an establishment of a *polis* for the public. In this sense, what one finds in the “communist” camp are struggles for social power, economic oppression of one group by another, but not a *polis* or *res-publicum*, where the matters of public would be accessible to the public arena for free adjudication and law giving. Marxism repeated the autocratic notion of the working masses as exclusive property of the state. The Western populations, specifically the working masses, have taken another path, which, seen in light of our conception of the citizen, has the following composition. Since the person who depends for his “independence” on another has little say solely by his own devices, he formed organizations capable of equalizing the social balance of power and allowing the organization to speak in the name of the individual in the public forum. While at a first glance this might seem as a way of falling back into the social domain, nonetheless, there is a political moment allowing the individual independence from the socially superior powers of those, on whom the individual is dependent for work. The organizations became the condition for the access to the public arena of the individual and, hence, in a mediated way, of independence in the process of public discourses for rights. By these means, the individual acquires recognition as an equal. Of course, the organizations would be “over determined” if they were relegated to be the
sole means, by which the individual acquires a voice in a *polis*. Yet, it is also obvious that the organizations are both possible in and a means for the maintenance of a *polis*. There is one danger, which will be discussed subsequently: the usual interests of such organizations tend to be interpreted as purely social and, hence, the organizations tend to reduce themselves to the balancing and achieving of social power.

Currently, there are trends, which tend to isolate the individual and, thus, to abolish his participation in the *polis*. It appears in the sophistic and even demagogical misuse of language. One associates freedom with the actions and will of a solitary individual, while organized action is regarded to be “collective” and, hence, unfree. Yet, since Toqueville’s analyses of the modern democracies, it could be claimed that the individual can defend his public freedoms against social powers, when he associates with a plurality of organizations, which allow the individual to speak and to have a louder voice. This is to say, the social powers, which can enter the political arena purely for the advancement of their interests, powers such as economic, cannot be countered by an individual. Precisely, the effort to isolate the individual is coextensive with the effort to push the social-private interests into the public arena. One counter to such efforts is a plurality of organizations, which task is not to bring social pressure for their own interests, but the maintenance of the political arena and its equal access to everyone, irrespective of social posture. Indeed, Kant’s analyses of the efforts to isolate the individual under the guise of “independence” have revealed these efforts as a sophistry at the service of social powers.

Given the thesis of the original covenant as the essence for the foundation of a *polis* (not historical origin), there still appears a constant issue, which has to be addressed, if not solved: laws comply with the essence of rights only if they are in accord with the fundamental law, i.e., the law of the original covenant, stemming from the will and participation of the people. But what about the laws, which were not concluded by the population? This could not be answered simplistically that the laws should be disregarded, if for no other reason than the fact that the law becomes effective by virtue of state power. Since the state includes the totality of laws and is empowered to maintain them, then the law passed by the state can equally be imposed. Moreover, in various cases, the state might be justified in taking measures to prevent injustice, e.g., when social events
change and when laws no longer correspond to the idea of rights, the laws become unjust and call for changes. It would be quite inappropriate to resist such establishment of new laws. Obviously, the resistance to law is one of the most controversial issues in the political arena. Of course, we must reject the resistance in case the state establishes a law, which is in accordance with the principle of rights; this calls for resistance as a duty in cases, where such rights are violated for whatever reason: religious, racial, educational or economic. The principle of rights sets the parameters both for the enactment of laws and for the power of the state.

Within this context, every determination of law, which goes counter to the idea of the original covenant, is to be brought to the open political arena for adjudication. This rejects some views, which would want to maintain a right to resistance and, indeed, to the overthrowing of the state. The rejection cannot be easily justified in an age of “revolutions”, where one or another group keeps “taking political power”. Yet, what has become quite obvious in the age of revolutions is that they do not constitute political revolutions; rather, they manifest social struggles of one group against another, each taking for a while the position of rulership over the other, without in any way establishing a polis, i.e., a public arena. Apparently, the nature of polis does not allow its overthrow. First, its overthrowing would reduce the community to a state of social struggle for power without a requisite area for common adjudication. One either has or does not have this arena. If one fails to have it, then fundamentally man rules over man. Second, given the social power confrontations, there is no instrument of adjudication within social parameters. Striving social groups cannot become “impartial” judges, i.e., neither of the groups can be a judge. Each would want to judge in favor of its own interests and, hence, would not resolve the power confrontations. A polis is necessary not only as a fact, but also as a principle for the adjudication of differences without the intrusion of social status or power. Third, the rights of every citizen are possible within the polis, and its abolition would mean the abolition of the citizen as a political being. This is to say, the more current conceptions of revolution, claiming that the population has a right to revolt against any polis makes very little sense, if such polis is de jure if not de facto democratic and accessible to all. In case of other forms of revolutions, where the people are “led” to overthrow a dictatorship and, thus, to
establish a social system, in which the revolutionaries rule in the “name” of the people, there, in fact, was not a political, but a social revolution of one group against another for power; here, one will not find a political revolution, since no polis was overthrown and none came into existence. This was the case with the Russian Revolution; there was no political society, but only a society ruled by autocracy with absolute power and arbitrary whims to do whatever the autocrat or his/her supplicants deemed “fun”. The revolution by Marxists-Leninists merely changed the autocracy – one was overthrown and another established such, that the new autocracy was just as arbitrary in wielding its power: after all it murdered millions and used Siberia as a disposal place of vast numbers of “erring” members of society. Same system of spies following every “suspect” resembling the ancient Persian empire, where the ruler had eyes and ears everywhere and had no qualms of torturing and dispensing with any conceivable threat to his power. In brief, the Soviet Union was another variant of Autocracy.

In contrast, the publically appointed representatives of the polis have the power, which is public and not private, and this power must be practiced in public and in the open and not in secret or private domain. If the officially appointed persons begin to exercise private power, the population has a right not to overthrow the polis, but to bring such persons to a public accounting. Polis cannot be overthrown without an abolition of the domain, in which the very citizen would lose the means of bringing to account any person, who is exercising illegitimate power over others. Citizens have a duty to bring to public attention the incursion of social power into the political arena and to call for the expulsion of such a power. Indeed, the citizens should not enter the public arena with the aim of abolishing the polis, since such move would sanction the very social power brought in by the public official into the public arena.

The rule of law can be interpreted in various ways. If, for example, the law is designed exclusively for the securing of rights, i.e., empowering the polis to maintain legal norms, then such rule can leave untouched the power relationships in the social arena and, indeed, can constitute a sanction of such power. The sole function that the law would perform is the security of rights, leaving the socio-economic arena to the confrontation of powers, wherein the political equality of the citizens would be pitted against the social power concentration in economic sphere. The adjudication between
the two cannot be simply imposed by an edict, specifically in light of the problems of political equality in the public arena and the condition that no social power or status should assume any priority in this arena. The Political Enlightenment points out that the task of the *polis* is a place for rational public debate and education, through which an enlightened public would see the irrationality of some of the social activities, such as “each man for himself” or “each man must seek his own happiness”, and would recognize that the danger of incursion of such irrationalities into the *polis* becomes a danger to the autonomy of the individual as a citizen. In turn, the educated citizen should be cognizant that even in the social arena the irrational power confrontations might lead to dangerous inequalities translating into political inequalities, public apathy and an incursion of the social into the political, thus abolishing the *polis*, in the sense of making it subservient to the social. The political equalities can be extended toward the social in order to make the social less dependent on power confrontations and irrational forces and more on rational understanding of the public well-being. The above discussion was needed to point out that organized labor and other organizations are political and not just social. This understanding demands an all pervasive and publicly accessible education.

Establishment of Polis in a Democratic Revolution

The central question, which determines modern revolutions of democratic type, is the possibility of freedom in an egalitarian democracy, whether the latter pegs itself on libertarianism or socialism. It is possible that in either of these freedom may be a mere appearance, a surface ritual without any substance. One must also be cognizant of the fact that there are flawed misinterpretations of democratic revolutions, specifically those by Jacob Burckhart, who was led toward total pessimism concerning freedom in democracy: for him, the dangers of democracy lie in centralism of government and administration, the domination of the public opinion over the individual and the restriction of personal sphere of freedom. We shall see that these points are not fundamental. Basic direction consists of rethinking the possibility of freedom in egalitarian democracy and modern political economy. Thus, there arises a demand for addressing the question of the new social class of the industrial workers not on the basis
of universal rights, but in terms of the principles of egalitarian democracy. While the liberal bourgeoisie saw the plight of the industrial worker as a humanitarian problem, in principle it is a political problem to be resolved on the basis of universal equality in light of freedom.

While in previous chapter the discussion was focused on the “will to equality” and its relationship to the maintenance of autonomy, in democratic revolution the equality of social relationships offers for our conception of the public a specific direction: for our conception of the law – a unique form, for government – new principles, for the people – new customs and duties. Moreover, the egalite sweeps in a multitude of novel conceptions, concerning human relationships. Of course, we must keep in mind that this founding of the democratic revolution on the ground of egalite des conditions should not be understood as a principle, from which one could deduce socio-political events; while egalite is posited as a principle, it must relate to other principles that are not derived from egalite, although are conditioned in their functions by the latter. These principles must be maintained in view if we are to get a more encompassing picture of democratic revolution. Yet, it should be stressed that egalite des conditions, spelling the equality of social conditions, is a major sign of the essence of democracy. Modern age demonstrates an overall development toward equality, indicated by essential signs: it is universal and permanent. We find here something most unique: the notions of “universal” and “constant” designate in the Western philosophical tradition something “eidetic” that can be deciphered in, and range over, a variety of individuals. Indeed, the designation “universal” stems from Greek kath’holon, meaning the “eidetic”, which comprises the truth of the singular; and the “permanent” was in Greek the aei on, the ever present. In this sense, this claim should signify that the unfolding toward equality of social relationships is the permanent and essential truth in the Western history. Indeed, another tenuous claim could be added: since the Western “model” ruled by the “eidos” of equality has become the sign-post for the globe and its sundry revolutions, then the question of democratic “eidos” is one of the most important “truths”, unfolding in humanity.

There are various ways of regarding the “eidos” egalite, but for the present task it will be understood as a tacitly given “rule of experience”. We can point to a development in medieval period, which did not have
egalite as a telos, yet which constituted the permanent, all-encompassing, although tacit, condition for thought and action. There appeared a development and expansion of the political power of the clerical class, which opened an access to politics for otherwise socio-politically very distinct classes: peasant and aristocrat. Then, there is the increasing significance of the jurists, who, with the increasing complexities of social life, have opened the doors to anyone, who is capable of learning. There emerges a sense for literature and art and the spread of education, breaking down the feudalistic barriers between “classes”. The more these factors increase in significance, the less important appear the factor of birth. Indeed, while the aristocratic “birth right” might be present, the person from the peasant class, having developed his talents through education can sit as a judge and in this respect be equal to the aristocrat. With the dawn of modernity, all events “chase” one another, revealing the tacit eidos of egalite. With the appearance of Protestantism and its proclamation of universal “priestliness”, the equality of all persons is taken for granted as far as the highest symbols are concerned: human relationship to the absolute.

The eidos of the democratic revolution was not dissolution of the existing government and its replacement by another, but a complete rejection of the existing form of society. While being social, the revolution was also political. It retained and, indeed, increased the public arena. Everyone became religiously free, i.e. religion was not abolished, but disassociated from the public arena, and every public rank lost its preeminence in this arena; other equalities were advanced and promoted through public education. The latter establishes similar habits, tastes and literary understanding. This equalization effected another and surprising tendency: each newly emerging group, with specific interests, calls for specific rules to protect its own position, thus, constituting a specific sub-society with its own limits and functions, without entering the interests into the public arena. The aristocratic group became restricted under specific rules of taxation and privileges, the bourgeoisie became split into various bodies, separating one from others by various “rights”, although each was striving for “supremacy”. Each of these efforts at some gain in privileges spells also decay in the political ethos. The polis is divided into specific social “rights” in isolation from others. The absolute monarchy was, in fact, a sign of this decay.
The crumbling of the old reveals the constitution of the new with an entirely different form. What is of theoretical interest in this process is the appearance of the above suggested awareness of “history”. The notion of “history” as a continuous unfolding must be challenged: on one level, the apparent, there seems to be “development”, while on another, the “eidetic”, there appears to be a “transformation”. To use the language of semiotics, the “diachronic” is an unfolding of the “synchronic” and, thus, constitutes a continuity of some specific “eidos”. This unfolding is not historical, but rather expressive of a given eidetic configuration “from various sides”. The historical moment is constituted in the shift from one eidetic configuration to another, and once the latter takes root, history “ceases”, and the unfolding is again an expression of the “new eidos” from “various sides”. One way of observing history is given in such transformations; the latter appears in the vast shift toward democracy. The novelty of *egalite* appearing in the Feudal order is manifest through the decay of the political ethos. There is a central body that rules in all public domains. The same minister runs all affairs; a singular official runs all things in a given province; the official is characterized by his hate for anyone, whether aristocrat or bourgeoisie, who would want to preoccupy themselves with the public matters. This appears to be the governmental despotism, which would pose the danger for the above delimited eidos of *egalite*, appearing “under” the social and political events, such as education, religion and social groups; yet, this danger coming from absolutistic “above” is also “egalitarian” in a specific way, since it began to prescribe rules for all in all of the domains of its power, i.e. an equalization of rules irrespective of social position. The feudal inequities cease to have any power, even if the aristocrats, who had surrendered it, are supporting an absolute monarchy; this support is no longer political, but social, i.e. maintenance of tax rules and land privileges, but not political preeminence. This withdrawal away from the public, the political into the social, left a lacuna, which had to be filled, and it was filled by the intellectuals, the literari, who, while being remote from any political praxis, had to project a construction of a *polis*. While there are marked differences in the projections, all of them concur that the *polis* should be a product of “reason” without any prejudgment of a tradition. Indeed, what other standard could be used except the standard, which is “equal” for all, i.e., free, but not social.
All these pre-given elements signify the constant efforts to depict the *egalité* as the motive for democratic revolution. The sole missing link was freedom of all in the political arena. Since the very notion of freedom cannot be equated with any natural preeminence of one person over another, it carried with it the call for abolition of the determination by naturalness and a call for a rule of unprejudiced reason. And, indeed, this reason, not taking for granted any preeminence of natural birth rights, i.e., any distinctions based on some inborn human nature, had no other recourse, but to reveal an eidos of *egalité*, which was not found in existence, but was taken for granted as a rule of experience. This sort of *egalité* is at the same time a manifest freedom, in the previously mentioned sense: something that can be regarded to be an eidos, not derived from some preexisting nature or condition, is rational and only rationality offers freedom. But as just mentioned, this rationality as freedom, confronted by the eidos *egalité*, has to be established, and the establishment is an act of will. Here appears another factor in the democratic revolution: something that works, functions or establishes some specific state of affairs in terms of an eidos given rationally is a willing of a free will. This is an expanded version of the “will to equality”.

What appears here in another form is the phenomenon that we encountered in Thucydides: the eidos is not something that is directly manifest, although it is something that is closest to our experience. In a peculiar way, it remains unannounced. Thus, the democratic revolution, which finally took *egalité* explicitly, had a long “preparation” through events and decisions, in which *egalité* was not announced as an object of reason to be realized by will in the future; the future of *egalité* was not present. Only at the end of this development that the eidos, which was the rule that combined numerous events and decisions, appeared for what it was and was posited as something to be achieved in a revolution and in a future. What has been present in its ruling immediacy assumed reflective objectivity to be enacted as some “project of the will”. We have seen the emergence of this domain both as reflection and as the establishment of the public arena, in which reflection is required and sanctioned both as a method and as a condition of modern subject’s self-understanding.

The unnoticed immediacy, the intimate taken for granted of the eidos, constitutes an experiential tradition that can become a “given”. The given,
apparently, maintained under various guises in the Western thought, had a principle of democratic revolution and *egalite*. No doubt, the recognition of the taken for granted experience, the eidos, has to be understood in a specific mode: the eidos that was present tacitly had a force of naturalness was regarded as “the way things are”. The reflective recognition of the eidos reveals its experiential character, extricates it from its natural prejugdement, showing it in its unique structure and making it available for enactment without obfuscations, without the presumption that it has a natural compulsion. After all, if it were natural, submitted to the laws of “human nature”, then it would make no sense to call for its establishment. The reflective revelation of the experiential character of eidos is at the same time a manifestation of freedom as rationality, and the possibility of rational choice for an enactment of this eidos. Of course, once a democratic revolution occurs, there is a drastic change in human self-regard: in an unprecedented way the human is called upon to take up the responsibility of its own “history” or the enactment of the eidos *egalite*. It becomes a matter of the free will and responsibility. Yet, it must be recognized that once the will takes up the establishment of this eidos, it opens all of its possibilities, except one: it cannot reestablish the old “natural” order and claim to be compelled by its necessities. It is inescapably responsible for the unfolding of its history. Any effort to “return” the populations to an “order”, which does not spring from the eidos *egalite* and its free enactment by the will is an effort based precisely on such a will and its choice of an “order”. All such undertakings must be called “reactionary”, regardless where they might occur. For example, the hilarious attempts by the Soviets or the Christians, the Muslims, etc., to “establish” a “proper order”, by revolution are attempts, which are founded on the will, following a reflected eidos, and not the necessities introduced by their “explanatory” theories.

**Freedom and Equality**

Taking for granted the eidos *egalite*, each individual has an equal claim to participation in governance; this claim guarantees that in the public arena no social differences are to be counted. In this sense, the citizens, in the public domain, are fully free because they are equal. In this extreme case, freedom and equality are convertible. At the outset, the basis of modern
freedom is equality, although subsequently freedom assumes a more fundamental role and, indeed, becomes the basis for equality. One could claim that the democratic revolution is an effort to maintain the identity between the two. Of course, this identity is an intentional eidos to be maintained and supported, so that every deviation from it would be judged as anti-democratic. Yet, they appear in various social compositions differently, and this provides us with a clue as to their difference. There can be equality in a social sphere, but not in the political, i.e. each is socially free to pursue his/her own interests, but does not have political freedom with respect to the establishment of laws and participation in public decisions. There can occur variations along hierarchical gradations, both with respect to equality and freedom. There is political inequality within social equality and conversely. Indeed, there can be a total political equality and yet a complete lack of political freedom, whether under one ruler or under a collective. What this shows is that freedom and equality assume intentional identity, i.e., are subsumed under an eidos of identity to be established, but they are essentially differentiated. Their eidos of identity seems to intimate that a complete equality is identifiable with freedom, and yet even in a democratic polis they can assume extreme opposition. Of course, the democratic revolution is led by the intention toward the eidos of their identity, being fully cognizant of the danger that a complete disappearance of freedom might be compatible with equality. One could point out that the more recent dictatorships were and are compatible with equality, but with a full exclusion of freedom. This seems to rest on the failure to distinguish between society and polis. Only the latter offers the identification of equality and freedom. Hence, such dictatorial systems as the Soviet Union can well claim that they are democratic societies, i.e. offering equality, but they are not equatable with a polis. There is, of course, another fascinating side to this phenomenon. Calling themselves “political” while being only social, they are most effective; democracy, which has lost its essence, is, in fact, most virulent, effective and, as we shall see subsequently, efficient and real. As we already saw, in modern Western world equality and freedom tend to separate and in many cases in a way that freedom usually comes up short.

Once equality becomes the principle of social formation, it becomes very difficult to overcome such a principle. It becomes embedded in human habits, customs, and beliefs that, under any ontological interpreta-
tion, fundamentally we are equal. Freedom remains only as long as it is insisted upon and maintained. The maintenance of equality requires no effort, while its abolition would be more difficult. Freedom requires continuous vigilance and it vanishes by a simple neglect. Of course, the preservation of freedom might become anarchistic if it is not secured by laws of freedom; yet, anarchy can appear in another form: given such laws, they might become ineffective and powerless by neglect, i.e. neglect would allow some social power and its interests enter the vacuum left by neglect and to rule by an arbitrary will. Indeed, the arbitrariness here is anarchistic and tends to promote itself by claiming that it is ruling in the name of “law and order”. The “dangers” of anarchy are very much obvious in the calls for “law and order”, in which context each can pursue his/her private aims in peace. This attitude tends to neglect freedom, and when “law and order” is threatened, the “good” people will always call for the “restrictions” of freedom. This is to say, when the social interests enter the polis by default, then such interests tend to call for “law and order” and to accuse those, who call for freedom of being anarchistic. In this sense, all the dangers to freedom are usually well hidden, specifically when one is assured that freedom is guaranteed by law.

The advantages of equality are obvious: all professions, all positions, aims are open to everyone; each can attain every wish in accord with his dedication and talent. Every person has equal social conditions and advantages. The advantages of freedom are more difficult to recount. They become visible only with the disadvantages after freedom has been lost. Tacitus has argued that the erosion of freedom under the guise of its maintenance ruins the political ethos and with it both the public and even the private commitments and, indeed, specifically when everything seems to be functioning well in accordance with “law and order”. If we strive to maintain the public sphere and free existence, our requirements change: instead of following our own individual interests, we must not only “transcend” ourselves but be willing to maintain this transcendence in face of our own social disadvantage. In this sense, freedom is not necessarily identical with one’s social and material wishes. Indeed, its maintenance is an effort and in many cases a sacrifice. History testifies that only few were willing to rise to the level of public and demand a polis, in which the socially disadvantaged were deemed politically equal to the socially ad-
vantaged and in which the few were willing to disregard their own private concerns. Thus, once again, it is obvious that the advantages of equality are easily acceptable to most, while the advantages of freedom tend to be disregarded and left out, specifically when the domain of freedom is difficult to maintain and might have no advantages in the area of social and private concerns.

Given the primacy of equality and the disappearance of freedom, *egalité des conditions* might also disappear. This is what happens with Marxism-Leninism, everyone is equal (except, of course, for the elite), but equality is reduced to being “all alike” without any right to follow your own interests, profession, talents, indeed to be different, because such a difference might mean inequality with others. In the Soviet Union, one was equal all the way to being anonymous. There is a chorus and a singer, but the name of the singer is not even announced because that might lend the singer a status, which is not equal to others. In other words, one cannot follow one’s talents in commerce because he will become unequal to others, leading to the abolition of equality of conditions and an establishment of equality of identical. This simply suggests that equality to pursue one’s own “wants” and talents is not possible without freedom. Once again, democratic revolution requires both and, thus, requires an establishment of political society.

It must be maintained that the democratic revolution bears, within itself, an effort to maintain as close a correlation between equality and freedom as possible. We should note that in democracy freedom can only exist in unity with equality, while the converse is not true; equality need not call for freedom and can exist in correlation to despotism, as is the case with Marxism-Leninism. In this sense, freedom is always less secure and constantly exposed to the neglect by the population, enjoying the fruits of social equality without the public arena of freedom. Given this, we must rekindle the question concerning the preeminent “will to equality”. Seen superficially, it is almost taken for granted that “no one is better than anyone else”, but this does not account for the fact that in face of glaring human differences in talents, abilities, inclinations, etc., there should be the claim to equality. In theoretical terms, any effort to maintain equality based on some kind of “naturalism” makes no sense. Naturally, humans are diverse and unequal, and our resistance to any “scientific” ploy
to show our inequalities, whether physiological, genetic, psychological or theological, testifies to our tradition and its experienced eidōs of equality. There is this constant that deflects all efforts to “naturalize” and, hence, to create inequalities. And in addition, any reference to history would testify against equality and convince us that inequality was the most pronounced human condition. Currently, entire populations of various traditions and on various continents are demanding equality “among peoples and nations”, without ever raising the question of the source of this equality. No doubt, the notion of equality might have been present among the Greeks in a limited way; each group, e.g. the aristocrats, was equal among themselves, and the demos were also equal among themselves. But in the democratic revolution, there is a will for the equality of all, a will that seems to have drawn in its wind the entire mankind. At the outset, we must exclude any explanations of this will to equality by the Christian notion of “everyone being equal in the eyes of a god”. In a fundamental sense, this equality is reserved for the future and another world, in which everyone will be judged equally, but not for this world as social and political engagement. Obviously, the feudal system maintained this “other worldly” equality, but also established vast social inequities. The same can be held with respect to the fundamentalist movements and pronouncements: only the fundamentalists are equal, while the rest of the human race is to be either converted, oppressed or destroyed. No doubt, some of the Christian sects offered deference to equality once equality became a “calling card” of the modern age, but deference is not a principle of social and political organizations. The question of equality must be sought elsewhere.

It is the contribution of the Greek philosophical thought, and not primarily of the concept of polis, that led to the understanding of equality. Even the Aristotelian distinction between “natural slaves” and “natural masters” took for granted that as humans the two groups are equal. To encounter someone as a “human”, according to Greek thought, one has to have a taken for granted vision, eidōs, which allows one to decipher among the different events and varieties that the encountered is a human. This eidōs is the permanent among the variations. But how is such a vision, a sight acquired? It stems from the question of the unity of qualities, which would make the human into human and nothing else. This is to say, the raising of the question of what constitutes the “being of the human”
irrespective of the innumerable differences; only in light of this question that the humans appear, in the final analyses, as essentially equal. One could validly claim that without the philosophical question that raises the problem of the “essential being of something”, there would not have appeared the notion of human equality. Thus, with the emergence of philosophy, there also emerged a fundamental determination of all humanity as equal. Philosophy, in this sense, subtends the modern democratic revolution. We should be more careful with respect to the notion of the “eidos” of the human; it has been deemed that we can extricate human “essence” by comparative means insofar, as we can discover the common human characteristics. The question that such a procedure must answer is this: even if we discover universal characteristics, we still have to presume them to be human, i.e. how do we decide that these characteristics, describable in their own right, are also human? It seems that before we delimit the characteristics, we already have the understanding of the human. Thus, the human is in some way “pre-visioned” and not generalized. This suggests that the pre-visioning is not inferential; yet, it could not be said that it is a priori, since a priori each culture has its own categorical systems, each defining the human in specific ways; yet each claiming in these differences and specifications, that they are dealing with the human. Thus, it is impossible to derive the view of equality either from comparative or from a priori postures. Anytime we seek comparisons or a priori assumptions, we already find that we take for granted our acquaintance with the human, irrespective of its definition.

Philosophy reveals in principle what the comparative and a priori positions transgress, i.e., take for granted. This state of affairs was clearly grasped both by Plato and Aristotle, leading us to suggest that the views on Plato, present in numerous interpretations, might be inadequate. Plato’s notions of “form” and “idea” need not be identical with “essentialisms”; rather, form and idea indicate a more fundamental grasp of the difference between specific delimitations of the human and the “prevision” of the human, which is used both in comparisons and in the definitions of form and idea. In this manner, the fundamental sense of our usage of the term “eidos” does not signify anything “universal”, but something subtending the universal and the particular. The Platonic riddle rests on this misunderstanding of eidos: on the one hand, eidos is the universal, and on the other,
the universal points to an *arche*, which cannot be explicated, since all explanations, whether universal or particular, take it for granted. The form and the idea, as universal, are founded on the *eidos* as *arche*, and the latter cannot be founded; rather, it is self-founding in the sense that whatever comes into view, does so in light of a “prevision”, which founds what is to be given in vision and in thought; in this vision and thought, the *arche* is equally given. This state of affairs, stemming from *eidos as arche* that founds all our particular, universal and even essential understanding, is what constitutes the basis and the problematic of equality even for our modern age. The controversies whether there is something “universal” to being human, e.g., common human nature, which would account for the “similarity” of cultures, or whether cultures, in fact, indicate differences, suggesting that there is no visible essence, rest on the assumption that, on the one hand, we already “know” what humans are before any of these controversies, and on the other, that we are failing to deal with the assumed *eidos as arche* and, hence, claim that no commonality is given. But as noted above, these claims take for granted the “prevision” of what the human is.

In the Western tradition, the Greeks have regarded the human as basically *zoon logon* or *noun echon*, a living being capable of the view of being of everything; a being that can conceive of every being for what it is, how it is, and through what it is. The latter is what constitutes the *logos*; hence, the human lives in the world with others and is open to *logos*. The latter, in human affairs, constitutes the basic *arche* of the human as a being of a *polis*. As a being of *reason*, the human is at the same time a being with others, living with its kind on the basis of knowledge and wisdom. This determination does not yield a direct call for the political equality of all persons. Rather, it is the condition for such a call. It is obvious that the condition need not be taken into account when forming social relationships. In medieval times, there was no opposition to the *eidos as arche* of equality, yet, there were vast social and political differences and inequities. Thus, we must raise the question concerning the reasons why the taken for granted equality became something unconditionally desired or wanted, i.e., whence the *will to equality* that was expounded in precious chapters.

The understanding of this question and a deciphering of an answer require some interim considerations. All that lives signifies the world. The human is no exception, although he not only relates to the world, but also
“represents” the signified, toward which she aims, and represents herself as the one, who aims at something. Facing the aim, the human also faces himself. Such a striving, that posits both that, toward which it aims and the one that is striving, is the essence of praxis. Since the human lives with others in a society and is in a position to constitute a polis, then the political praxis is the highest and most genuine. It requires a representation of both, the aim and of the subject, who does the aiming: political praxis and its ethos. Now, if we include in this political praxis the aim toward equality, the will to equality in the public arena, we shall note that here we are facing a democratic political ethos. But this ethos requires modern foundations, which, in their basic constitution, might not appear to possess any political import. The task is to show that despite this appearance, the modern age calls for a polis and a political ethos delimited above. But what is the eidos, the essence of will to equality? For this, we must offer a brief explication of reflective thought.

In philosophy, the modern age was initiated by Descartes, not in a sense of scientific revolution, but in a more fundamental conception of the constitution of thought and its relationship to the world. Although human thought has been considered in its representational form such that thought is an envisagement of what is Descartes reveals the character of reflective thought and with this sets the basis for the modern age. It is a thought, which sets itself as its own object, and, thus, assumes a preeminent place, indeed a dominating place in the understanding of the world. It is notable that in his cogito me cogitare, Descartes found the certitude of cogito sum in such a way, that the cogito me cogitare constitutes the certitude of existence, of sum. This delimits the way, in which the human is. We find here a specifically notable shift – to be explicated later in its various modalities in relationship to praxis and power – away from the classical Greek thought. For Aristotle, being has its fundamental determination in actuality, energeia, while with Descartes being, the sum is determined by the cogito me cogitare or the self-consciousness of a reflection. But in this case, there appears an eidetic shift offering one possibility, in which the entire being of man and of nature itself are drawn into the self-realization on the basis of human self-representation. But this is what makes up will in the sense of self-willing. While this novel mode of thinking might be overburdened by the Cartesian assumption of the Medieval concept of
substance, it slowly sheds this burden and appears in its more purified eidos during the development of modern history.

This line of modern development, apart from others to be considered subsequently, is the novelty, in which the self-reflective thought reveals most intimately what prior to modern philosophy was still obscure: the essential equality of the human represented eidetically since the classical tradition; the eidos is now connected with a will as a function calling for the realization of what was hitherto envisaged purely as a presence. Thus, we are in a position to suggest that what the human wants is only what he can and must want: the already taken for granted eidos of equality in a concrete instantiation. This has far reaching consequences: the self-conscious reflective thought, cognizant of essential human equality, can only want that this represented equality should also become reality. Since this reality of essential human equality depends on the will, i.e., a will that follows human representations, then the establishment of this reality is a matter of will and political praxis. Basically, what is at issue within the context of this unfolding possibility is that there is no concern with human essence; this is deemed to have been decided. Rather, the issue is its realization, which is a matter of will and action. Indeed, we would think the basis of democratic polis and equality quite inadequately if we were to conceive human action as aiming at some purposes with equality being granted a priori. Rather, we must realize that thought dominated by self-conscious reflection transforms the social action into a political action of the desire of the will, which first and all pervasive object of willing is the equality of all humans.

Obviously, the reflective and self-conscious thought of the equality of all, which demands the realization of this equality, is a free activity. It is the reflective representation of human equality, and not the social reality of human inequality, that determines human action toward the realization of equality. This is to say, the social fabric of unequal powers and causes does not determine the call for human political equality; to the contrary, the self-consciously reflected human essence as equal calls for an activity that would first realize this equality. In this sense, the representation of human equality elicits a new concept of freedom in the modern age: freedom as self-determination. Thus, the political praxis is the working out of equality in the mode of self-determination. This offers us a brief indication for the conjunction of equality and freedom in modern democratic revolutions.
Equality is represented and is the object of the will; the latter does not want what is there, does not want existing social options, but wants the realization of equality and this is only possible in a polis. This willing, is in fact, the self-realization of man on the basis of its own self-representations, and the self-representations determine the will, which is a will of self-realization. This self-effecting process is, indeed, self-determination, i.e. free activity. As we saw, this free activity is initially negative, i.e., abolition of the conditions of inequality by an establishment of a polis, in which equality is instituted not as a social, but as a political praxis. As we have seen, such an institution will have to do with two modern trends stemming from an effort to achieve total power. The trends, nonetheless, will not be able to establish equality and indeed will abolish freedom. This is obvious from previous chapters.

Our brief discussion of the understanding of self-worth in previous chapter has to be extended reflectively across Western philosophical tradition in order to demonstrate that any attempts to degrade the human being, any efforts to build a “new man” will have to contend with the background presence of the criterion – self-worth as a good in itself. Thus, we reached a juncture, at which the founder of Western philosophy – Socrates – can make his entrance. His life is precisely a reflective turning to the question of activity in the polis, an activity designed to be of service to all citizens. This activity is designed to keep the public domain open, demanding that all must participate in it. Although scholars locate Socrates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistemologist, we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is the good and a life world, where a person can live in accordance with the demands of the good as one expression of human intrinsic worth. Only under these conditions can Socrates search for truth as another aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good and truthful life. Thus, Socrates, like many others, was an object of derision and caricatures. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that his and others intrinsic worth demands a life world, in which the search for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his internal worth as the good above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his daimon, his eros, to “philosophize”, was equivalent to a destruction of a life world, in which his intrinsic worth
once had a place. Socrates is compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and demands a decision: is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate to fulfill his intrinsic self-worth. In turn, have the Athenians, by their own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value, where truth, dignity and honor will have no place. After all, such degradation to social value is obvious from the trial, when Socrates is offered a chance to surrender his troublesome quest and, thus, become a valuable citizen, and when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for “whatever little services that he might render”. Here appears a depiction of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness, which demands a legitimation of the life world, which is being offered to him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self-worth, have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after all, demands self-degradation and, thus, the denial of self-worth. Socrates resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warning: if you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens.

But what do we get at the other end of Socratic tradition, where lived awareness of intrinsic self-worth, seems to be destroyed in the pronouncements of Nihilism that appeared amidst Russian intellectuals and writers. Perhaps the most extreme pronouncements came from persons, such as Herzen, and even from writers toying with the death of god theme. After all, Dostoyevsky proposes a thesis that if god is dead, then everything is permitted. As we know, Herzen not only challenges the continuous life world of values, but attempts to devalue all values, to discard all meaning, aim and purpose, to burn down all that has been achieved and to set human life adrift on a turbulent ocean in a ship without a rudder. What is left over is blind, irrational, clashing powers, arbitrary decisions and complete self-degradation of the human into materialism. Yet, the same Herzen strives to find an answer to a question: given the meaningless, devalued, directionless and purposeless universe, how shall we live? He opens the lived awareness that intends self-worth as self-creation. It is significant that such self-creation is precisely what is required of self-worth: its own purpose, having no value for anyone and, above all, for social functioning – it creates itself for its own sake. The metaphor of life is no longer “all
for nothing”, but self-creation as its own worth. In this sense, nihilism and the devaluation of all values does not abolish philosophical quest for self-worth; to the contrary, it clears away all obfuscations and offers a higher opening to transcendental self-awareness. After all, it elevates awareness to encompass the cosmos as meaningless and asks the ultimate question whether this cosmos is open for self-worth. And the answer is absolutely yes and precisely because the constructed and purposeful values have obfuscated the most fundamental human awareness: first and foremost, I must demand of myself and others to be self-creators, following directly in purposeless recognition of absolute self-worth for its own sake.

What the Russian writers have in common with Socrates is that, just as he, they were not professional philosophers, but persons who demanded the recognition not only of their own, but of everyone’s unconditional self-worth. And just as Socrates, all of them (with an exception of Tolstoy who, nevertheless, was excommunicated) placed self-worth above their own safety, wealth, security, social position and were exiled, imprisoned, persecuted and censored. They placed self-worth above their life and dared to say no to their own and that of enlightenment’s life worlds. In this sense, the claims that various Russian writers, inclusive of Chernichevsky, Turgenev and even Dostoyevsky, were nihilists are wrong. Nihilism rejects the world of values and meaning without offering anything positive in their place. Not so with the Russian writers, whose transcendental awareness of self-worth is the only viable position, from which life worlds can be illuminated in essence and disclosed as to what kind of activity cannot be fulfilled. No doubt, they toyed with democracy and equality of all persons, but they also realized from their experience in the West that democracy was in crisis. West in general has abolished the public domain, where autonomous citizens could rationally debate public issues, by reducing it to the clashing sum of private interests and power confrontations. The rationality of Western man, as Dostoyevsky noted, is a facade, under which there lurk all sorts of irrational drives, such as greed, envy, aggression and incivility. Hence, the notion of freedom and, above all, self-worth can no longer be offered by the West. No doubt, equality and freedom remained in the background as a reminder of what is being lost, just as equality was in the background of the entire Western philosophical tradition, but the demand for its enactment has been pushed aside. Now, the previous principle of self-inclusion
can be concretized. A person, who recognizes absolute self-worth, as do the Russian writers, does not propose it as a thesis, but a demand in action that includes the very person who lives the awareness of self-worth. Hence, despite their loss of social value positions, wealth, freedom to write, they subsumed themselves under this absolute awareness and acted accordingly. We are emphasizing this aspect of Western philosophical tradition in order to show what transformation of paradigm must take place if Lithuania is to become a part of Western philosophical tradition, beyond autocracy and all the social functional values.

The point has been reached, where a question of awareness of self-worth can be answered. First aspect of this awareness is the possibility to extricate oneself from a specific life world. Second, the resultant disattachment, or bracketing of this immersion, is the awareness of self-worth, demanding the possibility of world orientation that would answer the question of absolute legitimation of fulfilling in practice and action what the awareness always tacitly maintained as self-worth. Third, it is to be noted that such awareness transgresses any specific life world, since any life world may offer partial-perceptual or signitive fulfillment of intrinsic self-worth. Under any other circumstance, intrinsic worth would be an intentionality of a given life world, interpreted, for example, as value, equivalent to other values, and, hence, a self-understood part of such a world, refusal of which would go counter to what is categorically self-evident in such a world. At this level, a refusal to participate in such a world would be impossible. In other words, intrinsic worth is not a perceptual given, but arises “perspectively” to the extent that we can regard our lived world as total from the perspective of intrinsic worth. This perspectivity is the price for our freedom to survey any life world and ask the question of legitimation. In this context, the persons, who were mentioned, whether Turgenev or Gogol or even Socrates, articulate phenomena that disclose intrinsic worth and demand of us to recognize our degraded state. As already stated, the recognition of other’s intrinsic worth is equivalent to the recognition of our own and conversely. This is relevant, above all, as a background of the Soviet paradigm that, while excluded from the hermeneutical circle of the Scientific Enlightenment, constantly reappears as a necessary condition and a horizon of such circle.

The awareness, correlated to intrinsic self-worth, is a transcendental background, on which any life world must be legitimated, concerning its
adequacy for fulfilling such awareness in activity. It was noted that the life world of the Enlightenment at its epitomy offered us a world of values, which had no other source except unlimited construction and, hence, unbound from any restriction concerning the manner, in which such values are used. This leads to arbitrariness and power to the extent that power must decide, which values are victorious – for a while. But the transcendental background of intrinsic self-worth was and is equally a given and provides a limit concerning the unrestricted valuations. The founders of the Enlightenment and its correlate – political democracy – were persons, who extolled honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness and justice in their actions and demanded no less of their adversaries. This comprises the background, on which the crisis of democracy appears. At the founding, just as well as now, there appears a first transcendental rule of awareness: maintenance of permanence of self-worth through enactment. This rule then demands, second, an establishment of a first democratic institution – public domain – in which every person must fulfill self-worth in praxis for its own sake. This is the principle of praxis, which is not defined by ontological categories of being, but by self-reflecting awareness that demands actions based on honesty, truthfulness, honor, dignity and respect for self and others – as a background of equality and freedom. Such maintenance requires the bracketing, exclusion, of arbitrary constructed valuations, such as economic, power, religious, ethnic, racist, that would promote the abolition of the public domain and self-worth; indeed, such valuations do produce rhetorical means to obfuscate their degrading and disruptive tactics. Such oxymorons as “free enterprise”, “public leadership” and even “free expression” comprise some of the rhetorical means. This sort of engagement comprises a third rule: valuations as disruption of the permanence of self-worth. This rule is quite prevalent and has been at the background of events, such as public apathy, non-participation in public affairs, and pervasive anti-intellectualism and anti-education. When the public arena is filled with all sorts of private interests, needs, desires, cultic dogmas that are at odds with each other, then either we also push for our interests or, lacking knowledge of such interests, we decline to participate. It must be emphasized that self-worth and the public domain are not objects of knowledge, but are constituted in our active engagement. If we cease to act honorably, justly, nobly, respectfully, we shall not have self-worth or
public domain, wherein self-worth is enacted. It must be also noted that freedom as autonomy is a result of self-worth; after all, we extricate ourselves from our own and other life worlds and demand legitimation as to their adequacy for self-worth. Only on this ground can we select a life world that permits autonomy and equality for their own sake. But autonomy, at this level, is valid only if it is correlated and subject to self-worth. Without the latter, autonomy may become reduced to “free choice” among things and lose its legislative dignity.

Dialectical Reason

The above explication of self-worth as the condition for autonomy and equality, and a political domain which, is a correlate of self-worth, is the ultimate background of all sorts of claims to individualism, community, progress and even responsibility to others and oneself. While discussing parts-wholes issue, it was noted that this issue translates from ontology to social thought: is the individual a basic unit of society, or does society have its characteristics as a whole and, thus, its needs are more important than those of individuals. It is necessary to point out that the “individual” in the hermeneutics of Western ontology is an atom, unrelated, separate and at times even solipsistic. Society is formed on the basis of individuals coming together to establish rules so that an aggregate of individuals could live together at peace. Yet, such an aggregate does not change the conception that society is a sum of individuals and that the rules express individual interests. At this ontological level, society has no characteristics of its own and is identical to the characteristics of the individuals, their wants, needs and subjective tendencies. Following Marx and Engels, Soviet paradigm was designed to resolve this issue, yet its resolution might not have been adequate and, thus, pointed to a failure of the entire system. To understand this failure, it is necessary to delimit precisely the principles of the paradigm, keeping in mind the extensive discussion of the Scientific Enlightenment and its assumption of material atomism, accessible to quantitative methodology. Moreover, our methodology of philosophical hermeneutics, in its modern version, also discloses the limitations of its circle, precluding the possibility of individual reflective thought as a ground of enactment of the will to equality and, hence, to autonomy and also the
disclosing of self-worth that is not identical with the atomistic individual accepted by the Scientific Enlightenment. Now, Marxism, throughout its unfolding, was submitted to a multitude of critical appraisals and refutations. Predominant among these were charges that its claims to be scientific turned out to be inadequate, since its prognoses, based on Dialectical Materialism, were always flawed. Yet, what is lacking in all of the criticisms is an evaluation of the basic ontological and epistemological claims to note whether at base there are some issues that cannot be resolved on the grounds of this paradigm and its basis in philosophical hermeneutics expressed by the Scientific Enlightenment. Thus, the following questions must be posed: can Marxism support the claims that it makes concerning social revolutions on the basis of Dialectical Materialism? If there are inadequate grounds within Dialectical Materialism, can such inadequacies be overcome within such Dialectics. If corrections are introduced, do they destroy the notion of social, technical and economic unfolding toward a utopian society?

To understand these questions we must delimit precisely the composition of Dialectical Materialism (at times interpreted as Historical Materialism). Dialectical Materialism is a theory proposing that nature, history and society are moved by laws; there are three basic laws that can be applied to all phenomena, from sub-atomic particles to theology. More precisely, the laws are not applied, but are in the very phenomena. The first law of Dialectics states that in all phenomena there is a change of quantity into quality. Quantity is identical with the modern notion of “sum of individual parts” (to speak in social terms, sum of individuals) with characteristics as magnitude, weight, location in space and time, and movement. Quantity as such does not have much influence on an essence of an object or phenomenon. It is simply a sum of parts. An object made of parts might be subjected to quantitative changes within specific limits without any qualitative changes. Qualitative characteristics, on the other hand, constitute an essence (although temporal) of an object in a way that without specific qualities an object cannot be what it is; qualities limit an object to be a specific kind or class of objects. Qualitative characteristics are more than the sum of characteristics of the individual parts.

The first part of the first law of Dialectics states that quantitative change takes place within specific limits; if the limits are reached and sur-
passed, then a qualitative change occurs. The previous qualitative characteristics vanish (although not all), and new qualities emerge, which cannot be reduced to the previous qualities or quantity. A new quality, or qualities, emerges comprising a new essence of an object. Thus, an essence of an object is a result of a particular time and the state of affairs of that time. This means that when objects with new qualities combine quantitatively and reach their limit, other new qualities will emerge. The second part of the first law of Dialectics has a twofold claim: the quantitative change is evolutionary, while the qualitative change is revolutionary. Marxists usually employ social and economic models to substantiate this claim: the quantitative expansion of productive capacity, its increasing production of more “parts” reaches a limit, which yields new social relationships and new qualitative characteristics in human, social constitution. Quantitative, evolutionary incrementations reach a limit, demanding the transformation of human essence and the change in social relationships. This means that a revolutionary change is inherent in all phenomena: destruction of previous qualitative-essential structures and emergence of new ones. This supposes to lead to an improved quality of life of all social members.

The second law of Dialectics states that the unity of nature requires a constant antagonism among opposing tendencies. The Dialectical law of identity, which states that identity is possible, only if there are opposing tendencies. The opposition cannot be resolved by reconciliation, but by the destruction of one tendency and an emergence of a new tendency with its specific qualities. Social examples are offered: opposition, which cannot be resolved between the owner class and the worker class; capitalism must be destroyed and the working class must gain new characteristics, which must change the entire quality of social and economic life. But the destruction cannot be complete, since capitalism, as a negative aspect, has something positive in it that must be retained; this leads to the final step in dialectical paradigm.

The third law of Dialectics is called “negation of negativity”. The superiority of one tendency, the positive over another, means the negation of the inferior tendency, the negative. Yet, the negative tendency has two moments: positive and negative. Resultantly, the superior tendency destroys the negative moment of the inferior, while retaining the positive moment. Here, the negation of one tendency by another is a negation of
the negative moment, or a negation of negativity in such a way, that the positive moment of the negative tendency forms a unity with the superior positive tendency. The conquest by the working class of the capitalist class is a negation of capitalism, yet such a negation is negated by the positive aspect of capitalism – its productive capacity. The positive tendency, the working class unites with the positive moment of capitalism to form a new characteristic of the working class, such that the workers are also the owners and managers of production. The negation of capitalism means that the evolution of quantitative incrementation of production cannot maintain the capitalist social order, leading to a revolutionary leap and an establishment of new qualitative human. In principle, what we call “human” belongs to a specific historical period. Based on methodological hermeneutics, it can be suggested that the very understanding – a qualitative capacity of humans – is also bound to its historical context, from which all other contexts are interpreted. But this means that the claim that previous historical periods were determined by their material conditions does not imply that indeed such conditions were the ones that shaped human self-understanding and social organizations. This simply means that due to our own conditions, we must interpret all other historical periods in terms of our own. Indeed, this could be extended to include the very Dialectics as a temporary or current mode of awareness, relevant and applicable to this historical period. In another historical period, there might not be anything called Dialectics. What is at issue is the impossibility to make Dialectical Materialism into a universal theory, since its position is essentially “local”.

This problematic can be extended to show the limits of Dialectical Materialism strictly within its own parameters. From what has been said so far, Dialectical understanding allows an access to the “past” and what quantitative conditions are given for the current state of the qualitative characteristics, comprising current “essence” of what humans are. Since the conditions that humans produce shape the producers and their understanding, then our access to our environment and ourselves comes from such production, period. It is to be noted that for Dialectical Materialism theoretical thought is also a result of material conditions and no theory is in a position to express more than the conditions would allow. This means that Dialectical Materialism, as a theory, must also reflect the current material conditions and would cease to be valid under some other conditions. It too is his-
torically temporal. In other words, on Marxian basis, one cannot make an exception to Dialectical Materialism without a contradiction. Hence, there is no way to prognosticate the future. This is to say, since human “essence” is defined historically in terms of a specific period, then no qualitatively different future human being can be understood without first establishing the required quantitative conditions. The argument that the current quantitative conditions might indicate the future qualitative transformation cannot hold: first, the current quantitative conditions have not evolved sufficiently to yield new qualities, and, hence, we cannot know what such qualities might be; second, our contemporary “essential” self-understanding was a result of previous quantitative conditions, but since such an understanding cannot be reduced to previous conditions, the latter is equally inaccessible to us; third, understanding current quantitative conditions that supposedly would lead to new qualities cannot tell us anything about such new qualities, since such new qualities cannot be reduced to the conditions, which might produce them. The claim to irreducibility is equally a block to understand the new qualities from our current quantitative conditions and our contemporary essence. Thus, observing the current quantitative relations we are in a position to understand the inessential evolutionary process, but not the essential revolutionary leap. We can say with assurance that the quantity of parts, when united, must lead to new qualities, are inadequate by themselves to miraculously produce something novel that the parts did not possess – unless we assume “more” about humans than the historically specific essence, resulting from quantitative aggregations. The “more” is precisely what our previous chapters explicated.

Dialectical Materialism inadvertently slips in this “more” as a metaphysical component of “negativity”, which is not available on any scientific grounds. When speaking of a positive tendency that negates the negative one, there appears an unwarranted designation of one trend as negative; after all, factually speaking, there might be a struggle in a society for power and, indeed, efforts might be exerted by one group to defeat another group, but neither group is negative. There is no need to claim that the losing party in war was a “negative”; it was simply weaker and could not compete with the stronger. What then can account for such use of “negativity” as a major moment in Dialectics? It seems that a criterion of what the future human qualities should be is used to judge the present quantitative conditions and,
indeed, the present human qualities in order to point to their inadequacies. This is to say, the criterion assumes a presence of something that is not yet there and, as argued above, cannot yet be understood dialectically. Nonetheless, it is precisely what is disclosed, as a background by modern philosophy: self-worth as a source of the will to equality and autonomy. This not “yet being there” has no existence and can be equated with “negativity” that can disclose among the quantitative and qualitative phenomena an absence, a lack that motivates the process for its realization. Indeed, the “not yet there” is not negativity, but something that cannot belong to categorical system, by which all value positions and human functions are usually deployed. As noted above, the will to equality and, thus, freedom is not given in any qualitative definition, since it is present only as a praxis, as lived. If the Soviet Union had suppressed this demand for praxis, then it suppressed the very essential presence of humans.

This is evidenced by the texts of Marxism-Leninism, wherein the interpretation of the newly formed Soviet Union had the following composition: the capitalist quantitative conditions for revolution toward the new qualitative human were not available; they had to be built in light of what? In light of the absence of the new human that was envisaged as the criterion to decide what quantitative conditions must be built. Hence, there was dialectically unwarranted assumption of a presence that was completely absent from any dialectical explanation – the presence of negativity that comprised the motive for the constant claims that the conditions are almost present to make a leap into a communist society and the new human. The problem is that the leap was never made because the interpretation of the Scientific Enlightenment in terms of “scientific socialism” precluded in principle the presence of human self-worth, action for equality and autonomy established by the Political Enlightenment. Indeed, its suppression in Soviet Experiment, nonetheless, demanded its presence, even in a negative form, and, hence, in accordance with methodological hermeneutics, it had to appear as a limit of Dialectical Materialism. If this is an appropriate interpretation, then instead of a dogma in an ideological form, philosophy, as a free search for truth, a free life of every individual, has reappeared and with it appears a fuller Western world. To the latter, we now turn to note the emergence of a broader paradigm than the one that Lithuania was subjected to under Soviet rule.
Appearance of the Suppressed

Having deciphered the flaws in Dialectical Materialism and scientific socialism and the silent reappearance of the suppressed moment – human autonomous freedom and equality, it is possible to unfold the suppressed consciousness and the manner, in which it appears in modern and contemporary paradigm. We can start at the level, at which Dialectical Materialism fails and disclose the background dimensions that are relevant to overcome such failure without complete abandonment of some of its positive aspects. The sum total of the presently given factual conditions, such as economic capacity, specific human characteristics, social relationships and mental capacities, constitute an existential milieu of a life world – fully knowing that such specifications are limited to a historical present. Since the quantitative conditions are such that they limit humans to specific and limited qualifications and since humans are capable of altering their conditions and, thus, qualifications, there is always an awareness of a tension between what is and what can be. What can be is an open possibility of being more than warranted by present limitations. Here, we are at the heart of modern Western ontology: our access to reality is based on the “conditions for the possibility of being” and, thus, the very presence of our surroundings is precisely what possible conditions humans establish to yield possible results.

The tension between the quantitatively established conditions by human activity and the new qualitative possibility constitute the basis for progress and the demand in the change of existential conditions, which would result in the establishment of what is more in human essence. But this morphology is correlative to human “free activity” as an interpretation of human autonomy. In Marxism, there is a demand that any theory is empty unless it becomes “praxis”; and this is the moment of truth: in the background of Marxian interpretation of society in terms of “scientific socialism”, there is a transformation of the Political Enlightenment of human autonomy into “praxis” as “free activity that constitutes the environment and the human. The problem was this: Dialectical Materialism was limiting and, thus, suppressing the praxis of free activity to a specific historical period as the ground of all explanations and, thus, obfuscated its own modern background that constantly reappeared as a criterion and
a critique of the “inadequacies” of the conditions to yield communism. Michael Gorbachev realized that such a background is a condition for any success of the Soviet Union and, thus, declared “openness and transformation”. Both terms rest on a realization that by essence humans are not limited to given conditions and must be allowed to be open to new horizons, which would expand free activity.

Of course, we cannot dismiss the temporary limitations by what humans have themselves established and how they understand within such limitations; but we must also disclose awareness, that such limitations are our own products and can be changed, opened to more than their current limits. In this sense, the “highest” or fundamental aim of history is a conscious establishment of existential conditions, which would be adequate to human essence: free activity. In this context, it is the European modern tradition, which comprises the required openness and a consciousness as to the development of a world of human autonomy and equality, interpreted as “free activity”. Here, the first step is to revise Dialectics in line with the modern ontology of human essence that will become relevant for another paradigmatic shift, developed by European thinkers. Of this later, but meanwhile another level of consciousness begins to appear and must be addressed: it is an awareness of alienation and the ways it appears and the manner, in which it can disappear.

The previously noted tension between established conditions and human essence as free activity demands a resolution. Modern ontology, leading to the notion of progress, can offer a resolution not in terms of the logic of progress as “material transformation of the environment and human material fulfillment”, but in terms of “historical aim”, which is both a future possibility and a constantly present criterion whether we are moving in the right direction. This movement is a way of resolving the issue of alienation. First moment of alienation delimits the states of affairs, wherein human life is “abstract”. The latter means that while living in a specific, limited environment, humans also know that the latter is completely inadequate with respect to the total free activity as human essence. In this sense, the limitation makes the complete fulfillment “abstract”, uninvolved and, thus, in practical life alien. This is to say, in concrete life there is no presence of the reality of full human essence and, thus, it is something that one is and yet something that is not lived, something
strange. This line of reasoning can be extended to include negativity: if one lives under limited conditions, unable to actualize the more, that one essentially is, then there is a sense that forces, not under one’s control, are negating one’s essential being – intrinsic self-worth. In this sense, one regards the humanly constituted environment as alien and negative, to be smashed violently in order to be free from it. Correlatively, one also regards one’s life equally as an alien thing, made by the conditions and, in fact, used as a condition for further oppression of oneself and others. This context suggests that the more one struggles to overcome the limiting conditions, the more one employs the means available, the more one becomes subjected to them, the more one becomes alienated.

According to this logic, alienation will diminish and vanish with a historical breaking out of limitations created and imposed by humans on themselves, whether such limitations are economic, ideological, technological or even theoretical. All these limitations may be at the base of fo-bias, intolerance and, above all, closed personality. This is to say, the overcoming of alienation is also overcoming of ones being closed, of not being open to one’s horizons of possible activities and, indeed, open to others. This means that the measure of alienation is not just personal, but historical, involving entire humanity. After all, we are inter-subjective not only in thinking, but, above all, in praxis, i.e. the way we relate to others and, thus, ourselves. While we regard our individuality significant, and rightly so, we must also understand that the unfolding of humanity includes our unfolding, that what we understand and are capable of doing depends on and is interrelated with others, who expand our horizons and open for us abilities, which we did not recognize we had. In this sense, the dialectical aim of history as having one purpose might break up into multi-purposive and much richer presence of free activity or, more precisely, free activities that mutually enhance and enrich one another. These aspects are a task of subsequent chapters, since we shall have to articulate the paradigm, which is unfolding in Lithuania in the context of Europe. One important issue that comes up is political society (that was lacking in Soviet paradigm) and what are its principles, above all, with respect to freedom and equality. This issue touches many levels, including the so-called “free market” and its ideological limitations. The methodology that was used revealed the presence of “more”, whether the presence was a background, as in classical
philosophy, or was brought to the fore by reflection, as in modern philosophy, it was the irreducible human self-worth insofar, as any efforts to derive it from any variant of sum of parts required its presence. In this sense, the quest to “build a new man” by any means, no matter how vast and powerful, are doomed to fail, since what is to be built is already available.

Suggested Reading

Mensch, J. *Husserl’s Account of our Consciousness of Time* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010).
Gallo Armosino, A. *Ver los Valores* (Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landivar, 2010).
CHAPTER VI

LIFE IN-BETWEEN

Introduction

First, we must introduce a brief understanding of civilizations, and specifically Europe, since the latter, and in broader terms the West, is central to the contemporary global tensions that, in many cases, reject the West and at the same time demand Western presence in all resolutions of conflicts, ethnic and gender antagonisms, and geographic disputes, including demands for aid, technical and educational input, and even support for different religious groups. Based on Western requirements for tolerance of others, respect for their civilizations and cultures indeed requests not to impose “Western values” on the rest of the world, we have to decide what such an imposition would mean, and whether there is a way of not imposing and yet of being able to participate positively in the lives of members of other civilizations. This is a sensitive domain and requires the most careful delimitation of what is European civilization and how it differs from others. The first task will be to delimit what is called Europe and its extended version, the West, what constitutes modern West with its two Enlightenments – Scientific and Political – and the ways modern West has become “globalized” on the basis of its own devised understanding of reality, political society and attendant requirements. Correlatively, it will be necessary to delimit another type of civilization – Middle East – and its variants gaining recognition under the designation “fundamentalist”. The latter include Hindu fundamentalism, at times covering the actions of Buddhists (in Mayamar against Muslims) and even autocratic tendencies in Eastern Europe. It is of note that all such movements tend to suppress development as Western invasion, and yet they cannot thrive without Western technology in the areas of communication and even building “defenses” against the “great Satan” of the West. We shall address
the bases of modern Western technology and the problems of technological transfer from one context into another. Yet, it is necessary to point out that the Lithuanian revolution against the Soviet Union and an escape from “scientific socialism” was a paradigmatic transformation, the latter was not total: the preeminence of technological mode of thinking is very much a part of the West, even if it seems to be more sophisticated, innovative, premised on individual initiative and even free. Our close analyses of what Lithuania is facing in the new life world will address the role of bureaucracy and technocracy as semi-independent “government” that poses a silent danger to democracy.

The West

We claim to be Europeans, but if asked what does that mean, we either falter or find a plethora of voices – indeed conflicting claims stemming from different regions of this continent and from some adjacent islands. There is the European Union, but some regions on European continent at times express dissatisfaction with the Union, although they wish to be Europeans. The same seems to be the case with Great Britain. Thus, to decide what Europe’s role in the world is, we must first decide what Europe is. It is claimed today that for the first time in human affairs a group of humans declared what in essence is human: fallible, yet living in accordance with his/her own established laws, refusing to kneel before some king of kings, lord of lords, god of gods. Greek writers, such as Aeschilus, rejected the power of divinities and, thus, absolutist claims, since such claims, backed by divinities, make humans into play things of alien forces. The wisest woman in human “history”, Athene, demanded that while humans are fallible and temporally limited, they must decide how to live together in accord with their own rules. If they make mistakes, they will be responsible for them and will have to correct them. Let there be divinities, but do not let them determine human affairs. In principle, Europe and the West at the outset are secular. This was and still is the case of Prometheus. In terms of civilization, the Greeks demanded universal understanding not based on some divine dogma, but on Paidea, universal education, articulated well by Plato, where it is not a trust in conflicting divinities, but in logical reason that can decide what is good for fallible humans.
This suggests a revolutionary transformation: humans themselves must run the affairs of society. This appears in a direct human way in the myth of Prometheus, who rebels against Zeus’ edict that forbids fire to humans. The supreme authority, Zeus, in his anger denies humans the use of fire. Divine intervention initiates human suffering, if not tragedy. Prometheus, moved by the unnecessary suffering of humans, steals fire from the gods and gives it to humans. Here, we have practical assistance, for which Prometheus does not ask anything. He does not wish to rule or to have others follow his way of life. He does not form a party or demands to be a judge on the court. There is no revenge present against anyone or obedience to some divine command. He simply regards Zeus’ law as unjust and, indeed, premised on one aspect of tragedy: revenge by Zeus against humans. What is interesting is that the Greeks accepted the action of such a rebel as a noble violation of bad or even unjust laws. Although, speaking formally, the act of Prometheus was “bad” or illegal, his personal nobility and his positive attitude and qualities outweigh his formally bad act. Prometheus could be regarded as practically rational and worldly “materialist”. His aim was to help others, but with this help he changes the notion of justice. Even Zeus accepts this change by admitting that his edict prohibiting fire to humans was a bad law. The worldliness – secularism – of Prometheus appears in his personality, which is independent from any authority. He has his own views and is capable of planning his own future based on his own knowledge and choices. If he makes mistakes, he admits them and corrects them. After all, Prometheus had decided to support Zeus in the battle against the Titans, but after the battle he recognized that Zeus had become a tyrant. Thus, he decides to correct his mistake by rebelling against Zeus’ laws, simply because he decides that such laws are practically unjust. Here, the highest authority is negated as unacceptable in principle without any question concerning one’s own benefits. Humanity here is in charge of its own affairs and demands that gods no longer intervene.

In Promethean mythology, Zeus is the highest cultural symbol of permanence – as authority. Prometheus, in turn, is a cultural symbol of action. As an initial supporter of Zeus, he reveals an awareness of permanence maintenance and enhancement. He wants to insure Zeus’ victory over the Titans and his permanent position as the ultimate authority. Yet, by becoming a rebel against Zeus’ bad law, he reveals an awareness,
which is a disruption of permanence. Such a disruption in the myth of Prometheus reveals, in the final outcome, a very specific relationship between permanence and change: the highest symbol of permanence – Zeus – is compelled to agree with Prometheus and, thus, to change his absolutist and arbitrary position. In this sense, permanence can be open to the requirements of change. This means that this civilization opens a possibility to challenge any authority, law, to interrogate them sensibly and, thus, to change them. In other words, there emerges a dialogical relationship between permanence and change. Given this composition of awareness, classical Greek understanding of mythical figures could not escape democracy and philosophy. Every position, tradition, even the thinking of the highest figures, can be interrogated openly and reasonably, can be investigated, analyzed and requested to justify themselves in a full light of public and poly-logical debate or in a public court. If a given position, and even an accepted tradition, cannot be justified by reason and by the well-being of humans, then they can be openly rejected. This is the reason that classical Greece comprised an arena of intellectual tension among multiple positions, views, all calling for an open public, in whose context such a tension could be maintained. This open public space comprises a cultural symbol of permanence that tolerated and enhanced all creative flux: permanence as maintenance and enhancement of flux. This composition of awareness comprises the ground of every person’s rationality and responsibility. It also founds the modern Western democratic understanding, although articulated by different symbolic language. Modern revolutions were premised on the notion that autocracies, monarchies and theocracies, the divine rights of kings and the infallible rulers were in fact ruling arbitrarily. Their permanence had to be challenged – as did Prometheus – and replaced by institutions that allowed and promoted openness and change. These revolutions returned Europe to its essence.

More recent and contemporary Western intellectuals, following Athens and its subsequent result, the Enlightenment, condemned all dogmatic ideologies, all autocratic civilizations, including fascism and communism, as unfit for Western mode of life and, indeed, unfit for any human life. Thus communism and fascism must be seen as some sort of virus to be expunged as alien to European spirit. From the very inception, Occident is rational, even scientific, and thus, reason is a base of Western civiliza-
tion and historical life. Such an understanding is not restricted to Europe, although the latter is a cradle and continuation of reason — philosophy as a universal project. In brief, Europe, West, Abendland, Occident is a site, where human essence, with its universal requirements, is maintained. Thus, Europe is identical with philosophy and all of its requirements: universality, reason, direct and accessible experience, world, autonomy, rights, duties and responsibility. Obviously, these concepts became global in that they formed a challenge to others and the others are demanding to be Western — and the latter is no longer local, but a universal idea. But the latter is not delimited by any specific parameters or categories; to the contrary, Europe is strange and does not recognize boundaries. European and Western self-recognition has a form of identity requiring critical self-reflection, re-creation, reworking, always anew, every year, every day. Should this flux be an indication of what is Europe, what is Occident?

No doubt that the seers, shaman’s and high priests, holy men of other civilizations, have justifiably accused Europe and the West of engaging in terrible imperialism, colonialism, exploitation, arrogance, slavery and numerous other misdeeds. Indeed, Westerners bought and sold people, bought the Africans, but the same Westerners condemned such actions, and slavery universal evil, universally unacceptable, and only the West demands such profound self-reflection. Yet, no one speaks of the Muslims, Arabs, African tribes, who captured and sold people into slavery. It is at times embarrassing how the Westerners still accuse themselves of all the past misdeeds and how they wish to atone for them with vast aid, generous support for the “downtrodden”, even if the latter are squashed by their own chiefs, leaders and self-appointed autocrats. What is noticeable, while visiting numerous nations and tribes around the globe, wherever there are oppressions, discriminations, depravations, whether originating with local governments, tribal battles, cultic murders, there is always a complaint that “no one knows about our plight, and no one pays attention to our situation”. But this complaint is not addressed to China, Japan, India, Brazil, but to the West. Moreover, the oppressed do not strive to be anywhere else, but in the West. Thus, despite all the accusations, the accusers themselves want to be recognized and to live in the West. On the one hand, the West is condemned, accused and called upon to accept responsibility for previous generations, and on the other hand, the West is asked to defend the rights, interests, cultures, cults, minorities and even lives of the “oth-
ers”. Thus, the West, while appearing in possession of identity, always remains open and undefined – even the search for identity of various major cults or minor cultures – is Western.

Western universalism ranges through various layers of awareness without any having supremacy. Let us begin with care, since hasty pronouncements might lead to confusion. In accordance with Classical Western thinking, universality is premised on open public domain, requiring of every citizen to participate in public affairs without introducing private wants, desires and prejudices – since only such participation guarantees a free discussion, not determined by causes. In this sense, public decisions are autonomous and autonomy means that every citizen is equal, regardless of social position: equality results from autonomy. All rules are derived from rational dialogue among autonomous, responsible and equal persons. It is also important to note that such rules might be partially mistaken and, hence, it is the duty of responsible citizens to correct them – equally through public dialogue. This state of affairs can be stated as an unconditional human responsibility for decisions, their enactment and a duty to correct mistakes. What is to be excluded are prohibitions to challenge any dogma, creed, any absolutist claim, any self-appointed leader and, indeed, question oneself. As Socrates, the major force in establishing open public dialogue, would say: I have no knowledge, even of myself.

Paradigmatic Transformation

A shock wave across the world – Soviet Union is collapsing, its grand “explanation” of all events, human and cosmic no longer holds, and the culprit of this collapse, Lithuania. A group of persons, mostly artists, poets, philosophers, said “we are tired of being afraid” and declared that hence to fore we are autonomous, equal, with our dignity, honor, honesty and self-respect are the principles directing our actions. It is a Socratic moment, enacted in Paris, Philadelphia and now in Vilnius, too. We must understand the radicalness of this stance: the entire autocratic empire, which demanded our servitude, our compliance with rules from above, an empire that told us what and when to eat, how to think, an empire that supplied us with modicum of commodities and “protection” is no longer acceptable. Here we stand, naked and powerless, without appeals to any authority, any
scientific explanations, any dogma or ideology, without any prospects of better tomorrow, armed only with an awareness that it is we, as equals and autonomous, must create a political society from our limited and fallible understanding, from our own absolute self-worth and the worth of others. We reject all the values that lent us our functional positions in autocratic empire and we do not seek any positions for ourselves: all we want is ours and the peoples of the entire Soviet Union to say “here we stand – we cannot do otherwise”. This is the paradigm shift: from autocracy to political society. By now, this shift ought to be obvious from our previous chapters, delimiting Western modern world and its split into two histories: Political and Scientific Enlightenments and the tension between them. The revolution in Lithuania was an enactment of self-worth in the form of will to equality and correlatively, autonomy. And thus, there is a continuation of the Political Enlightenment, comprising the entire Western philosophical tradition. Lithuanian revolution was, in principle, democratic; it abolished an autocratic society and opened itself to Europe as something strange, something that imposed unknown demands: not only all the rights, but also the burden of responsibility for actions and for the very subsistence independent from any guarantees by the state; the state itself became the matter for the public’s decision. But the shock had another side that was a continuation of the defeated autocracy: all the unrealized promises of the Scientific Enlightenment – technology or more basically technocracy.

The failures of the Soviet autocratic system, including its theoretical inadequacies, left open the other aspect of the Enlightenment, which was the political. While suppressed, the latter was constantly present in the background as a criterion for the measure of “dialectical progress” toward the utopian society. That such a society was not yet achieved was made evident by the presence of the State and its vast means of owning everything, including resources, production and the producers. According to classical Marxism, state is a sign that there is a ruling class and the working class, such that the ruling class establishes a state as means of oppression of the working class. In a communist society, state will be irrelevant and will disappear, since there will not be any classes. The Soviet Union was the opposite of communist society. Thus, the question must be asked: what is the paradigmatic shift from the Soviet State to the Western State? Can we speak of a radical break with autocracy and an establishment of de-
democracy? If not, can we speak of a totally new paradigm? In this chapter, we shall have to be most prudent to delimit precisely what is continuous and what is novel in Lithuania and indeed what is still to be done if we are to speak of Western democracy in principle. The meaning of “principle” is equivalent to the classical Greek *arche* in the sense, that any effort to explain it by something else will necessarily involve such principle or by any proposal to abolish it will require its presence. Given this context, we shall have to demonstrate what comprises a political state as democratic, in contrast to the current state of affairs. If there is going to be a critique of such affairs, it will not be based on some interests or even ideology, but on the “essence” of political society or democracy.

Not a shadow of doubt can be offered concerning the daring movement by Lithuanians, with Sajudis at its forefront that it was in principle democratic. It was a moment, equivalent to other moments and places in Western history, where a declaration was presented by people that rejected a rule of human over human, of oppression of anyone by anyone, of refusing to be subservient to any autocracy, authority or dogma. It was a proclamation, similar to those in ancient Athens of Socrates, in Paris, in Philadelphia, where a group of persons told an empire that it could no longer rule, despite its power, and so it was in Lithuania. Here we stand, without any backing by power, without any laws, since the only laws we had were those imposed by autocratic masters, and hence, we start as if from nothing. If there shall be laws, we shall make them, if there will be education, we shall create it, if there shall be economy, we shall decide its shape. No highest authority, no clairvoyant shamans, no unconscious forces or power interests will decide the fate of our nation: we shall begin from the beginning. We are autonomous and equal and are creating a political society for its own sake, for the very autonomy and equality, which will not be distinguished from the shape of the new and very old basis of Western civilization. If we create this political society, it will have to be for everyone without exception. This very beginning does not guarantee our future, because we do not know what future forebodes; after all, we cannot accept blindly the pronouncements of the high priests of sciences – we lived under such high priests and suffered. In brief, we cannot offer our citizens and ourselves rewards and prizes, and indeed we do not expect to be rewarded by high positions. If there shall be such positions, they will be
rewarded by the public not to make us powerful, but to serve as responsible citizens under the same laws that the citizens will decide. Let us unfold this founding of the political society with all its rights and responsibilities, demands and burdens.

Having won the Cold War, the West stepped in to extend its ideology – “free market” – by offering it as a shock treatment for immediate transformation and economic growth, and, as is done in the West, equated it with democracy. We must be cognizant of the free market or capitalist ideology not as it is present in some images and propaganda, but as it is in its essence: the reason for living, acting, dreaming, relating is money. The only law is anything is permitted if it results in profit. If capitalist society can be called a society, then it is simple: war of all against all and by any means. No need to proclaim some romantic notion that this is not human, not civilized, not democratic; the latter, for capitalism is either inconvenience or to be bought. Resultantly, we shall have to distinguish democracy from capitalism, communism, and all other sorts of “explanations”. It is most interesting that in the United States, there are still fierce groups and their subservient cadres that, despite the open case that the markets – bereft of regulations – self destructed, and yet, such groups still insist that markets are the solution. The left ideologues claim to be armed with better tools: they know that all problems can be solved by establishing “better conditions” that will cause better results. In brief, throw money at a problem and – voila. And nothing happens, because something more important is missing. Today, both sides are identical to the former Soviet Union, except that we have two unyielding ideologies and they had one. But what is the difference, if neither is democratic, if either assumes an absolute stance and does not realize that democracy does not recognize absolutes and calls for public forum, public debate and the responsibility of the elected public servants to be accountable to their “bosses” – the citizens. While joining the West, Lithuanians must be made aware of the dangers of absolute positions and, thus, a lack of dialogue between contesting claims. An example might be offered from contemporary United States as pointed out by dramatically conservative publications, such as The Economist concerning the “missing middle: the woeful gap in America’s politics”. The point is that we are not inventing this gap; we are merely wondering how it is filled to make the public gullible. A couple of decades
ago, there was a rhetorical movement called “contract with America”, offering term limits to congressmen, and the public fell for this ploy. After they all got elected, term limits went into oblivion, and the leaders of the “contract” stayed on, despite their numerous hypocritical actions and contradictory statements. But we must also look at the ultimate source of responsibility: the public. Those, who still participate minimally and vote, do so on the basis of “me journalism” in the sense, that each person reads and is in contact with “news” that confirms the unquestioned prejudices one holds. The grand technological window of opportunity – the internet – to be open to the whole world – became a window to be in contact with only those, who hold the same prejudices. While the Political Enlightenment has become irrelevant, the Scientific Enlightenment ended up at the service of irrationalisms, such as blind and unconscious desires, biological survival, genetically caused “morality” and the “fallen state of humanity”. We shall not blame some system, some unknown and/or imperceptible forces, some conspiracies by “ruling elites” and some common denominator, such as the economy. What then is at issue?

The distinction between the political and the socialprivate shows that human autonomy requires a political community, where the individual’s autonomy and humanity can be guaranteed by the free establishment of and responsible adherence to laws. Conversely, public and free enactment of laws is, equally, essential to a political community. This framework allows for the discussion of all purposes. Depending on temporary requirements, one may establish other institutions, such as legislative, administrative and judicial, yet they too have the clear task of assuring that in the final analysis the autonomous being remains the undisputed arbiter of all rules. There is a hidden condition of this guarantee: in the public arena, all social and economic differences are disregarded, as everyone enters the public domain with equal rights and duties. The most important point of political society is the primacy of the public over the private, and that includes economy. It must be pointed out that what is to be private, including property, was founded and is continuously being founded on the political decisions that determine the line between the social-private and the public. There were social customs that allowed the beating of women and children, but the publically adjudicated laws drew a line, which made such beatings a legal concern of the public and the private practice had to
be abandoned. The same thing holds for economy – in principle. In this sense, we can speak of political economy, i.e. that the public adjudicates the reach and the limit of economic activity; otherwise, as noted above, the market will function in accordance with its essence: war of all against all, and no laws are needed.

We must understand that political dialogue as public is not simply about “politics”. As was argued above, the political is the public domain of autonomous and equal persons. Accordingly, political dialogue pertains to concerns that are significant to the public. Such an understanding excludes all informal arguments and the psychologization of issues. The term “psychologization” covers emotional appeals as well as rhetorical exhortations related to the use of images, rituals and slogans. This modus operandi is not designed to treat the individual as autonomous and rational, but as subject to manipulations and irrational outbursts. In effect, public issues are obfuscated. Soliciting such reactions is a mode of modern, but not classical, rhetoric. In the latter, one finds a detached reasonableness and a clear discursive practice founded on rules, while in the former, disconnected and psychologically over laden speech that is designed to make a direct impact is dominant and, thus, the autonomous political process is subverted.

If publicly appointed figures or those, running for public office, engage in this level of rhetorical obfuscations, they disqualify themselves from public service. This claim carries no moralistic undertones; it simply follows from the principle that the political is primarily public and relates to proposals for open discussions about public matters. No such justification as state secrets, known only to the leaders, can be used to either prevent public debate or to avoid addressing important public concerns. Presumed by this practice is that only the officials are in a position to decide what is good for everyone. This is known as paternalism and is modeled on the mistaken view of the political state as a family. Sure, there are temptations not to become embroiled in politics and to leave these activities to the government. In this case, the citizen has duties, but surrenders its rights. This tendency may appear even in a representative democracy, if the representatives begin to assume that all public problems can be resolved by the wisdom of the leaders. This ideology is obvious in the case of a charismatic representative’s appeal to the public. Such an appeal allows an official to pursue undebated his or her personal dogma, thus, leading to disastrous results – so obvious from the popular “leadership” of recent years.
And now, let’s consider the sticking point that is in the background of all the confrontations: free market. Once again, let us be clear about the subject matter: free market as “private enterprise”. We already noted that the line between public and private is established by the public; otherwise, there would not even be a difference between them and Mr. Carnegie, Mr. Rockefeller, Maxima and others, with their hired armies, would own any country. Fortunately, the Lithuanian revolution was not leaving Soviet autocracy for private property and free market: the revolution was an entirely different “project”: we shall forfeit our wealth, lives and sacred honor not for money, some divinity or social status, but for autonomy and equality, honor and dignity. In this context, any private interest, coming from society, having any public impact, will become a matter of public debate and adjudication, whether such interest is a large enterprise, wishing to use public water system or roadways or a person’s right of way across his back yard – all are subject to the political domain. Free enterprise becomes free, precisely when it becomes adjudicated rationally, with full consideration not only for the interests of the proposing agency, but also for the interests of the public and all other segments of private society. The important aspect of this adjudication, if it is done in representative democracy, is that those public servants, who are going to debate such interests, should discount their private interests, their possible gains and judge each case on its own merits. This cannot be regarded as government “interference” in private business, since the business demands public access and perhaps even an impact on general social well-being, whether through pollution, discarding public safety, including the safety of employees and an inadequate support for public institutions, such as education. We tend to overlook the fact that public education, funded by citizens, provides a free benefit to enterprises – after all, they do not have to bear the total burden of providing skills for their employees; the skills are funded by the public.

Political Technocracy

Now, in political society, the public has the right and the duty to be informed. Given the emergence of technology in the domains of production, research, control, efficient power, their complex interrelationships, their attendant legal issues, there emerges a need for persons, who are ca-
pable of managing such complex information and processes. Such con-
ceptions and relationships are premised on material, psychological and
economic interests. Thus, the issue of autonomous decisionmaking by the
public begins to be changed into an interestladen portrayal of knowledge.
The latter one results in a legitimation crisis. Given that the underlying
structure of technocracy has become dominant in the critical as well as
the general systems schools, this mode of order should be delimited. Espe-
ially important is the role of technology in democratic institutions. After
declaration of autonomy, Lithuania was flooded by latest Western innova-
tions and promises of almost “miraculous” possibilities, unlimited com-
modities, latest styles in music, dress, manners, in short, as Prof. Arvydas
Sliogeris said, “Lithuania found itself between a plow and a super com-
puter”. The latter is simply a more sophisticated symbol and continuation
of the former Soviet technocracy: all problems will be solved by specialists
and experts.

What is known as modernity, inclusive of the Political as well as the
Scientific Enlightenments, is premised on the human ability to reshape the
environment to suit human needs and designs. This alteration requires the
exclusion of knowledge based on experience, therefore, giving primacy to
quantitatively constructed models that are imposed on a purely homo-
geneous “matter”. This imposition is not based merely on mathematical
thinking; it requires human physical and practical intervention to shape
the raw materials into products. Thus, a view emerges that only experts
can manage the specific domains, ranging from changes in production to
behavioral controls. Such experts assume not only a technical model of
the world, but have the ability and power to change the material processes
(including humans) in the domains of their expertise in accordance with
new discoveries. Here, the very principles of operation in all areas are con-
trol, manipulation and power. Any event can be used for setting up the
conditions to obtain a desired result if these conditions are controlled by
experts. One should be careful to note that the experts are not interested
in reality, but in how to manipulate variables to obtain a desired result,
whether the result is a new product on the market or cloning.

Given this setting, the dangers to freedom in democracy are of two
kinds. The first was already noted by Plato, where democracy might yield
tyrranny, the second is more difficult to decipher, simply because it does
not seem to be a threat and appears to function within democratically guaranteed rights. It spreads without offering any visible opposition to the citizen. There are various modes of this danger, including centralization. We can speak of two modes of centralization: first mode is concerned mainly with national questions, such as national laws and international relationships. The second type would be dealing with localized concerns of regions, provinces, counties. If the first is located in one place, we can speak of a centralized government; if the concerns of the second type are also centralized, then we can speak of a central administration. Obviously, in the modern age no nation can survive without a central government. It is an entirely different matter with administrative centralism and its most dangerous form: the unification of centralized government with a centralized administration. In this case, the government obtains a direct means to exercise power without any diffusion through any mediation. Not only does it concentrate power, but because of its “remoteness” from local concerns, it continuously weakens the political sense of the citizen all the way toward the dissolution of political will. This does not occur through an exercise of a direct power; rather, the increasing centralized administration removes the citizen from public participation and leads to an abdication of political will through habit of non-participation. There appears a specific logic in this process. The citizen is isolated, individuated, in fact made to conceive of himself as completely independent and, in turn, summed into a mass, a non-descript quantity to be accessed by generalized slogans.

Such a “powerless” administrative despotism is called bureaucracy and may appear as modern phenomenon in the guise of administrative technocracy, arranged in a hierarchy of expert positions. What is this phenomenon? Since the appearance of modern complexities, the state cannot function without a staff of office holders. Such a staff is a precursor of bureaucracy. But they are not identical; bureaucracy is a form of independent rulership with its own invented norms and procedures. In its purest form, bureaucracy appeared in colonial rule toward the end of the nineteenth century, e.g., the French regime des descrets in Algiers or British governorships in India. In this form, administration replaces government, orders and rules replace laws, and, in brief, an anonymous mechanism of an administrative office replaces open public decisions. In this sense, it is a form of rulership with a complete lack of freedom and justice. This bureaucratic domination can be mildened
and restricted by a judicial process. The judicial process, in many cases, provides formal rules or general frameworks, while the concrete content is dealt with by a bureaucracy, which implements and, hence, directly supervises official policies. Here, the public process, dealing openly with laws and rules, is translated into a bureaucratic power with its own anonymity of procedures and interpretations of the legal framework. Hence, irrespective of the modern form of government, there appear degrees of administrative despotism. This becomes more so in a technological age. The technocrats charged with the implementation of legal procedures in specific domains not only impose their interpretation of such procedures, but are in a position to construct the concrete means, which will pervade the natural and social environments in a visible and material form. The basic form of this domination is the Scientific Enlightenment and, thus, comprises the continuation of Soviet paradigm that everything must be constructed in accordance with “science” and scientific experts – without public interference. A more serious issue appears with the coupling of technocracy with “free market” such that the latter is not only productive of the latest “technologies”, but is in a position to demand special privileges in the public domain. It promotes “what is good for the public” and claims that its products (whether electronics, entertainment, chemistry, bio-chemistry, nutrition, attire, home implements and countless others) need not be adjudicated by the public. Technical experts will decide the safety of such products, while the experts are also researchers funded by the market. The result is an autocracy of market/technocracy. Lithuania is currently in between this sort of autocracy and the Political Enlightenment. As in the Soviet Union, so in Lithuania autocracy has no interest in freedom.

Within this context, there appears another danger to freedom in a democratic polis, and indeed a danger, which coincides with the very basis of democracy: individualism. While of quite recent coinage, the term individualism is ambiguous. Positively, it designates the independence, the energy, originality of the singular, while negatively, and in modern age more prevalently, it signifies selfishness, greed, carelessness toward others and the surroundings. Obviously, selfishness as a human phenomenon need not be negative; it becomes negative, when it is associated with modern individualism. Selfishness means that the person relates everything to himself and seeks to maintain advantages against others. Left purely to itself, it does not recognize any other rationality. The selfish person regards his
advantages as the most obvious and natural. Individualism is a reflective concern with oneself, leading toward isolation and distance from public and limited relationships with those having similar concerns in daily life: family, friends, business. Selfishness might in some sense be regarded as a phenomenon of ethics, while individualism relates to the issues of polis and, thus, is of greater concern than the more easily manageable selfishness. Individualism might leave in-tact the social virtues and the concerns for one’s circle and its interests, but it slowly begins to neglect the political virtues, those of self-worth, requiring participation in the public arena. This leads toward the neglect of the common interests and, finally, to pure selfishness. This aspect is very prevalent within the new paradigm pervading contemporary Lithuania.

While individualism has various trends, which have comprised its final shape, for the present we shall explore one such trend and its consequences; subsequently, we shall concern ourselves with other trends and their consequences. The trend under consideration stems from equality with a focused freedom of each individual, irrespective of social descent, to “make his own way”, to shape his own destiny, owing nothing to anyone, having no masters, and placing himself in a position of being a master of himself and his survey. Some become examples of having made their own way and, indeed, “on their own”, irrespective of odds and oppositions. This is to say, they have shown that man can make and live his life independently of others, withdraw into “his own business” and leave the business of others to their own devises. This withdrawal into the domain of material interests, into “my business is none of your business, and your business is none of mine”, leaves the public arena not only unattended, but such an arena begins to be regarded as irrelevant if it does not touch “my direct material interests”. The concerned and frugal individuals become unconcerned citizens, who become subject to political events, against which they have become helpless. As we shall see, such “helplessness” leads such individuals to intervene in the public domain in order to force it to serve the private needs of these individuals.

Individualism can assume a shape, which is not adequately describable by this term. An analysis of such a shape will lead us to a closer cognizance of the dangers to freedom in democracy. The release of each individual from any social position which once determined rights and duties
sets each to seek his own success and fortune. Thus, in the age of equality, the individual finds too troublesome to tear himself away from his private interests. The public interests are left to the all-pervasive state and the representatives. At the same time, the unbridled striving for success, specifically in the material sphere, also elicits fears of external threats, insecurities and disturbances, which tend to reduce the political sphere to public “peace and security”. There appears a willingness to give the public powers new rights, as long as the powers claim to be able to promote security and order. It is well known that despotism has always remained true to one rule. It isolated the citizens from one another by reducing them to their social-private sphere and claimed that there is no need for citizen participation in the affairs of the public. The public sphere is to be run by the “leaders and experts”. Those citizens, who would want to organize and claim a right for public participation and demand public accountability, are accused of being “disturbers of peace” and “disruptors of law and order”. The peaceful and good citizens, those, who “mind their own business” and stay out of the public domain, are to be warned against such disruptors and, indeed, even organized to aid the “authorities” in silencing such disruptors. The despotism guarantees security and protection to all citizens of good will and law and order. In the age of democracy, despotism assumes an extended form: the public arena, which is centralized not only governmentally, but also administratively and technocratically, tends to expand its power by guaranteeing that the efforts of these powers will lead to success and happiness of the citizens. This promise equally tells the citizen that he ought to support the administrative rule without citizen’s participation.

There emerges a foreground with an apparent public support, in which, nonetheless, the public has neither a voice nor participation. The background power and domination do not manifest itself; anytime that anyone would attempt to pierce the foreground appearance he would be accused of “disturbance” not only by the administrative powers, but also by the respectful citizens, of threatening the social fabric with “anarchy”. Such a threat is confusion between the political and the social. It is clear that a serious threat of anarchy appears only at specific junctures. First, when people are released from a highly and hierarchically structured system and have not yet acquired the habits of democratic polis of self-rule,
of being law-givers, and second, when some persons are mistaken about
democratic polis and confuse the self-imposed laws, which regulate free-
dom from the vantage point of autonomous freedom of each person, with
a rule by power, with unfreedom. The latter forget that the laws of freedom
stem from the principle of a polis, in which freedom rules and freely limits
itself by the principle of equality of all citizens. Given this conception of
democratic polis, anarchy is the least threat. The threat is rather an envis-
agement of a centralized government and the all-pervasive administrative
bureaucracy, which does not want the participation of the citizen in the
public arena. Anarchy is used as a ploy to threaten the population with
disorder if the population enters into the public arena and becomes dis-
ruptive, i.e. a theatre, which is used to demand that the administrative bu-
reaucracy should be permitted to handle the public domain without public
interference. In principle, anarchy is not at all equitable with autonomous
freedom, but with an absolute position demanding societies conformity to
absolute rules. It is basically metaphysics of the will that posits an absolute
ideology, which may appear in the guises of theology, scientific determin-
ism and elitist claims to knowledge how to construct a utopian society.
Such a position sees all natural and social events as inadequate and to be
transformed, violated, in order to establish total control. Anarchistic con-
sciousness is a final outcome of the metaphysics of will in the form of an
all-encompassing ideology that was the life world of the Soviet Union.

Obviously, any threat of anarchy cannot be taken seriously in face
of the current centralized governmental and administrative powers, pos-
sessing the police, the military, technology of monitoring every move and
conversation of anyone and anywhere and the mass-media means to form
public opinion. Indeed, because of this power to form public opinion, the
centralized powers can constantly point to anarchy as a threat to “well
ordered”” private-social domain, in which a person can seek his aims in
peace. This threat reduces the citizen to private concerns and asks him to
leave the public domain in the hands of the powers, which promise pro-
tection. In this sense, the genuine danger to democracy, the weakening
and the exclusion of public participation in the polis, is covered over. Cor-
relatively, the citizenry, bent on security and order in their private sphere,
would accept any oppression of those, who demand participation in the
public arena, specifically in a society, in which economic gain is the sole
concern of human striving and purpose. The citizenry itself falls for this ploy and turns against the polis, i.e. permits the polis to be degraded into a despotic power-use and manipulation of events and public opinion for the sake of private-social gains. This is a modern form of the degradation of political ethos. One is propelled toward cynicism with respect to all public institutions. More fundamental reasons for this degradation will be discussed subsequently.

There is a degradation of political ethos, when two groups, the one more numerous demands order and security at any price in face of fear of freedom, and the other, which proclaims conservative morality and, hence, has already given up freedom, join forces in democracy. This happens de facto, even when de jure the formal democratic institutions remain. In summary, the dangers to freedom in a polis are a conjunction of mutually reinforcing factors. There is the governmental and administrative centralization and, thus, an emergence of anonymous bureaucratic power, possessing mass means of control and directing the public opinion toward the limits of a private sphere and concerns. There is the trend toward the promise to handle the public domain without the participation of the citizenry, enhanced by the hints at all sorts of “enemies”, which are threatening the security of private pursuits by anarchy and lawlessness. All these means are a way of covering over the despotism of centralized power. In the private sphere, everyone is still guaranteed equality, but in the public sphere, freedom is gone and inequality rules. In this sense, freedom is the most endangered factor and calls for the citizen to look away from his private social position and to enter the sphere of public, in which he is equal to all and free.

Throughout our discussion, we made a distinction between the “social-private” domain of concerns and the polis, the domain of public and freedom. What is characteristic of the private-social domain in the democratic age of equality is the preoccupation with material well-being. Whence this general concern? Why does it appear so prominently in the age of equality and political freedom? Subsequent discussions will develop various ontological controversies, while at present we shall deal with the “human” factor. What would be the object, to which the human would be most attracted or attached? Not an object, which is secure and guaranteed, but the one, which is desired and even when acquired, is not securely pos-
sessed. The human is, thus, constantly concerned with an object, which is desired and needed and yet exposed to a constant threat of loss. To grasp the significance of this state of affairs, we must consider the background, from which democratic equality emerged: feudalism. In feudalism, there were two major social positions, the aristocrat and the peasant. The aristocrat possessed wealth by birth right; hence, material well-being was not an object of concern. It was deemed natural. There was no need to strive for possession and its security, since there was no fear of loss of one’s natural birth right. The peasant, on the other hand, was materially poor and, because of his origins, could not hope to be rich or to acquire material wealth. In this sense, material wealth could not be an object of desire, for which one could strive. Desire and striving can emerge sensibly, where there is hope of possible attainment and fulfillment. For the aristocrat, wealth was never a question of possibility; it was a given actuality. For the peasant, wealth was also not a question of possibility, since there was no glimmer of hope to fulfill such a possibility. God himself told the peasant that he must be poor.

For Lithuanian population under Soviet autocracy, the situation was similar. The elite did not need to be concerned about wealth, since it owned the entire society, including the “working class”, which did not possess anything and had no hope of possessing more than was allotted by the autocrats. Hence, no striving to be more or to have more was a possibility. If one wanted to become part of the autocratic elite priesthood, one had to go through a protracted rituals and training to demonstrate one’s own obedience and subservience to the prescribed dogma, the “sacred doctrine”, learn the appropriate rhetoric and when and where for its recitation and only then be permitted to join the lower ranks of the “immortals”. The change in this context can occur only when both classes are exposed to the possibilities of loss and gain, i.e., when the aristocrats are exposed to the loss of their possessions, and the lower class is exposed to the possibility of acquisition of wealth. Once the privileges are discarded by the decree of equality, once possibilities in every domain become open for everyone, the limits of what can be reached and attained no longer lie in one’s social position, but in one’s own wishes, talents, dedication and in becoming one’s own standard creator and bearer. But this is subtended by one condition: not being bound by any birth right and privilege, the
individual is no longer dependent upon and, in turn, can neither depend on nor ask for assistance from anyone; he is on his own to make his own way, shape his own destiny. No one will guarantee or secure his social position and material survival. Thus, he must live in an incessant striving to secure his own livelihood in competition with others and in face of a possible loss. There is another factor in Lithuanian revolution as a shift in paradigm toward the Political Enlightenment: the sudden emancipation and the entrance of all things Western were overwhelming. The novelties, the abundant commodities, the offers to have “anything you want” appeared as if for the taking. The citizen’s senses were overpowered by the dazzle, the new noises, the glamour, the incredible difference from the drab Soviet life – all one had to do is acquire more money, strive for better paying position, go into any business to make money – and you will be happy. The ritual of privatization became the preoccupation of everyone, from the highest communist party officials to the street vendor. This was not just selfishness, but the very image of becoming Western.

This new, equal person after Lithuanian revolution has to be primarily interested in his own private survival and well-being; he is dominated by a striving, which can never be fulfilled, a striving for security and well-being, and in face of fear that at any moment he might lose his acquisitions. Under these conditions, the entire social fabric becomes an arena of private striving for well-being, of a struggle of everyone against everyone. The elected public servants had the same interest: use the public office for personal gain, serve other private interests and enjoy sumptuous life. Such a personality is fearful of freedom, of disruption of what it has attained and is most eager to call for strong government, strong measures and even for a strong man to maintain law and order. Even the rich cannot escape this striving; having won their wealth through struggle, they have established a mode of life, in which the acquisition of more and more is a second nature. Indeed, the calculated striving to obtain more and more has become interpreted as a religious, moral duty, a god’s way, a sign of divine favor. Thus, Max Weber and, of course, in Lithuania, the new God – the market – entered prior to any considerations of its limits – political economy disappeared and pure economy took root. This is to say, the private, social arena entered as a primary factor, leading to a society, which, while formally democratic, de facto is a social system of powers contesting other powers.
This general attitude is not only accepted, but comprises an essential factor in public opinion. In democracy, there is domination by an open, public opinion that is difficult to locate. This domination is the source for the establishment of mass media in its various forms. The domination, of course, must be determined from the background of equality. With respect to public opinion, equality shows some major trends. It guards against the yoke of traditional habits, conceptions, family lines and to a certain extent nationalistic prejudices. All calls for justification of one’s action are to be found in one’s own reasons and not in family line or some traditional moralities. In addition, knowledge of reality is acceptable only from one’s own experience and not from authority, and such knowledge is viable if it can be translated into praxis for success. Yet, what is most important in this context is suggested by a question, concerning Reformation and Enlightenment: how was it that Reformation closed itself within a domain of religious conceptions and, thus, freed reason for different tasks, and how is it that despite the possibility of application of Cartesian thought, Descartes limited it to the objects of science, and why is it that by the eighteenth century this mode of thought became so prevalent, leaving schools and entering the general fabric of society? In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the social and political conceptions could not accommodate the new mode of thought. This mode, which recognizes only human reason, could be accommodated only with the emergence of equality. This is the democratic mode of thought, and it is bound up with free rationality. Any efforts, up to date, to prevent democratic political institutions, go hand in hand with the degradation of the rationalism of the Enlightenment; any revolution for democratic institutions always takes recourse to the Enlightenment, since its mode of thought is completely democratic. While during the times of Kant, the Enlightenment, stressing the independence of the individual’s judgment, spread from a minority, it was not the elite-minority conception, appearing in the nineteenth century that stressed “education: and was a product of bourgeoisie. The latter would be in principle opposed to the Enlightenment, since it posits an “educated elite” against the “spiritless masses”, claiming that the democratic revolution is the greatest threat to “cultural spirituality”.

As all societies, obviously the democratic society must also possess something common, i.e., human focus that would hold the society togeth-
er; whether the focus is the Durkheimian structure or some mythological imagery, it is unimportant. What is important is to note what would hold together a modern democratic society. First of all, the disappearance of class rights by birth and the appearance of equality shifts matters in such a way that there is a lesser willingness to “stand out” and to take on leading positions. In turn, there appears a slow development of awareness that among equals the opinion of the majority is the best guide. In this sense, the public opinion begins to take over the role of dominating the individual. This is not to be confused with the concept of authority. Authority excludes challenges to itself, but public opinion includes its own criticism. In a democratic polis, each individual is thrown back upon his own understanding, yet the social matters become the question of public opinion; after all, what is necessary for a common life should not be decided by one individual, but by a consensus of the majority. And precisely this context places the individual in an unavoidable twilight. If the individual compares himself to others, he knows of his equality, but if he compares himself to the “public”, he senses his insignificance and powerlessness. Thus, the domination of public opinion is of a specific kind, a kind, which would be completely foreign in aristocratic, autocratic and even technocratic societies. The public opinion convinces not so much through argument, but is rather compelling without a distance. Unlike the aristocratic rule, where “the lords” are “the others”, in public opinion, the individual is “Mr. Public” and is intimately part of the opinion pool. And the latter offers a plethora of moralities, advises, social and economic conceptions, political truths, etc. Reason is found in the majority and this strengthens the domination by public opinion. It should be understood that the principle of majority is not an explanatory ground for the domination of public opinion over the individual; the true ground is equality, and majority is its expression. This is the reason why the domination of public opinion is completely bound up with democracy.

The equality of social members leads to two contrary aims: it opens ways of new life and thought, and the latter is enhanced as never before. Yet, this freedom of thought in democracy is also threatened by democracy. With equality, everyone’s thought is equal and, hence, no individual and no group can proclaim that his/her thinking is somewhat superior. In this circuitous way, the individual’s contribution is forced into the open to
be judged by the public opinion and, indeed, either made into one among many opinions or interpreted along average lines. In this sense, the censorship for the freedom of thought has not vanished, but changed. With respect to freedom of thought, it must reject any tyranny, irrespective of its origin. Whether it is exercised in the name of aristocratic birth right and blood or egalitarianism, autocracy or some political party of peace and security, oppression remains the same to the individual.

The modern, single party dictatorships, the autocracies, whether communist or fascist, decided public opinion from central positions, party decrees and the dictatorial leader. But another domination of public opinion is through manipulation and shaping of consciousness. Such manipulation begins with the manipulation of information: as is well known, information has two senses. First, one receives a report about something in a way that one can form one’s opinion about it, and second, one receives information, which already contains an opinion and, thus, precludes a free formation of an opinion and judgment. In the last sense, we can speak of manipulation. But we should differentiate between two types of manipulation. First, the direct forming of consciousness through information by controlling the information mass media offers by using the latter as means of control by interest groups. This can be called an intentional manipulation. The conceptions, which dominate the individual, here, are inseparable from the social structure and the main interests. This must not be confused with the simplistic notion that consciousness is a mirroring of some economic laws. This thesis is not only untenable, but dangerous. It abolishes any possibility of judging social relationships. It assumes that there is only one mirroring, while other conceptions can be deciphered as false consciousness and can be explained through “objective” interests. The only correct view belongs to the power holders. But it could also be the case that by the very fact of living in a society one is intimately structured without any cognizance of this structuration. This is not to say that such structurations take place in some unconscious way, but are the very structures of thinking. They remain invisible to consciousness, since the latter cannot extricate itself from them; they are the principles of consciousness itself. In this case, it would not be quite appropriate to speak of manipulation.

In democratic polis, the individual’s judgments and the public opinion go hand in hand. This opens the door for some interest groups to make
the thought of the citizens into an object of influence in order to direct it toward the interests of the groups. This is a functional manipulation and is intended. Yet, it must be understood that such a manipulation is possible in principle only in a democratic polis. For example, in a feudalistic world, such as medieval or autocracy of Soviet type, there is no manipulation of public opinion, since there is one group that rules, and the rulership is embedded in social power structure, such that the “authorities” need not justify anything to anyone. Moreover, there is no public in a proper sense; there are only the others who are told – in case the rulers want to tell anything at all – what the rulers want to tell. Any public or individual judgment of the correctness or incorrectness of the pronouncements is of no consequence, i.e. it is irrelevant whether the “public opinion” was influenced or not. The ruled know their place by the simple virtue of initially imposed force and, subsequently, acquired habit of submission. Manipulation appears through a democratic revolution, where factual relations of domination lose their legitimation, i.e., their force. Each is equal, and if anyone wants to have any power over the public, he must engage in a manipulation of opinion, but in such a way, that the function of manipulation should be hidden. Lacking this, it would not be a manipulation, but a transparent effort of intended controls of the population. Being hidden and deliberately so, the manipulation of public opinion is difficult to uncover. Of course, while manipulation takes place through self-effacement in order to be effective, it cannot remain completely hidden. For its effectiveness, it requires various means, from selection of times for “information”, intonation, conceptual and stylistic means, the positions taken behind the information, the constant ideological message of the interests, the veiled threats aimed at the various anxieties of the citizens and enticements of various resentments. This is one of the paradigmatic changes from former autocracy, and the greatest danger is the entrance of private interests of the social domain into the public domain. For example, under the guise of “free speech”, there appear efforts to sell private interests and, indeed, to sell candidates for public service by use of rhetoric. Thus, one may exalt the virtues of “free market” and suggest that the latter should become uncoupled from any “political” interference. To paraphrase an American rhetorical figure of speech, “The business of Lithuania is business”. This rhetorical ploy is never noticed as a way of political society to return to a society of clashing powers of interest and complete abolition of human
self-worth with its attendant will to equality and autonomy. We should be reminded that “free market” is an oxymoron.

It is important to note that any disturbances, concerned with freedom, are very healthy for the democratic polis. They disallow the encrustation of the aims and purposes of one group, or one generation, to dominate the future. There have been recent claims that the government is constantly with the people, because it follows the wishes of the “silent majority” or the “moral majority” or even “what the people really want”. These appeals were already noted by Tacitus, who pointed out that the “middle”, the majority, shows no will for the public matters and is concerned solely with its private domain. This reduction of the majority to non-participation and then an appellation to its “silent voice” as a political measure for public decisions is a ploy of despotism. It claims that any challenge to the current state of affairs is counter to the majority, which has not spoken. This despotic presumption summates all individuals into an amorphous mass of indistinct persons, none having a will, a voice or an interest of its own. Given this “insult”, the individual has to speak, and in democracy the voice can be had through the press and mass media. For democracy, the free press is an inextricable component. The press is a means, which the individual can use to become public and to involve the public in a debate of singular or common concerns. The free press is a democratic instrument of freedom. Without much discussion, the same could be said of an independent and impartial judiciary, specifically with respect to the protection of the individual against the imposition of either social or state domination. As it is well testified by modern history, the individual’s rights are always endangered; the availability of the judiciary to all citizens is coextensive with democratization and a guarantee against an assumption of rulership either by a social interest or a bureaucracy. Lacking this protection, there might emerge a clamor by a social group, calling for the realization of its aims as “benefits” for the society, e.g., the economization of society either by the bourgeoisie or the collectivists, both having the same format, which would demand the “temporary suspension” of the polis and its guarantees of equality and freedom.

Such temporary suspensions are justified by various ideological ploys, such as “scientific necessity” or “historical necessity” of some presumed “laws”. The claim is then made that once the “necessities” have been either fulfilled or abolished, equality and freedom will be either instituted
or restored. Meanwhile, the more efficient achievement of the social aims is best left to a socially preeminent elite, e.g., the “industrial captains”, the “party leadership”, the “scientific technocracy” and even the “religious leadership”. What we would like to maintain is that a surrender of even one slight freedom, the abolition of one individual’s rights, however minute, is in principle an infringement on everyone’s rights. The consciousness of rights is damaged, when this consciousness allows the violation of the rights of one individual. Perhaps, the greatest damage to democracy would stem from the state if the latter were not submitted to limitations, which could not be abridged irrespective of which group might attempt to assume and enforce its interests and social power over the entire public. The dangers of state and at the same time the means for deflecting these dangers stem from the very democratic revolution. On the one hand, the dangers can emerge very effortlessly through the self-exclusion of the individual from the public arena – don’t bother me with politics, I have my own troubles – leading to increasing domination of this arena by private interests either of the “politicians” or their private friends; on the other hand, the preservation of freedom is not an effortless non-participation, but, in fact, calls for a continuous awareness of events, continuous interrogation of the state, in short, it requires knowledgeable participation. In this sense, freedom is not a given, but an effort of knowledge and action. And this should not be a surprise; after all, democratic revolution is a product of praxis, a praxis, which concerns a will based on knowledge. If one simply accepts the side of the will and its projects to reconstruct the world – including the human – one may end up in an ideology that subjects knowledge to its purposes. In principle, ideology arises, when will supercedes knowledge and an attendant correlative ontology and offers a reconstruction of the world in accordance with invented rules. This is to say, the shift from the given to the willed is a shift from knowledge to the metaphysics of the will. This shift is the ground of ideology.

Interests and the Public Domain

The technological outlook extends equally into all domains, thereby, leading not only to the requirement that experts manage public affairs, but also to the demand that appointed officials be in a position to offer
solutions in meeting private wants. No doubt, private wants are a part of social life. Yet, once these needs are introduced into the public arena, they become a matter for public adjudication and do not justify imposing one group’s interests on everyone else. Actually, the introduction of an interest into the public domain is tantamount to submitting this issue to public decision. No privilege can be granted to one interest over another without public consent. In this sense, even the sacred cow of private enterprise has to be adjudicated by the entire citizenry if this activity enters in any manner into the public domain.

At issue here is the principle of equality based on the universalization of any rule. If individuals or groups demand that their interests should be given primacy over others, then they are inviting all persons to introduce their interests as equivalent and worthy of consideration. In this regard, the very notion of what is private turns out to be a matter of public debate. Barring such adjudication, there is a temptation to introduce one’s private interests into the public domain without subjecting these concerns to discussion. This practice tends not only to split the public arena into private spheres of influence, but also to reduce the function of public officials to managing diverse and, at times, opposing interests of various individuals or groups. This kind of reduction often culminates in the holders of public offices to begin to favor various interests. Groups or individuals, occupying social positions of power and influence, will tend to make their interests into public issues and exclude those of less favorably positioned members of society. In this case, the public domain ceases to be a dialogical institution for the maintenance of autonomy and turns out to be a battle ground among interest groups. In turn, officials are compelled to make promises to support diverse and even opposing interests. These promises have an appearance of seriousness, since the officials make the claim to have technical expertise in managing such interests. This means that the public domain is being fragmented into disconnected interests, thus, resulting in the privatization of the polity. This is to say, the members of such a community tend to enter the public domain only to the extent that an issue is relevant to their own and not to the public’s interests. The political realm becomes a means to fulfill other purposes. It ceases to be an institution of autonomous freedom. And this is what constitutes the legitimation crisis: abolition of dialogue between autonomous and equal persons and, hence, a loss of human participation.
A legitimation crisis is in part coextensive with a complex and interconnected set of factors that tend to exclude citizens from participating in public dialogue. First, giving priority to instrumental reason leads to the assumption that technical experts ought to be empowered to solve all issues. There appears a contingent of “experts” or technocrats to manage citizens. Second, the public’s demands are equally reduced to the level of material wellbeing. The public comes to be comprised of interests that are privatesocial and not publicpolitical. As a result, the public demands that the appointed officials manage the affairs of the public at the level of interests and not at the level of earlier discussed public institutions. Third, since interests vary and are backed by differences in social power, then those, who are socially and privately more powerful, dominate the public arena and direct the enactment of laws. This results not only in the emergence of winning interests, but also the division of the public into classes and pressure groups. Such a division fosters public apathy and cynicism. Fourth, these factors imply that a legitimate government is one that supports interests of all kinds of groups. What remains at best are freedom of choice among technically produced material commodities based on “needs” (and not autonomy) and, finally, abolition of responsibility (as autonomy).

There is no difference between capitalist or communist societies, because in either case public officials are in charge of managing public affairs and are thought to have the right ideology for guaranteeing material and psychological wellbeing of the population. The main result is a technocracy without a political ethos. This type of government regards itself as capable of adjudicating public affairs merely on the basis of material interests and technical expertise. This form of management is seen as factual and, thus, ethically neutral. This presumed neutrality opens the door for moralizing about the practices of the technocratic establishment, not to mention the debasing of the public domain by various mythologies. Instead of calling for the public accounting of such practices, the citizens “participate” only to the extent of making moralizing complaints. Together, such “participation” abolishes the public arena, where free and equal citizens make decisions and demand their enactment. The public servants also win elections by relying on technical experts to design rhetorical images to mesmerize the public not by presenting a rational case for debate, but by “messages”, such as “Don’t worry, be happy”. 
While one must report the news, one need not stop at this level. A free press, if it is free, is also responsible for informing the public what the officials are hiding behind the obfuscations, theatrics and equivocations. At the same time, what is relevant to the public must be exposed to insure that public figures explain their rhetoric or the introduction of myths, moralities or ideologies into the public arena. Clearly, the institution of free press is one of the key institutions of political society and is linked inextricably to the continuous maintenance of such a polity. It will not do to argue that currently the main mass media is dominated by huge enterprises, which are interest laden and present prejudicial views to serve such interests. In brief, alternative media must have an equal voice to present other viewpoints. No doubt, but it is important to note that the very institution of the public domain allows alternative media to have a say and maintain a plural public. Yet, it must also be clear that while the main stream media might be dominated by interests, it cannot be counted as journalistic mass media, designed to maintain the public domain of autonomy and equality, but simply as a social and private institution, engaged in advertising private ideologies, moralities and other designer wares. If the alternative media are to serve the public domain, it cannot fall into the same trap of presenting their own private and social interests, but must counter the main stream media by filling the gap, where the main stream has failed.

Education

There cannot be any doubt that autonomy, responsibility and rights are coextensive with knowledge. Ignorant persons cannot make judgments in public dialogue without running the risk of being misled by all sorts of rhetorical ploys and interest manipulations. Education is a process from authority to autonomy – rational and free adjudication of issues based on knowledge. One must move through authority by those, who know a subject matter and are capable of articulating its intricacies, whether in sciences, literatures, social affairs and even public institutions. But one must also grow out of being subjected to authority by mastering issues and complexities in principle of different fields of knowledge in order to make rational and thus autonomous decisions. Without such a process, the per-
son cannot be responsible for his decisions, since the latter are blind and irrational. In this sense, education is another institution that is coextensive with the public domain of dialogue and, finally, autonomy and responsibility. This extends into the very domain of universal human rights to education as a continuation of all other rights to be autonomous, equal and responsible member of human public community. This is specifically important in an age, where such public domain and universal rights to autonomy and equality are being assaulted by technocracy and materialistic reductionism of all functions of human life to cause and effect and, hence, to irresponsibility. By now, it ought to be obvious that autonomy and equality are not pre-given empirical data, but are phenomena that remain as long as we enact them. This is the case with education – a process from authority to autonomy – where autonomy is developed and finally exercised with full responsibility. This means that any refusal to participate in autonomous engagements is identical with the loss of autonomy.

A political society constitutes its own purpose, without which there could not be any talk of free speech, assembly, free market. Democracy is never a means for some interest, since in such a case individuals would reduce their public actions (use democracy) for their private interests and abandon the very meaning of democracy. The political institution is coextensive with the public domain of autonomous persons, who are engaged in dialogue about matters that are deemed significant for public life. This life is strictly distinguished from social and individual activities that are interest laden and, thus, lack the autonomy to be political. Indeed, the political must be restricted to the public domain, in which members of society participates in open dialogue and decisions. Publicly appointed officials are bound by the democratic ethos to maintain this arena and, thus, are called on to communicate public issues. Any communication that is based on obfuscation and designed to advance a particular group is inappropriate for this domain. In various ways, such a communication becomes a monologue and rejects the dialogical structure and exchange of information that is required to maintain the autonomy of the public. Seemingly, those, who claim to have expertise in the design and manipulation of rhetorical images, do not have anything to do with the public domain; rather, they add to the legitimation crisis that leads, finally, to public cynicism. The political free press, as part and parcel of originating and maintaining
the political society, serves all by providing information that is of public concern for educated and responsible persons.

It is obviously incorrect to equate morality with laws and rights. Moral laws require the person’s freedom, but they have no compulsory call to be followed. Freely established laws as a guarantee of freedom can be enforced and consequences delimited in case of the incursions against such laws. Thus, those, who are appointed to insure the public domain, are not preservers of any morality, but keepers of the law and nothing else. Inclusion of morality would turn political society into warring factions of fanatics, each offering his “ultimate value”. If the judiciary were to assume the role of the preserver of morality, then it would have to apply the methods of inquisition in order to check the private conscience of every citizen.

Let us take up the issue of the so-called economic crisis sweeping the globe. By admissions from all sides, the crisis was a result of abolishing various legal restrictions on private enterprises. The managers of such enterprises paid handsomely to the public servants to support social/private interests and, thus, neglect the laws that were of public interest. This move is coextensive with the notion that we no longer need political society; we shall reduce all public matters to private affairs and exclude the public from participating in the public domain and the formation of laws. The very concept of representative government loses its credibility, since the appointed or elected public servants are also interested only in their private aggrandizement. When the elected public servants can write laws for others, but exclude themselves from such laws, then the very notion of “equality under the law” is meaningless and allows the citizenry to claim that no one need follow laws. One of the blatant and well known cases is insider trading rules. Privatization of everything means that there is nothing left of democracy, and the public domain is a place of total war of all against all; no wonder that no one questions strange notions in democracy, such as “who is currently in power”. In the democratic public domain, no one is in power, but the language of power suggests that we have abandoned our citizenship, autonomy and responsibility. In brief, it is the equal, autonomous citizens, with rights, duties, responsibilities and honor, who abandon the maintenance of democracy.

The citizen must also be cognizant of all sorts of mystifications and obfuscations that – almost imperceptibly – abolish autonomy and respon-
sibility. The just mentioned economic crisis was not a responsibility of the managers of enterprises, but the doing of “the market” as some sort of mysterious “invisible hand” that relieves the actors of their responsibili-
ties. It is assumed that “market knows best” and has the power to improve lives everywhere – provided that one “obeys the market”. Examples are too numerous to recount of the mention of the wisdom and power of this supreme authority: if the Indonesians had listened to and obeyed the re-
quirements of the market, they would be well off; it is their government that was fallible and interfered in the market, or morning radio “news” proclaiming that the Wall Street investors are nervously waiting to “see what the market has decided”. It is peculiar that while admitting human errors, everyone knows the grand, divine market that is an unfailing au-
thority of all human affairs. These were private individuals making deci-
sions solely for their private benefit and, hence, are the only ones, who should be held responsible. Yet, most of them, if not still in their own positions, descended into their mansions on golden parachutes. They are the ones, who demanded “deregulations” not because the invisible hand called for it, but because they wanted to be pure capitalists: live for profit without restrictions as to the means. And the gap widens, while the citi-
zens of democracy, task of which is to fill this gap, have also disappeared.

The infallible left and the infallible right must come to terms in the realization that political society is neither capitalist nor socialist, since nei-
erher would allow public participation in all matters of concern. The right wants an absolute rule from above and that means, in principle, a society ruled by one power without any right to question such mode of rulership, while the left, in principle, wants some sort of mysterious abstraction – the government – to do for everyone what everyone cannot do for herself – ending in a state, where the political society disappears and a ruling elite with the grateful ruled would form a society. One side already has all the answers absolutely, whether the answers come from some unquestionable pronouncements in ancient stories or from some absolute, although in-
visible, hand, the other side has scientific technocracy that can do every-
thing that society requires, as long as members of public cease to meddle in things that are beyond the ken of the majority of the population. While the rhetoric is different – one wants to rule “in the name of…” whatever, the king of kings, the invisible hand, the other wants to rule “in the name
of…” the people, as long as the people do not interfere. In both cases, we are moved back to social – power relationships, and away from our public domain, our democracy. No social conditions, no systems, no lords, can make us free and equal; it is up to us to resume our duties and responsibilities as citizens and, hence, as the government and management of social affairs. Democracy is not a system, but is always in the making by us, and if we cease to participate in its making either by neglect or by assuming some infallible poises we shall abandon what is in principle a human way of life.

Legitimation Crisis

While legitimation was mentioned briefly, its dangers are more extensive, since the assumption of bureaucratic conditions by the governmental apparatus tends to usurp all domains of socio-economic processes, and such usurpation leads to political problems of legitimation. It is noteworthy that some of the most influential writers in the field of socio-economic domain, such as Jurgen Habermas, have raised the problem of legitimation of the government in the contemporary Western societies. The crisis of legitimation hinges on two preeminent factors: (i) the politization of economy as technocracy and (ii) the de-politization of politics or the technocratization of politics. While these two factors are logically distinct, they function in a complex web of interrelationships. Hence, their treatment cannot be separated into clear lines. If we were to take the economic relationships between the corporations and their employees, we would find that purely speaking the contract between the employer and the employee is economical. It is a free choice of the employee to offer his/her abilities for an agreed remuneration and conditions of work. The same is valid of the employer. The employer is free to employ a person with certain abilities to perform required duties and under certain conditions, such that if the abilities are no longer required, or if the employee disagrees with the conditions, the contract can be terminated. This process is politically “indifferent”. It does not depend on political powers either for capital or for regulations. The capital produced at the economic sphere is distributed in accordance with the agreements among employers and the employed and in accordance with the exchange values of commodities.
On the political side, the governmental functions are purely for the maintenance of agreements obtained among individuals, groups of individuals or between a group and an individual. The political functions are not there to prescribe new relationships among individuals, but to insure the relationships, which are accepted or agreed upon between individuals. Moreover, the political functions are not for the sake of economic enhancement of individuals or particular groups. If there is taxation, the monies are to be spent in the public sphere, such as education, maintenance of public domains and services. The monies are not spent for the economic support of particular individuals or groups. The monies cannot be employed to intervene in private economy and its agreements and practices. If this is not respected, then politics and economy become mixed and the mixture leads to socio-economic tensions and confrontations. Who is to get the tax money and for what economic purposes? By political intervention into the economic sphere, political functions become economic powers, with which groups and individuals must reckon in terms of economic benefits. Instead of being executors of social regulations, the political functionaries assume a power of distribution of economic benefits, which can be wielded to obtain both political and economic advantages, either of the political functionary or of his/her ideological friends in the private economic sector.

The conflicts in the economic sphere, the problems in the relationship between employer and employee are conflicts of contract, to which both the employer and employee commit themselves. The conflicts are to be resolved at the economic level. Of course, the agreements must also be treated as legal-political and, indeed, the bargaining by worker’s organizations are to be treated both as economic and legal insofar, as the individual is represented by a group and, thus, delegates the group’s elected representatives to guarantee the individual’s rights. Yet, if the political sphere assumes economic clout, it translates the economic conflicts into political conflicts. In this case, individuals and groups begin to look for purely economic solutions of conflicts toward the political sphere. Such a situation exposes the political functionary to the economic pressures of the private sphere and exposes the private functionary to the dangers of seeking solutions for private economic problems in the political sphere. The political functionary can be “bought” for economic benefit, because the benefac-
tors expect economically favorable conditions from the political functionary. Moreover, the promise to support a specific economic legislature for the interests of some group also implies that the members of a given group will vote for the individual making such promises. Here, autonomy begins to slip away toward causes and, thus, ceases to belong in the public domain.

Before we can proceed, we must point out that the analysis of legitimation crisis by Marxism is no longer applicable for the current socio-political structure of the Western nations. The reason for this inapplicability lies in the very continuation of the modern liberal tenets, which, while seeking equality, have introduced the functions of the political state into the private sphere, into the field of economic relationships and the distribution of privately acquired wealth, income and economic relationships among the members of society. Economy has lost its autonomy from the state, autonomy so necessary for Marxian analysis of the relationship between private and public-political domains. By means of planning agencies, by the use of public funds acquired through taxation or over-extension of credit, the government tends to create conditions for equalization of economic status; not only by public funds, but also by the introduction of laws, such as the minimum-wage law, the equalization tendency is carried out and introduced into all private domains. This means that the private, economic contracts between the employer and the employee have become acts of politically required agreements. Of course, these are not the only factors; there are governmental credits, price guarantees, subsidies, loans, contracts, income distribution, labor contracts and policies, through which adjustments are made between competing private interests; the government furthermore intervenes in trade relationships at the international level by subsiding advertisements of major economic players – the corporate welfare. It also infuses capital in various “non-productive” domains, such as space exploration, armaments, public works, transportation, communication, health, housing, city planning, research and development, etc., that can be translated into benefits for “private economy”.

The political intervention in the productive segment may and, indeed, has taken various forms: first of all, it intervenes by establishing what can be called “reflexive labor”. This consists of governmentally funded programs of scientific and technological research, which is subsequently em-
ployed for the private segment of the productive process and, hence, ben-
efits the private accumulation of capital. This means that the government
purchases private labor with public funds and subsequently is in a position
to “favor” some private segment with the products of publicly funded
labor. Secondly, in various private sectors, the private arrangements be-
tween employer and the employed, the corporation and the union, have
been replaced by political procedures determining the cost of labor. Since,
as is well known, the value of commodities are based, according to Marx-
ism, on the labor quantum (measured in terms of socially required time per
unit), then political functions intervene to dictate the production of “market
value” and, indeed, the “surplus value”, from which originates profits. This
is not to say that only Marxism is here untenable, but also that the political,
the public sphere, assumes inroads into the private sphere and can use this
intrusion to support one private segment against the others.

If we were to extend this logic to its conclusion, the outcome would be
the complete control of private segment by the public and, thus, the abol-
ition both of the private and the public domains. While this is problem-
atic in itself, more fundamentally, there is a hidden danger of the political
functionaries employing the public segment, the public wealth and the
products of publicly funded “reflexive labor” as a punishment or reward
for the private domain. Such procedure can lead to “silent” coercion of
the private segment, since the political platforms are structured in terms
of private inducements in economic and welfare areas. Free elections no
longer lead to the selection of officials to guard the public domain, but to
handle the populations’ private affairs. The private domain becomes po-
liticized and the public sphere becomes open to private interests; in turn,
the private interests are exposed to political manipulation.

The point is that the organizational principle of socio-political life has
been drastically altered. The distinction between the private and the pub-
lic has been obliterated. The non-political relationships, in the econom-
ic sphere, for example, have become political, where private economic
achievements are distributed socially vis-a-vis the political or public func-
tions. This is the reason or at least one of the reasons for the confidence-
crisis. The population no longer votes for a public platform, but for private
platform, which promises to fulfill private needs by way of distributing the
privately acquired social wealth and benefits. If the platform tends to favor
one private segment over the other, then the vote is split along the lines of who falls within the favored and who falls outside the favored private interests. The crisis reaches a culminating point, when the political functionaries cannot carry out the promises to fulfill the needs of the private sphere. There are created expectations in this fulfillment by the public, and when the fulfillment cannot be attained, the public views that its vote is “irrelevant”, that its participation in the public affairs “makes no difference”. This is indeed ironic, because the public has accepted the notion that the public sphere must somehow manage the private sphere. Not only manage, but comprise the conditions for the welfare of the private sphere. By requesting the fulfillment of private welfare, the public invites the political domain to intervene into the private domain and, thus, obliterates the differentiation between the public and the private spheres. The social steering mechanism is no longer a self-regulating private segment, such as economy, but the state apparatus, which has assumed functions capable of replacing and, indeed, coercing the private functions.

This is laden with the questions of legitimation and its crises. This is obvious, when the governmental planning cannot steer the private segment to fulfill all private interests and accommodate all the conflicting private demands. In this case, some segments of population will be opposed to the governmental functions and will see them as illegitimate. The governmental intrusion into the private domain and the obliteration of the distinction between the private and the public leads to the legitimation crisis. In turn, the publics’ demand for governmental solution to private problems leads to the same crisis of privatization of the public sphere and, hence, to the dissatisfactions when the public sphere cannot solve all private, social and economic problems. Another factor in legitimation crisis, as would be perceived by the population, is the loss of the confidence in the conception of fair exchange. There is an awareness that the distribution of wealth and welfare depends on governmental policies and the political negotiations, which mediate among various private interest groups. It is known that in the free private sphere the basic motive is profit and, hence, setting of goals in terms of maximizing profit. Since these priorities, due to governmental interference, have lost their “natural” force, they must be legitimated through political process. Since governmental interference distributes public wealth and welfare in accordance with interest
groups, the productive interests, such as corporations, while receiving public funds, are perceived as receiving an illegitimate dole for maximizing private profit from the public funds. Hence, they maximize profit not only on the basis of free market, but also on the basis of governmental favors. Since the public perceives these favors as stemming from the public domain, it views the governmental action as illegitimate; after all, such an action “makes the rich richer”. Hence, voting for a political party and/or its platform is seen as useless, since the function of such a platform does not allow the private sphere to function in terms of its own risks, but rather aids the private sphere to exploit the public sphere. Since the public does not wish to legitimate private appropriation of public’s wealth and since the political party is nonetheless involved in the distribution of public’s wealth to private interest groups, then the population concludes that its input in public affairs is meaningless, powerless and ultimately irrelevant.

After all, formal democracy is designed to insure the independence of the public sphere from private interests, and yet the governmental functions, by politicizing private interests, change the substance of formal democracies. In turn, as paradoxical as this may seem, the formal democracy is depoliticized, insofar as the voter is concerned. The elected functionaries in the public sphere are using their political functions to favor and to sanction private economic processes and either accumulation of profits by one group or use of public funds for the undeserved welfare of another group. In turn, paradoxically, while the public demands of the officials to engage only in the public-political sphere, it depoliticizes the public sphere by demanding that it fulfill the needs of private welfare. In both cases, the public sphere is obliterated and the meetings dealing with the public affairs are attended only by those, whose immediate private interests are affected. The public’s participation in the public’s affairs is no longer public. The result is a political “privativism”.

The increased activity of the state produces an expanded need for legitimation, for justification of governmental intrusion in the private sphere. At the same time, the process of administrative planning produces the unintended effect of undermining the traditional procedures of legitimation. What this means is that by planning “public programs”, such as educational, family, health, the government “publicizes” the private domain by offering technological solutions to questions, which were once
settled by traditional ethics and norms functioning in the private sphere. Yet, this “politicization” is merely an appearance. The public, having been offered the “programs” for health, housing, family planning, education, depoliticizes the process and makes it into “private” rights to have “public” health, housing, education and, indeed, welfare. The end effect is the disruption of private norms of social action and their replacement by bureaucratic procedures, which depend on political parties and their platforms. This, nonetheless, does not lead to public rights in the public sphere, but to private rights to services and conditions. It leads to privatization of the public domain. In brief, state interventionism into the private domain of this kind, into norms of action, disrupts the culturally accepted forms of behavior legitimation, translates them into the public domain, while the public depoliticizes the public domain by regarding the public functionaries and programs they establish as “private rights”. The only demands that the public tends to place on the governmental officials is the fulfillment of private welfare. But in this sense, the public legitimation of the public domain is in crisis. The public domain should remain outside of the private manipulation of interests, and yet the only function that the public officials fulfill is a private one. Since we are dealing with the domain of norms, within which traditional private sphere functioned, the disruption of such norms leads to the disruption of values, which cannot be reproduced at will. There are no administrative procedures for production of values.

They emerge and develop through long traditions. Once disrupted by bureaucratic-technocratic programs, they tend to vanish. A good example would be the publicly provided means for abortion. Everyone has a right to abortion. By such a provision, the state enters into a private sphere, which was once regulated by values. By providing a free access to abortion, the state sanctions abortion and, thus, disrupts the traditional values; and yet, it does not establish a value, since it claims that the programs are technical or bureaucratic means for the citizen to achieve private ends. But the voter, who must legitimate a political platform, is called upon to legitimate a program, which is disruptive of the citizen’s private values. While attempting to legitimate the public sphere, the voter is asked to legitimate programs, which are means for private ends inconsistent with traditional values. Indeed, the political functionaries may point out that if the voter disagrees with abortion, he/she needs not use the public program – after
all, that is his/her private business – yet, the voter is asked to endorse a program, which is against his/her values. This is to say, the voter is asked to legitimate a program, which will be used for private purposes by others, who, while initially maintaining the traditional values, may be tempted to abolish such values through the availability of such a program. In turn, those, who claim that the political domain is disrupting values, is compelled to demand that political platforms should make those values into a law, e.g., prohibiting abortion by law.

The danger of disrupting the values and meaningful norms of social interaction lies not only in the inability of administrative production of values and meanings, but, above all, in the mechanization of human decision making process, in the reification of choices in a way that the individual’s decisions are channeled into prescribed programmatic avenues. This is to say that value decisions are abolished in favor of mechanical means to achieve mechanical aims: pregnancy – public programs for abortion or laws mechanically prohibiting abortion. Welfare recipience is another variant of the same problem of legitimation. Availability of public programs tends to relieve the individual of decision and channels him/her choices into the acceptance and use of the programs. This kind of mechanization tends to create a society without values, specifically, when the governmental functionaries establish the means for solving not public, but private problems. The private decisions of values are preempted by the publicly, i.e., politically, established means or conditions to attain ends mechanically. This procedure, of course, follows our previous discussion of the technological structure of modern thought. Given certain conditions, certain results will follow; the conditions, in the political sense, are established by the state, and the private citizens are channeled to reach the results prescribed by the conditions. If this “logic” were to be taken to its conclusions, then the state would have to establish conditions in every area of social life, directing the population to fulfill mechanically the requirements established by the conditions. This purely technological process is devoid of value and meaning.

At the face value, such a process has been interpreted to be beneficial to the population. It was claimed that it constitutes far greater variety of choices for the individual to achieve his/her desires. It was claimed that the individual can choose to use the conditions if he/she needs them or
wants them and to disregard them if the conditions are irrelevant in his/her life. Yet, such an argument contradicts the liberal thesis that the individual is conditioned by his/her social environment and contradicts the conservative thesis that individuals follow their natural greed. It is presumed that the establishment of conditions is tantamount to the changing of the individual in terms of those conditions and, conservatively, that such conditions go counter to human nature, which is equally determinate. In this sense, the question of choice is redundant. Moreover, if this thesis were to be pushed to the limit, then it could be maintained that: (a) the voter cannot make any choices, since the choices are determined by the voter’s conditions or nature, (b) the political party in power should be in a position to either establish conditions, which would compel the voter to vote for the party or to propose that the individual must follow some inherent nature; (c) voting, as a legitimating process, would be redundant, since the voter is not choosing the political figures; rather, the outcome is predetermined by conditions or by nature. This, of course, is another problem in legitimation. While we are under the illusion that we are electing officials to manage the public domain, we are: (a) responding to socially established conditions or natural compulsions; (b) “electing” officials, whose only function is to augment conditions for the private domain; (c) “electing” officials, whose aim is to fulfill their private aims and/or natural inclinations.

The mechanization of the public domain, its programming for the “benefits” of private lives, abolishes the public domain. After all, the public domain is the sphere of a free forum on how to manage common affairs in a rational way. Yet, with the mechanization of the public domain, its sole function is to adjudicate the ways that conditions are established for various and competing private interests, “who gets what”. The “public” officials, who are temporarily in the driver’s seat, are in a position to dispense favors not on the basis of values or social norms or on rational grounds, but on the basis of technological and bureaucratic “expertise”. The public sphere becomes a process of trade-off between (i) competing private interests and (ii) between the political functionaries and their private interests and the private interests of various social groups. The problem of legitimation, of course, cannot be resolved where values and meaningful social norms are involved. After all, there cannot be trade-off of values, unless
values are reduced to material needs. One cannot say that if you surrender your principles, dealing with abortion and vote for a platform embodying public abortion programs, you will get a program for better housing. Even if the legitimation crisis, in the domain of public distribution of economic wealth, can be covered over, where the privatization of the public domain is not noticed, it is impossible to cover over the legitimation crisis in the public domain of values by the technocratic means.

An attempted disregard of values and meaningful social norms by the political functionaries do not solve, but rather delay the question of legitimation crisis. If the social individuals are motivated by their culturally developed values and meaningful norms of interaction, the motivations, provided by the political sphere in terms of technical programs, clash with the values. Metaphorically speaking, it is a confrontation of spirit and matter. The tragedy is that under liberal interpretation of the social fabric, matter must win, since the theory of social conditioning claims that the material factors determine and, indeed, change our spiritual motivations. But in this case, the state, the political public domain loses all claims to value and moral justification and responsibility. Legitimation crisis, in this sense, is a moral and a value crisis.

It is possible, thus, to decipher a motivational crisis in the public and its willingness to participate in the public domain. If socio-cultural value motivations play a role in the legitimation of public and political domain and if this domain obliterates values in favor of material programs, then the motivation for participating in public affairs may diminish drastically. “I am not going to vote for a platform which offers abortion programs funded by public funds”. After all, the funds are going to be employed for the propagation of a perceived private immorality. It is, thus, comprehensible that a motivation for participating in the legitimation of the platform may be absent. This lack of motivation can be generalized to include other public factors. If the individual adheres to a traditionally maintained work ethic, he/she will find no reason to vote for a platform, the only concern of which is to establish public programs, which pay private citizens for their non-productivity or unwillingness to engage in useful work.
Postscript

Throughout this chapter, there appeared a tension between the public and the private-social, such that while the distinction between them is posited in principle, it begins to blur with the vast input of technocracy, intrusion of the public in the private and appearance of the private in the public and, thus, a mixture of public/private. Yet, the basic issue that frames this tension is the efforts to adjudicate and balance between freedom and equality. Pure “market” leads to drastic and even increasing inequalities, but equalizing economic positions leads to accusations of discarding freedom. After all, the modern Political Enlightenment has an arche that each person is equal and free to follow his own purposes, to engage in enterprises, lead an unobstructed life, and yet those, who lose their equality due to the advancement of the free talents of others, their “doing better” than others, claim that equality is lost and demand an equalization of social domain by publically established rules. Lithuania after the revolution has been indeed tensed between these two, initially identical, aspects of the Political Enlightenment. Once technocracy and market forces enter, the balancing of freedom and equality becomes intensified, leading on all sides for either public intervention or calls for exclusion of the public/political from private affairs. To see this issue in deeper and broader dimensions, it will be necessary to disclose Lithuania’s presence in European Union and the latter’s role in the context of the logic of globalization. And this is the task of the next volume.

Suggested Reading

Habermas, J. Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
The fall of the Soviet Union and the political, cultural and economic shift of Lithuania toward western European world requires complex analyses of the philosophical context in which such a shift could take place. The context is modern western civilization, consisting of two life worlds, established under the names of Political and Scientific Enlightenments. One major task of the text consists of a disclosure of the founding principles of these two life worlds to note both, their common ground and their seemingly irreconcilable divergence. In the text it is argued that the Soviet grand experiment is founded on a specific interpretation of Scientific Enlightenment that led to the invention of a theory called "Dialectical Materialism" and its consequent reduction of all events to "material explanation".

The text also contains strict analyses of the Marxian, Soviet paradigm, called "Dialectical Materialism" and shows the impossibility to maintain such a paradigm without contradictions. If the contradictions are to be avoided, then this paradigm must allow Political Enlightenment as the ground without which the Soviet experiment is doomed to failure.

Finally the text shows that Lithuanian proclamation of independence from Soviet Union opens the principles of Political Enlightenment and "joins" Western Europe as a site where autonomous and equal citizens become the basis of any government. Indeed, the text points to an issue which is unresolved: the materialism of the "free market" that demands "freedom" but abolishes equality and thus creates a fundamental tension in current Lithuania between the fundamental and inseparable aspects: freedom and equality.

UDK 321.6/.8

Algis Mickunas

MODERN WEST: TWO LIFE WORLDS
Monograph

Layout Daiva Šepetauskaitė

SL 585, 2013 12 09.
Number of copies published 150. Order 21 076.

Mykolas Romeris University
20 Ateities str., Vilnius
Website: www.mruni.eu
E-mail: leidyba@mruni.eu

Prepared by JSC “Baltijos kopija”
Kareivių str. 13B, Vilnius, Lithuania
Website: www.kopija.lt
E-mail: info@kopija.lt

Printed by JSC “Vitae Litera”
Kurpių str. 5–3, Kaunas
Website: www.bpg.lt
E-mail: info@bpg.lt